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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent evolution of case law construing how the fourth
amendment applies to suspected illegal aliens has been significant.
Against the backdrop of an increasingly serious illegal immigration
problem, the restrictions on the activities of law enforcement agen-
cies seeking to address this problem have been somewhat lessened.
The interplay of the fourth amendment with the enforcement of
immigration laws presents sensitive and often unspoken concerns
about the validity of using race as a primary factor in approaching,
detaining, or arresting suspects. These same concerns are often
raised in the criminal law enforcement context. Courts have effec-
tively lessened the focus on racial aspects of law enforcement efforts
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by, among other things, expanding the concept of consensual en-
counters; that is, the courts may avoid implicating the fourth amend-
ment in a large number of cases by presuming that most law en-
forcement contacts are voluntary encounters with the targets of the
inquiry freely answering questions or consenting to a search. Where
this approach is taken, it is legally unnecessary to determine whether
race played an undue part in the encounter, even if it leads to a
seizure. However, this legal expedient of engaging in the fiction of
consent where minorities are predominantly the targets of such en-
counters could lead to an erosion of trust in, and cooperation with,
law enforcement by minority group members.
Although important protections against unwelcome governmental
intrusions remain under the Constitution, the targets of law enforce-
ment investigations,, at least as concerns street crime, seldom know
what their rights are.
In addition, fairly recent case law has resulted in significant "clar-
ifications" as to when a "seizure" occurs. As this article discusses,
the point at which a seizure occurs is often crucial in assessing
whether the fourth amendment has been observed and whether the
Exclusionary Rule will be invoked to bar admission of statements or
other evidence. As a result, the courts may be providing people less
protection from governmental intrusion by simply reevaluating when
a seizure has occurred. Finally, although it has been generally as-
sumed that the fourth amendment protects all within the United
States from unreasonable searches and seizures, language in a recent
Supreme Court decision1 has called this proposition into question.
That case involved a challenge to evidence uncovered in a search of
-the defendant's residence in Mexico. The defendant was a Mexican
national, and after a search was undertaken of the defendant's resi-
dence in Mexico by United States agents in cooperation with Mexi-
can authorities, the defendant was forcibly brought to the United
States for trial.2 While the precise issue before the Court involved
the applicability of the fourth amendment to extra-territorial
searches, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated in
dictum that the Court had not squarely ruled on whether illegal
aliens enjoy the protections of the fourth amendment. He noted that
the Court's decision in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza3 did not dictate that
the fourth amendment protected such persons; it merely assumed
1. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
2. Id. at 1059.
3. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
that the fourth amendment applied.4 Two justices of the five-member
majority were careful to disassociate themselves from this dictum.
Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, disagreed with the major-
ity's assertion that the term "the people" in the fourth amendment
was limited to those with a voluntary attachment to the United
States.5 Further, Justice Kennedy stated that if the search in ques-
tion "had occurred in a residence within the United States, I have
little doubt that the full protections of the fourth amendment would
apply."6 Also, Justice Stevens gently chided the "sweeping" lan-
guage of the majority. Justice Brennan, in dissent, further criticized
this dictum.'
An analysis of these and other leading cases is of particular impor-
tance to both the enforcers of the immigration laws and the targets
of that enforcement. Some general principles can be distilled from
recent cases regarding fourth amendment restrictions on efforts to
detect and deport undocumented aliens. This article identifies and
discusses the various legal theories currently being used to avoid con-
sideration of arbitrary law enforcement methods, especially the
targeting of racial minorities as suspects.
It has been widely debated in journalistic and legal circles whether
the perceived lessening of fourth amendment protections is war-
ranted to address so-called public exigencies. This debate is nowhere
more spirited than in the battle against illegal immigration.
4. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1064-65.
5. Id. at 1067 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
6. Id. at 1067-68 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
7. Id. at 1068. Justice Stevens also stated, "Nor is comment on illegal aliens' enti-
tlement to the protections of the fourth amendment necessary to resolve this case." Id. at
1068 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring).
8. [T]he Court implicitly suggests that the fourth amendment may not protect
illegal aliens in the United States. Numerous lower courts, however, have held
that illegal aliens in the United States are protected by the fourth amendment,
and not a single lower court has held to the contrary.
Id. at 1070 n.6 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
While Chief Justice Rehnquist's dictum may signal his openness to consider the ques-
tion of undocumented aliens' fourth amendment protections, his statements clearly carry
no weight as law or precedent. Further, under the facts at issue, there was no question
that the defendant was an alien with no voluntary ties to the United States. Justice
Rehnquist implies that it may be an open question whether in cases where alienage is not
in dispute, the alien can thereafter claim the Amendment's protections. But, in most
cases, the privacy interests of United States citizens would be implicated in the effort to
determine who may or may not be legally in this country. Thus, the Chief Justice's dic-
tum is of even more limited import.
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II. EXEMPTIONS FROM FOURTH AMENDMENT PROHIBITION
AGAINST "UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES"
A. Stops and Interrogations at International Border or Its
"Functional Equivalent" Are Not Covered by the Fourth
Amendment
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that this
country has an inherent right to protect its borders. Thus, searches
at the international border are not "embraced within the prohibition
of the [fourth] amendment." 9 The Court has explained that:
Border searches, then, from before the adoption of the fourth amendment,
have been considered to be "reasonable" by the single fact that the person
or item in question had entered into our country from outside. There has
never been any additional requirement that the reasonableness of a border
search depended on the existence of probable cause. This longstanding rec-
ognition that searches at our borders without probable cause and without a
warrant are nonetheless "reasonable" has a history as old as the fourth
amendment itself.10
The Government's broad power to conduct searches and seizures
at the international border is premised, inter alia, on Congress' au-
thority under the Constitution "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations."'" The Supreme Court has sanctioned a detention that ex-
ceeded sixteen hours at the border of a person whom the Govern-
ment suspected of smuggling contraband in her alimentary canal.'2
It was noted that this went beyond a routine search, but the Court
upheld the legality of the detention.
We hold that the detention of a traveler- at the border, beyond the scope of
a routine search and inspection, is justified at its inception if customs
agents, considering all the facts surrounding the traveler and her trip, rea-
sonably suspect that the traveler is smuggling contraband in her alimentary
canal.13
Given that the Government's power of search and detention is great-
est at the border, and that the nation is experiencing a crisis of drug
smuggling, the Court found that the traveler's diminished expecta-
9. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 622 (1977)(quoting Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 150 (1925)).
10. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619.
1I. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. United States v. Montoya De Hernandez, 473
U.S. 531 ,(1985) (invokes this provision of the Constitution as the Government's author-
ity to conduct border searches).
12. United States v. Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541.
13. Id. The Court declined, however, to address whether aliens have lesser consti-
tutional protections at the border and what level of suspicion is required for nonroutine
border searches, such as strip, body-cavity, or involuntary X-ray searches. Id. at 541 n.4.
tion of privacy at the border was not unduly impinged.14
Although the detention took place more than sixteen hours before
the Government sought a warrant, and although the woman was
held incommunicado, the Court held that the procedures were not
unconstitutional. 15 The Court reasoned that the woman, who was de-
tained pending a bowel movement so that her feces could be ex-
amined for drugs, could have submitted to an X-ray and avoided the
rather prolonged detention." The Court stressed the Government's
broad power to protect the nation from entrants who may bring a
harmful condition, e.g., communicable diseases, or items of contra-
band.1 7
With regard to searches of persons seeking to enter this country,
the governing statute reads as follows:
Any officer or employee of the [Immigration and Naturalization] Service
authorized and designated under regulations prescribed by the Attorney
General, whether individually or as one of a class, shall have power to con-
duct a search, without warrant, of the person, and of the personal effects in
the possession of any person seeking admission to the United States, con-
cerning whom such officer or employee may have reasonable cause to sus-
pect that grounds exist for exclusion from the United States under this
Chapter which would be disclosed by such search.18
The pertinent regulation provides that:
Any immigration officer is hereby authorized to exercise anywhere in the
United States all the powers conferred by section 287 of the Act. 19
Thus, in enforcing the immigration laws, Service officers are empow-
ered to search, without warrant, persons (and their personal effects)
seeking to enter this country if there is "reasonable cause to suspect"
that such persons are excludable 0 and that a search would disclose
evidence relating thereto. For the reasons set forth above, persons
attempting to enter the United States may not rely on the fourth
amendment to object to searches.
The same reasoning that authorizes border searches without prob-
able cause authorizes such searches at "functional equivalents" of
the border. The Supreme Court first used this phase in 1973.21 In
dictum, the Court noted that the broad search authority at the inter-
national border might be extended to similar situations:
14. Id. at 538-40.
15. Id. at 535, 544.
16. Id. at 543.
17. Id. at 544.
18. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(c) (1982).
19. 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(c) (1991).
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1982) (lists 33 classes of aliens excludable from admission
to the United States.) It is not uncommon for INS officers to search the person and
property of certain nonimmigrant visitors for evidence that the person intends to remain
indefinitely in this country. Letters concerning employment or living arrangements may
be probative of whether one is intending immigration with appropriate documents.
21. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
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[S]earches at an established station near the border, at a point marking the
confluence of two or more roads that extend from the border, might be
functional equivalents of border searches. For another example, a search of
the passengers and cargo of an airplane arriving at a St. Louis airport after
a nonstop flight -from Mexico City would clearly be the functional
equivalent of a border search. 22
Lower courts were left with the responsibility of defining what con-
stituted a "functional equivalent" of the border.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in an expansive and thorough
decision, offered a reconsidered analysis of what constitutes a func-
tional border equivalent.23 The court reversed its prior decisions
which held that a particular fixed checkpoint fourteen miles from the
Mexican border was a functional border equivalent at which plenary
searches could be conducted without regard to the fourth amend-
ment.24 The checkpoint, operated by the U.S. Border Patrol, was es-
tablished to check vehicle occupants for citizenship and immigration
status.25 The court admitted that its earlier decisions confused the
functional equivalency concept with reasonableness under the fourth
amendment.
[T]his circuit's designation "functional equivalent of the border" has been
founded on the fourth amendment's "rule of reason," in light of the "stag-
gering" problem of aliens entering the United States illegally, and with the
impossibility of stemming this illegal tide by patrolling the full length of the
nation's expansive southern border with Mexico cited as justification for
searches away from the border. However, contrary to the "exigent circum-
stances" analysis of our cases, the constitutionality of searches conducted at
a border equivalent does not depend on a fourth amendment analysis. ...
The constitutional basis for searches at border checkpoints is fundamentally
different from the basis for "stops" at checkpoints in the interior of the
United States. Our cases have erred in confusing the two. 28
In issuing its new definition, the court stated that to constitute a
functional border equivalent:
[T]he government must demonstrate with "reasonable certainty" that the
traffic passing through the checkpoint is "international" in character. In
practical terms, this test means that border equivalent checkpoints intercept
no more than a negligible number of domestic travelers.27
Under this test, the checkpoint in question was determined not to be
a functional border equivalent. As a consequence, a search of the
22. Id. at 272-73.
23. United States v. Jackson, 825 F.2d 853 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 1011, 1019 (1988).
24. Id. at 854
25. Id. at 855-56.
26. Id. at 857-58.
27. Id. at 860 (citations omitted).
vehicles passing through the checkpoint may not be made absent
probable cause or consent. However, as discussed below, certain re-
strictions on vehicular movement through fixed checkpoints may be
made without probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
B. Consensual Encounters with Law Enforcement Officers Versus
Seizures Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment
In Terry v. Ohio,28 the Court articulated two important principles.
First, not all contacts between law enforcement officers and the gen-
eral public constitute seizures within the meaning of the fourth
amendment.2 9 Second, some seizures that involve relatively modest
intrusions on an individual's freedom (brief detention for question-
ing) require only a reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause.
We are here concerned with the first of these principles. The stated
rule is that a "seizure" occurs only when an officer, by force or show
of authority, restrains the liberty of an individual. Despite this stan-
dard, it is not always easy to determine when one's liberty is
restrained.
The Supreme Court has indicated that it will employ a weighty
presumption that encounters between individuals and law enforce-
ment officers are consensual and accordingly do not implicate the
fourth amendment. In INS v. Delgado,30 the Court disagreed with
the court of appeals, which held that Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service agents had displayed their authority in such a manner
that a reasonable person would not have felt that he or she was free
to leave.31 The Supreme Court ruled that when INS agents checked
factories for illegal aliens, they did not effect a detention or seizure
under the fourth amendment by questioning factory workers about
their right to be in the, United States.32 In January and September of
1977, the INS, armed with warrants, conducted a "factory survey"
of the work force at Southern California Davis Pleating Company,
searching for illegal aliens.3 3 Although no particular aliens were
named, the warrants were issued on a showing of probable cause
that numerous illegal aliens were employed at the company.34 A
third factory survey was conducted with the employer's consent in
October 1977 at Mr. Pleat, another garment factory.35 The Court
described the actions of the INS officers as follows:
28. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
29. Id. at 16.
30. 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
31. Id. at 217.
32. Id. at 218.
33. Id. at 212.
34. Id.
35. Id.
[VOL 28: 499. 1991] The Fourth Amendment and the INS
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
At the beginning of the surveys several agents positioned themselves near
the buildings' exits, while other agents dispersed throughout the factory to
question most, but not all, employees at their work stations. The agents
displayed badges, carried walkie-talkies, and were armed, although at no
point during any of the surveys was a weapon ever drawn. Moving system-
atically through the factory, the agents approached employees and, after
identifying themselves, asked them from one to three questions relating to
their citizenship. If the employee gave a credible reply that he was a United
States citizen, the questioning ended, and the agent moved on to another
employee. If the employee gave an unsatisfactory response or admitted that
he was an alien, the employee was asked to produce his immigration papers.
During the survey, employees continued with their work and were free to
walk around within the factory."8
Respondents, two United States citizens and two permanent resi-
dent aliens, challenged the constitutionality of the factory surveys
and sought declaratory and injunctive relief.3 7 They argued that the
surveys violated their fourth amendment right to be free from unrea-
sonable searches or seizures, as well as the equal protection guaran-
tees of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 3 The district
court ruled that respondents had no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy at their work places, and, as a result, they did not have stand-
ing to challenge INS entry pursuant to a warrant or owner's con-
sent.39 The court further found that each of the respondents was
asked a question or questions by an INS agent during one of the
factory surveys.40 Applying the rule of Terry v. Ohio, the court con-
cluded that law enforcement officers may ask questions of anyone
and that none of the respondents had been detained under the fourth
amendment during the factory surveys, either when they were ques-
tioned or otherwise.4 Accordingly, the court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the INS, implicitly concluding that since respon-
dents' fourth amendment rights were not violated, neither were their
rights under the fifth amendment.42 However, the court of appeals
reversed, holding that the entire work force was seized for the one-
to two-hour duration of each survey because the stationing of agents
at the building's doors showed that "a reasonable worker 'would
have believed that he was not free to leave.' -4 The court ruled that
questioning individual respondents violated the fourth amendment
36. Id. at 212-13.




41. Id. at 213-14.
42. Id. at 214.
43. Id. (quoting United States v. Anderson, 663 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1981)).
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because there was no reasonable suspicion or probable cause as to
any of them."' In this connection, the court held that reasonable sus-
picion or probable cause to believe that a number of illegal aliens
were working at a particular factory was insufficient to justify ques-
tioning any individual employee.45
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court began its analysis by
stating that "the fourth amendment does not proscribe all contact
between the police and citizens, but is designed 'to prevent arbitrary
and oppressive interference by law enforcement officials with the pri-
vacy and personal security of individuals.' "46
Quoting from Terry v. Ohio,47 the Court stated that "[o]nly when
the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has re-
strained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a 'seizure' has
occurred. '48 The Court further noted that "an initially consensual
encounter between a police officer and a citizen can be transformed
into a seizure or detention within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment, 'if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave.' -49
The Court then indicated that an interrogation relating to one's
identity or a request for identification by a law enforcement officer
does not, by itself, constitute a fourth amendment seizure. However,
the Court cited Brown v. Texas50 for the proposition that a person
has the right to refuse to cooperate with law enforcement officers
and that if this right is exercised, the officers must have a reasonable
suspicion of misconduct to detain the person to determine identity or
for any other purpose.51
From these principles, the Court found that the conduct of the
INS officers "should have given respondents no reason to believe that
they would be detained if they gave truthful answers to the questions
put to them or if they simply refused to answer."52
44. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 214.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 215 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554
(1976)).
47. 392 U.S. at 19, n.16 (1968).
48. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 215.
49. Id. (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 549 (1980)).
50. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
51. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216.
52. Id. at 218. In addressing the fact that other persons, seeking to flee or evade
the agents, were detained, the Court stated that the respondents could litigate only what
happened to them. Id. at 220-21. The Court, however, carefully avoided discussion of the
relevancy of these other events to whether a reasonable person witnessing them would
have believed she was free to simply walk away or to decline to answer. Justice Brennan's
dissent criticizes the majority's "fanciful" approach of considering each interrogation in
isolation. Id. at 229-30 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In United States v. Levetan, 729 F.
Supp. 891 (D.D.C. 1990) (per Flannery), the court in concluding that a reasonable per-
508
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The Court described the factory surveys as follows:
The record indicates that when these surveys were initiated, the employees
were about their ordinary business, operating machinery and performing
other job assignments. While the surveys caused some disruption, including
the efforts of some workers to hide, the record also indicates that workers
were not prevented by the agents from moving about the factories.
Respondents argue, however, that the stationing of agents near the fac-
tory doors showed the INS's intent to prevent people from leaving. But
there is nothing in the record indicating that this is what the agents at the
doors actually did. The obvious purpose of the agents' presence at the fac-
tory doors was to insure that all persons in the factories were questioned.
The record indicates that the INS agents' conduct in this case consisted
simply of questioning employees and arresting those they had probable
cause to believe were unlawfully present in the factory.53
Based on these facts, the Court concluded that the questioning of
each respondent by INS agents was merely a brief consensual en-
counter. 54 The Court acknowledged that persons other than the re-
spondents who sought to flee or evade the agents may have been de-
tained for questioning. 55  However, the Court noted that the
respondents did not do so and were not detained. 56 Thus, the Court
concluded that respondents could litigate only what happened to
them, and that their encounters with the agents were "classic con-
sensual encounters rather than fourth amendment seizures. ' '57
son would have felt he was not free to walk away from a police encounter, noted that one
factor in its decision was that the police advised the individual that others were being
questioned. The court stated, "A reasonable person is unlikely to believe that he alone
can walk away from police when he is one of a group of persons being questioned." Id. at
901. This conclusion seems all the more reasonable when others evading questioning are
forcibly detained.
53. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 218. The Court stated that positioning agents at the
factory doors did not indicate that the agents intended to prevent people from leaving.
Rather, the agents' purpose was to "insure that all persons in the factories were ques-
tioned." Id. However, if the questioning depended upon the voluntary cooperation of the
workers, it would have appeared more consistent with voluntariness if an announcement
were made inviting persons to talk with the agents instead of placing agents at the exits.
•Also, the fact that some employees tried to hide strongly suggests that they did not be-
lieve that they had the right to refuse to answer questions with impunity.
54. Id. at 219.
55. Id. at 220.
56. Id. at 220-21.
57. Id. at 221. While the Court did not directly address the question, it has been
recognized that flight or attempted evasion of uniformed immigration officers by one with
whom a consensual encounter is attempted provides reasonable suspicion to justify a brief
detention for questioning or investigation. Lee v. INS, 590 F.2d 497, 502 (3d Cir. 1979);
Au Yi Lau v. INS, 445 F.2d 217, 223, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864
(1971); See also Marquez v. Kiley, 436 F. Supp. 100, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (the court
cited Au Yi Lau for this principle). Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 482-83
(1963) (before flight can show guilty knowledge there must be clear and sufficient identi-
fication of the law enforcement officer's office or mission). But in Delgado, the Court
Thus, Delgado explicates the rule of Terry v. Ohio.58 It reaffirms
the principle that an individual is "seized" if a reasonable person
would not have felt free to disregard the questioning and walk away.
This belief may be premised on either "physical force or a show of
authority." 59 However, the Court has made clear in Delgado that it
will not easily find a show of authority so great as to overcome the
presumption that "most citizens will [voluntarily] respond to a police
request. '60 The Court concluded that the respondents had no reason
to believe that they could not, with impunity, "simply refuse to an-
stated the rule of Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), that "absent some reasonable
suspicion of misconduct, the detention of [a person] to determine his identity violated
[his] right to be free from an unreasonable seizure." Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216.
58. The general rule for forcible Terry stops of suspected undocumented aliens was
stated in Au Yi Lau v. INS, 445 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864
(1971). The court observed that because forcible detentions are "far greater intrusions
upon personal privacy than ... nonforcible approaches, and since aliens in this country
are sheltered by the Fourth Amendment in common with citizens," constitutional princi-
ples applicable in similar detentions in other law enforcement contexts govern. Delgado,
466 U.S. at 223. Thus, it was held that immigration officers may make "forcible deten-
tions of a temporary nature for the purposes of interrogation under circumstances creat-
ing a reasonable suspicion; not arising to the level of probable cause to arrest, that the
individual so detained is illegally in this country." Id. However, such determinations
must be made on a case-by-case basis. Id.
59. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 19 n.16.
60. 466 U.S. at 216. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented from
the majority's conclusion that a reasonable person would not, under the circumstances of
the factory surveys, have felt free to disregard the questioning and walk away. Justice
Brennan strongly criticized the majority's decision on this point as reflecting a "studied
air of unreality" and as being achieved through "a considerable feat of legerdemain." Id.
at 226 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Other jurists have criticized the majority's reasoning. See, e.g., People v. Lopez, 212
Cal. App. 3d 289, 260 Cal. Rptr. 641 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989), review denied by California
Supreme Court on October 12, 1989, cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1122 (1990). In Lopez, the
California Court of Appeal grudgingly reversed the trial judge's ruling that Lopez had
been seized. The court stated:
If undocumented aliens would believe themselves free to go despite an immi-
gration official's request for identification, a notion difficult for us to accept,
Lopez could hardly have felt different. He at least should have been able to
count on a winning suppression motion had he refused to produce identification
or attempted to depart and been searched as a result. Under the rule currently
in effect, however, his cooperation with the officers was his downfall.
Id. at 293, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 644. Judge Crosby, who wrote the opinion for the California
court, then went on to more strongly express his views in a concurring opinion. He stated:
The instincts of the trial judge were absolutely correct. In the real world, this
defendant could not possibly have felt himself free to walk away when his iden-
tification was requested, and it is almost laughable to think the officers would
have let him do so. (Citations omitted). Nevertheless, a solid majority of the
United States Supreme Court is of the view that ordinary citizens and even
undocumented aliens confronted by immigration officials would be aware that
they could merely saunter off when asked to identify themselves and produce
confirming documents. (INS v. Delgado (1984) (citation omitted)). The same
majority also believes law enforcement agents would allow them to do so, an-
other highly dubious proposition. (Citations omitted.)
Id. at 294, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 644 (Crosby, J., concurring).
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swer."61 Further, the Court indicated that "interrogation relating to
one's identity or a request for identification by the police does not, by
itself, constitute a fourth amendment seizure. '6 2
The INS, apparently seeking to see how far the courts would go in
finding encounters with law enforcement officers to be "consensual,"
pressed the "consensual encounter" concept and was challenged in
LaDuke v. Nelson.63 In this case the INS appealed, among other
things, the district court's ruling that the INS had effected a seizure
of occupants of migrant farm housing. The court affirmed the dis-
trict court's factual findings that uniformed Service officers ap-
proached or surrounded residences with emergency vehicles with
flashing lights, awakened the occupants, and stationed officers at all
doors and windows. Residents who exited the housing were appre-
hended, detained, and interrogated. 4 Further, the record showed in-
cidents of forcible intrusion, either physically or with flashlights, into
the housing units.65 The court noted that one agent testified that his
"customary procedure" for obtaining consent was to grasp the belt
of a person. Another agent awakened a woman sleeping in her bed-
room and pulled the covers off her to determine if she was alone.66
The court in LaDuke had no problem concluding that a seizure of
the housing units had been made, noting that, unlike Delgado, this
incident occurred at homes and not the workplace, and there was no
warrant, unlike the facts in Delgado.67
The teaching of Delgado is that immigration officers may ap-
proach, question, ask for identification, and engage in other "consen-
sual encounters" with persons in public places or in places the of-
ficers are authorized to be. There is no requirement that persons
questioned be told that "they are free not to respond. 68 In fact, per-
sons so questioned are free not to respond or listen to the officers.
Furthermore, the exercise of this right cannot serve to justify even a
brief seizure.
61. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 218.
62. Id. at 216.
63. LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318 (9th Cir. 1985), modified on other grounds,
796 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1986).
64. LaDuke, 762 F.2d at 1327.
65. Id. at 1327-28.
66. Id. at 1328 n.13.
67. It is, however, interesting that the INS read Delgado so expansively as to ar-
gue that the encounters were consensual.
68. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216.
i. Vehicle Stop Usually Does Not Involve a Consensual
Encounter
It is important to note that Delgado involved a situation where the
subjects of the officers' questions were approached on foot in a public
area, where the officers had a right to be. By contrast, vehicle stops,
with the exceptions noted below, do not involve consensual en-
counters. Such stops, at a border, its functional equivalent, or at
fixed checkpoints away from the border,69 constitute a significant in-
trusion on movement,70 and thus require a "reasonable suspicion
based on specific articulable facts" that the vehicle's occupants are
illegal aliens.7 1 Hispanic appearance and presence in an area where
illegal aliens frequently travel are not enough to justify a stop to
interrogate the occupants of a vehicle.72 Further, as discussed below,
vague assertions of expertise in identifying vehicles containing illegal
aliens will not suffice. Instead, as noted by Nicacio v. United States,
there must be "specific articulable facts" to justify the stop.73 In this
connection, the court, citing numerous cases, ruled that the failure of
vehicle occupants to make eye contact with INS officers is insuffi-
cient; it is not indicative of illegal alienage 4.7
ii. Stopping Vehicles and Questioning Occupants: The
Procedure of Roving Border Patrol Operations Seeking
to Detect Undocumented Aliens
Nicacio v. United States75 held that "[s]tops of persons traveling
in automobiles are 'seizures' within the meaning of the fourth
amendment." 76 The court stated that to justify a vehicle stop, "Im-
migration agents on a roving patrol may stop a vehicle only when
they have a reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable
facts that the vehicle contains aliens who may be illegally in this
country." 77 Further, reasonable suspicion must be based on objective
69. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (authorizes limited in-
trusions on movement at fixed checkpoints).
70. As one judge succinctly explained: "Vehicle stops ... always involve an invol-
untary detention and are much more serious intrusions than street interrogations." Illi-
nois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 540 F.2d 1062, 1076 (7th Cir. 1976) (Tone, J.,
dissenting).
71. Nicacio v. INS, 797 F.2d 700, 702 (9th Cir. 1985).
72. Id. at 703. This rule was clearly established in United States v. Cortez, 449
U.S. 411, 417 (1981), and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975).
See also Ramirez v. Webb, 599 F. Supp. 1278 (D.C. Mich. 1984), afd, 787 F.2d 592(6th Cir. 1986) (vehicle stops implicate the fourth amendment and require more than
Hispanic appearance of vehicle's occupants).
73. Nicacio, 797 F.2d 700, 705 (9th Cir. 1986).
74. Id. at 704.
75. 797 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1986).
76. Id. at 702 (9th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).
77. Id. (citing, among others, Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 8731 884 (1975)).
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"articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those
facts. 17 8 The facts cited in seeking to support a reasonable suspicion
must distinguish characteristics of aliens illegally in this country
from citizens and aliens legally here. That is, a forcible detention
may be made only when there is "a reasonable suspicion based on
specific and articulable facts that the vehicle contains aliens who
may be illegally in this country."7 9 While an agent's experience may
be pertinent in assessing whether reasonable suspicion exists,
hunches and intuition will not suffice. Rather, reasonable suspicion
must be premised upon articulable facts, measured against an objec-
tive reasonable person standard as opposed to the subjective impres-
sions of a particular officer.80
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,81 the Court ruled that the
U.S. Border Patrol requires a reasonable suspicion to stop vehicles in
areas near the Mexican border to question the occupants about their
citizenship and immigration status. Recognizing that there is a
strong public interest in meeting the problem of illegal immigration,
the Court stated that a modest intrusion of stopping a vehicle near
the border to ask its occupants whether they were legally in the
country did not require a finding of probable cause. Instead, the
Court balanced the public interest in apprehending aliens illegally in
this country against individual privacy interests and found, "when an
officer's observations lead him reasonably to suspect that a particular
vehicle may contain aliens who are illegally in the country, he may
stop the car briefly and investigate the circumstances that provoke
suspicion. ' '12 The officer may question the vehicle's occupants about
"their citizenship and immigration status, and he may ask them to
explain suspicious circumstances, but any further detention or search
must be based on consent or probable cause."8' 3
The Court then summarized some of the factors upon which a rea-
sonable suspicion has been found. For example, particular types of
vehicles, traffic patterns, and evasive action of vehicle occupants
have been sufficient to support reasonable suspicion. 4 However, in
78. Nicacio, 797 F.2d at 705.
79. Id. at 702 (citations omitted).
80. Id. at 702-03. See also United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384, 1387 (9th Cir.
1987) (fourth amendment stop based on hunches alone will not withstand constitutional
scrutiny).
81. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
82. Id. at 881.
83. Id. at 881-82.
84. Id. at 884-85.
each case, the totality of the particular circumstances has to be con-
sidered.85 The Court ruled that appearance of Mexican descent may
be a factor in the reasonable suspicion requirement, but that this
factor standing alone was an insufficient basis to stop a vehicle. 86
Nacacio v. INS87 states that Brignoni-Ponce and its progeny make
clear that Hispanic appearance and presence in an area where illegal
aliens frequently travel are insufficient to justify a stop to interrogate
a vehicle's occupants. 88
One case offering a thorough analysis of whether an investigatory
vehicle stop in a border area was supported by a "founded suspicion"
is United States v. Cortez."9 In this case, the Border Patrol had en-
gaged in a solid and well-reasoned investigation. They had tied to-
gether various facts and inferences to show it was reasonable to
make the limited stop. A review of this case may offer some insight
into what a Court will view as sufficient suspicion to make an investi-
gatory vehicle stop.
C. Some Lower Courts Have Sought to Narrowly Interpret
What Constitutes a Consensual Encounter
The pervasive drug problem in this country has prompted some
law enforcement agencies to randomly approach persons on board
public transportation or in other places and, after advising them of
the area's problem with drugs, ask questions of the person, including
consent to search the person and his or her belongings. 90 These
surveys have been described as "inconvenient, intrusive, and
intimidating." 91
Because of the intrusiveness of these sweeps, many lower courts
have attempted to call these police encounters non-consensual and
thus bar their use under the fourth amendment. 92 For example, in
United States v. Winston,93 the district court ruled that the approach
85. Id. at 885 n.10.
86. Id. at 886-87.
87. 797 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1986).
88. Id. at 703. See also Ramirez v. Webb, 599 F. Supp. 1278, 1282 (W.D. Mich
1984), afd, 787 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1986) (Hispanic appearance insufficient to stop vehi-
cle for investigation).
89. 449 U.S. 411 (1981).
90. See Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2389-90 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (describes how this police procedure works and cites numerous cases that have dealt
with such sweeps).
91. Id. at 2390 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 2390-91 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (highlights lower court decisions
which have ruled that these sweeps violated the fourth amendment). The dissent stated
that "[riemarkably the courts located at the heart of the 'drug war' [the lower courts]
have been the most adamant in condeming this technique." Id. at 2390 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
93. 892 F.2d 112 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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drug enforcement team members used constituted such a show of
authority that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave. The
court of appeals, however, reversed. The court of appeals acknowl-
edged that the "assumption that ordinary citizens actually believe
they are free to walk away from police officers" has been criticized
as "artificial. ' 94 The court responded, however, that:
The well-established test ... is. not whether a person interviewed by the
police would find himself psychologically compelled to cooperate with an
officer's requests, but whether such a person Would reasonably conclude, as
a consequence of the officer's show of authority and other relevant circum-
stances, that he was not at liberty to leave. s
The court stressed that throughout the encounter, the officer "used a
polite and conversational tone of voice" and "made no physical con-
tact" prior to defendant's arrest.9 6
Nevertheless, lower courts continue to find that seizures occur be-
cause of the show of authority by government agents. Some seize
upon the slightest distinction to avoid higher court precedent. This
seems to indicate a basic disagreement with INS v. Delgado.97 These
courts evidently feel uneasy with an operation where law enforce-
ment officers approach passengers aboard public transportation,
94. Id. at 118.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 114, 117.
97. See, e.g., United States v. Montilla, No. Cr-89-142C (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 22,
1990) (agents held defendants' identification when requesting permission to search, and
agents, rather than defendant, opened bag); United States v. Felder, 732 F. Supp. 204
(D.D.C. 1990) (search on bus where one officer stood at door of bus while others ap-
proached passengers, blocking defendant in confined space in his seat, and subjecting
persons refusing "consent" to further scrutiny at later stops); United States v. Levetan,
729 F. Supp. 891 (D.D.C. 1990) (officers held defendant's train ticket while search con-
ducted, suggested they were searching others on train and that they might hold train
until search complete).
In United States v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1990), the court reversed two
district court rulings which concluded that a seizure occurred where law enforcement
officers boarded a commercial bus at an intermediate stop and asked cooperation of pas-
sengers in the "war on drugs" by consenting to a search of their persons and baggage.
The lower court had obvious difficulty with the entire procedure. United States v. Coth-
ran, 729 F. Supp. 153 (D.D.C. 1990) (seizure occurred because officer blocked defendant
from exiting confined bus seat, and a refusal to "consent" resulted in further scrutiny at
other stops), rev'd, 921 F.2d 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v. Lewis, 728 F. Supp.
784 (D.D.C. 1990) (seizure occurred because defendant blocked in narrow bus seat,
questioned and patted down in public after giving his "consent" despite officer's claim of
no suspicion whatsoever of criminal activity), rev'd, 921 F.2d 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1990). The
court of appeals ruled that the confines of a narrow bus necessarily restrict the freedom
of movement of passengers being questioned. It concluded that a seizure does not occur,
despite the limiting confines of a bus, unless the particular facts suggest that a passenger
would feel that he must cooperate fully, or he would not be let alone.
question them about criminal activity, and request their "consent" to
search their persons and possessions. Such persons are somewhat of a
captive audience by being in the confined area of public transporta-
tion and may feel less freedom to refuse cooperation because the law
enforcement officers typically obtain the cooperation of the
driver-an authority figure on public transportation.
One court commented on such a program as follows:
The evidence in this case has evoked images of other days, under other
flags, when no man traveled his nation's roads or railways without fear of
unwarranted interruption, by individuals who had temporary power in the
Government. The specter of American citizens being asked, by Badge-
wielding police for identification, travel papers - in short a raison d'etre -
is foreign to any fair reading of the Constitution, and its guarantee of
human liberties. This is not Hitler's Berlin, nor Stalin's Moscow, nor is it
white supremacist South Africa .... 9
Some courts are further troubled that the "random" targeting of
suspects, in "consensual" and other encounters, actually focuses on
the less powerful, including racial minorities. 99 However, the cases
which involve racial targeting for investigative purposes address such
challenges only where a seizure has taken place. For example, in
98. United States v. Lewis, 728 F. Supp. 784, 790 (D.D.C. 1990), (quoting State
v. Kerwick, 512 So.2d 347 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987). The lower court in Bostick v.
Florida, 554 So.2d 1153, 1158 (1989), quoted this same language in striking down the
kind of bus "inspections" at issue in Lewis.
The Supreme Court in Bostick ruled that the practice of boarding a bus and asking for
consent to search was not per se so coercive as to invalidate consensual searches and
remanded for a determination whether the particular facts surrounding the encounter
suggested whether a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to decline the
officer's requests. 11 S. Ct. at 2389.
99. The court in United States v. Laymon, 730 F. Supp. 332 (D. Colo. 1990), after
an evidentiary hearing, ruled that pretexual traffic stops and subsequent efforts to obtain
consent to search were racially based. The court found a "pattern, practice and habit of
racist law enforcement." Id. at 337.
Judge Weinstein, dissenting in United States v. Patrick, 899 F.2d 169, 172 (2d Cir.
1990), stated:
[H]ad defendant [a permanent resident Jamaican] been a citizen of the middle
class (instead of a member of three minority classes by virtue of socioeconomic
status, color and alienage), the good people who guard our borders would not
have so encroached on his freedom, and this case would never have arisen.
Judge Weinstein went on to cite authorities that conclude that the decision to approach
or detain a suspect often turns on impermissible considerations of the suspect's race. Id.
at 173 (Weinstein, J., dissenting).
Also, in United States v. Lewis, 728 F. Supp. 784 (D.D.C. 1990), rev'd, 921 F.2d 1294(D.C. Cir. 1990), the lower court pointedly noted that the police's "random" questioning
of a young Black man resulted in absolutely no suspicion of illegal activity, and yet the
officer persisted and asked if he would "submit to a body search." Id. at 787; see also id.
at 790.
In a front page story, a major newspaper reported that the war on drugs has focused
on Blacks and the Black community, despite the fact that experts say that whites sell
most of the cocaine and account for 80% of its users. L.A. TImEs, Apr. 22, 1990 at 1, col.
1. The article states that many, and even some involved in law enforcement, are "warn-
ing that constitutional protections against unwarranted stops, searches, seizures and har-
assment have been all but suspended," in minority communities. Id.
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Florida v. Bostick,100 the Court found that the practice of law en-
forcement officers, without reasonable suspicion, boarding public
buses and asking passengers for consent to search their persons and
belongings did not necessarily violate the fourth amendment. How-
ever, the majority did not address whether the practice would be le-
gal if the requests for consent targeted racial minorities. Justice
Marshall in dissent, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, ex-
pressed doubt that the bus sweeps were random. He pointed out that
evidence in other cases involving this practice suggested that Blacks
were more likely to be approached and questioned than others.101
Thus, he concluded that the basis of the decision to single out partic-
ular passengers during such a sweep "is less likely to be inarticulable
than unspeakable."102
The dissent also challenged the majority's view that a reasonable
person might feel free to refuse an armed officer's request for con-
sent to search when the officer was standing over the person in the
cramped confines of a bus. Justice Marshall states:
I have no objection to the manner in which the majority frames the test for
determining whether a suspicionless bus sweep amounts to a fourth amend-
ment "seizure." I agree that the appropriate question is whether a passen-
ger who is approached during such a sweep "would feel free to decline the
officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter." What I cannot un-
derstand is how the majority can possibly suggest an affirmative answer to
this question. 10 3
This is the same concern that the dissent expressed in INS v. Del-
gado.0 1 That is, whether the average person would feel free to disre-
gard a police officer's questions or requests. This issue is at the heart
of the disagreement between the majority and the minority in Del-
galdo and Bostick. It reflects a basic difference over how the Justices
believe the public perceives and feels about the police.
In one high-profile case, baseball Hall of Fame member Joe Mor-
gan was approached by a Los Angeles police officer in the Los Ange-
les International Airport and questioned about narcotics.10 5 Joe
Morgan is black. The officer did not have reasonable suspicion
that Morgan was involved in criminal activity, yet the officer wres-
tled Morgan to the floor and ignominiously arrested and handcuffed
him. Morgan won a $540,000 lawsuit against the officer and the City
100. Florida v. Bostick, III S. Ct. 2382 (1991).
101. Bostick, I1 S. Ct. at 2390 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2391 (citation omitted).
104. 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
105. L.A. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1991, part B, at col.2.
of Los Angeles. 106 Likewise, Buffkins v. City of Omaha'07 involved a
black woman who sued the City of Omaha and two Omaha police
officers for illegally arresting her primarily because of her race. The
court of appeals reversed the trial court's dismissal of the action and
remanded for trial. In these cases, the subjects of the encounters ex-
pressed indignation at being questioned about criminal activity and
did not acquiesce to the extent that their conduct could be labeled
voluntary. These two cases wound up in court. However, one must
ask the question: how many persons are approached daily and ques-
tioned about possible criminal activity solely because of their race?
Many people simply submit to questioning and to searches so that
they may more quickly go on their way. Unfortunately, there is no
record of the number of such "consenting" individuals. Furthermore,
these cases call into question the premise of the Supreme Court, that
where there is no reasonable suspicion the person is free to simply
walk away.
Because the Court's reasonable person in the "whether a reason-
able person would feel free to decline to cooperate" test is one who
feels very little coercion during police encounters, it would be inter-
esting to determine empirically whether the average person believes
she is free to refuse to cooperate with the police. Further, if the data
proved that the Supreme Court's assumptions were wrong, it would
be interesting to see whether the Court would adjust its view of what
a reasonable person would believe.
D. Refusal to Cooperate with a "Consensual" Encounter
In Delgado, the Court embraced the rule articulated by the plu-
rality in Florida v. Royer,"°8 that a consensual encounter with law
enforcement officers does not oblige the person being questioned to
submit to interrogation, and that no inference of suspicious conduct
may be drawn from a refusal to cooperate. 0 9 In Florida v. Royer,
the plurality stated:
The person appr6ached . . . need not answer any question put to him; in-
deed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way
.... He may not be detained even momentarily without reasonable, objec-
tive grounds for doing so; and his refusal to listen or answer does not, with-
out more, furnish those grounds.110
106. Id.
107. 922 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1990).
108. 460 U.S. 491, 501 (1983).
109. 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984).
110. Royer, 460 U.S. at 497-98. In Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 540 F.2d
1062 (7th Cir. 1976), modified, 548 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977), the court stated that it
recognized the right of INS agents to engage individuals on the street in "casual conver-
sations." Id. at 1070-71 n. 10. However, the court stated, "We disagree with the Govern-
ment when it claims that INS agents may ask questions and under threat of detention
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Likewise, in Brown v. Texas,"' the Court held that absent reason-
able suspicion of criminal activity, law enforcement officers have no
right to compel an individual to give his or her name and address,
even where a state statute purports to make such refusal a crime if
the stop is lawful." 2 Thus, the fact that a person does not answer
questions posed by law enforcement officers cannot be viewed as sus-
picious conduct which would justify even a brief detention. Accord-
ingly, it seems clear that absent reasonable suspicion, an individual
may not be forcibly detained for questioning or any other purpose.
However, as Justice Marshall stated in dissent in Florida v. Bos-
tick," 3 few will know that they have a right to refuse to answer such
questions and thus this "right" will often go unexercised."'
i. Law Enforcement Personnel and Government
Employees Have Refused Consent for FourthAmendment Intrusions
Among those who are aware of and who have exercised their right
to refuse to cooperate with a request for consent to search are law
enforcement officers and government employees. For example, in
Kirkpatrick v. City of Los Angeles," 5 a suspect who had been ar-
rested claimed that the arresting officers stole money from him. The
suspect initially claimed that $600 had been stolen but later changed
this amount to $60. When the supervising officer sought to question
the accused officers about the charge, they refused to say anything.
Despite this fact, the accused officers were strip searched. The ac-
cused officers challenged the validity of the searches. The court
noted that the government has a strong interest in the integrity of its
police force, but that the officers have privacy interests as well." 6
compel answers about the individual's right to be in this country." Id. The Court rea-
soned that "it would render meaningless the individual's right to walk away ... if that
refusal were to be then used as grounds to justify detaining the individual." Id.
In Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991), the Court expressly stated that persons
have the right to refuse to answer a policeperson's questions without having the refusal
used against him. However, Justice Marshall, in dissent, complained that one unadvised
of his rights and otherwise unversed in constitutional law has no reason to know that the
police cannot hold his refusal to cooperate against him. Florida v. Bostick, I 11 S.Ct. at
2393.
111. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
112. Id. at 53.
113. 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991).
114. See supra note I10.
115. 803 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1986).
116. Id. at 488.
The court, balancing these two interests, ruled that it was appropri-
ate to conduct a strip search of police officers where there is "reason-
able suspicion" to do so.11 That is, the person responsible for the
seafch must be aware of specific articulable facts and inferences
therefrom which reasonably warrant a suspicion that contraband or
other evidence of corruption will be found.118 The court found that
no reasonable suspicion existed and that it would be improper to re-
quire that the officers be subjected to a strip search.
In a series of lawsuits, federal employees are challenging the fed-
eral government's policy of subjecting them to compulsory random
urinalysis drug testing as an unreasonable search and seizure.
Though this issue will likely be resolved by the United States Su-
preme Court, the plaintiffs have met with considerable preliminary
success.
1 19
E. Where a Consensual Encounter is Attempted, Flight,
Furtiveness, or Other Factors May Support Reasonable Suspicion
to Detain
The Court in INS v. Delgado acknowledged that persons at or
around the factories who attempted to evade the agents may have
been detained for questioning. °20 Flight or evasion by one with whom
a consensual encounter is attempted, alone or in combination with
other factors, has been held to constitute reasonable suspicion to jus-
tify a brief detention for questioning. 121 If the subject refuses to an-
117. Id. at 490. The court stated in United States v. Kerr, 817 F.2d 1384, 1387
(9th Cir. 1987), that every fourth amendment analysis "is a balancing between two com-
peting concerns-society's interest in effective law enforcement and the individual's pri-
vacy and liberty interest." Thus, the analysis does not change when the privacy and
liberty interests at stake are those of a law enforcement officer.
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., Harmon v. Meese, 690 F. Supp. 65 (D.D.C. 1988) (granting an
injunction against the government's implementation of the challenged procedures without
a reasonable suspicion of drug use). See also Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335 (D.C.
Cir. 1987); National Federation of Federal Employees v. Weinberger, 818 F.2d 935
(D.C. Cir. 1987). See also National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S.
656 (1989) (nonconsensual drug testing of public employees is a search, despite the fact
that the results of the test could not be used in criminal proceedings without the employ-
ees' consent). The Court ruled that such warrantless searches were permitted for Custom
Service employees involved in front-line drug interdiction because the government has a
"compelling interest" in ensuring that such personnel are physically fit and have unim-
peachable integrity and judgment. Id. at 668. This five to four decision is notable for,
among other things, Justice Scalia's strong dissent in defecting from the Court's othdr
conservative members. Id. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Also, the Supreme Court has ruled that a public employer's search of an employee's
desk and files requires reasonable grounds to suspect the search will turn up evidence
that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct. O'Connor v. Ortega, 474 U.S.
1048 (1987).
120. 466 U.S. 210, 220 (1984).
121. See. e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975), stating
in dictum that "erratic driving or obvious attempts to evade officers can support a reason-
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swer questions, in some circumstances it may be reasonable to con-
tinue the detention pending a brief investigation to discover whether
there is independent evidence that he may be involved in a violation
of law.
However, INS v. Delgado also recognized that targets of consen-
sual immigration check encounters may, with impunity, simply re-
fuse to answer and walk away.122 In International Molders' and Al-
lied Workers' Local Union No. 164 v. Nelson, 11 the court, citing
Delgado, ioted that a refusal to answer questions, without an at-
tempt to flee or evade agents, cannot justify a detention or seizure.2 4
Accordingly, to go beyond a mere consensual encounter there must
be "some minimal level of objective justification to validate the de-
tention or seizure.' 25 Thus, it is clear that exercising the right to
walk away cannot be equated with flight or evasion or it would
render the right meaningless. 26
When an-immigration officer is in uniform and clearly engaged in
the effort to detect and apprehend persons illegally'in this country, it
seems reasonable to conclude that flight or attempted evasion may
be an indication that the individual is illegally in the United
States. 27 , But care must be exercised so as not to loosely construe
able suspicion." See United States v. Larios-Montes, 500 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1974);
Duprez v. United States, 435 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1970). See also, United States v.
Medina-Gasca, 739 F.2d 1451, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984) (two heavily laden vans, traveling
in tandem on a known smuggling route, whose occupants "dispersed" from a roadside
stop when an officer approached on foot, supported reasonable suspicion). See also Au Yi
Lau v. INS, 445 F.2d 217, 223 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971).
However, evidently out of concern that the INS may try to create a reasonable suspi-
cion on which to base a forcible stop by prompting flight by targets of its scrutiny, one
court has issued a preliminary injunction barring the INS from conducting itself in a
manner that deliberately provokes flight by workers. International Molders' and Allied
Workers' Local No. 164 v. Nelson, 643 F. Supp. 884 (N.D. Cal. 1986), aft'd in pertinent
part, 799 F.2d 547, 554 (9th Cir. 1986). See also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 484 (1963), where the Court stated that after a law enforcement officer seeking
entry into Wong Sun's building aroused his suspicions by falsely claiming to be a cus-
tomer, Wong Sun's flight from the unidentified officer did not support an inference of
guilty knowledge because to conclude otherwise would transform "ambiguous conduct
which the arresting officers themselves have provoked" into probable cause.
122. 466 U.S. at 218.
123. 799 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1986).
124. Id. at 553.
125. Id.
126. "[I]t would render meaningless the individual's right to walk away.., if that
refusal were to be then used as grounds to justify detaining the individual." Illinois Mi-
grant Council v. Pilliod, 540 F.2d 1062, 1070-71 n.10 (7th Cir. 1976).
127. See California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1549 n.1 (1991) and Wong Sun
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). However, even assuming that flight constituted
strong evidence of illegal alienage, if the subject refused to answer any questions and the
what conduct constitutes attempted evasion. The court in Nacacio v.
INS"" stressed that failure of vehicle occupants to make eye contact
with immigration officers does not justify a stop of the vehicle.' 29
Thus, for a detention or arrest on the basis of attempted evasion to
withstand a court challenge, the evasion must be clear, significant
and weighed with other pertinent facts. 30
immigration officers had no independent evidence of the person's status, it would be vir-
tually impossible to assert a ground of deportability under the law. See 8 U.S.C. §
1251(a) (1982), which lists the 19 grounds of deportability. The first paragraph in every
order to show cause is the allegation that the respondent is not a "citizen or national of
the United States." (For definition of "national" see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 (a)(22) and (29)
and § 1408 (1982).) The second paragraph is the allegation that the respondent is a
native and citizen of a specified country or countries. The third paragraph typically states
how and when the respondent entered the United States. The succeeding paragraphs
then assert facts to support a particular ground of deportability. However, without facts
no ground of deportability can be alleged. Thus, the fact that a person fled from immi-
gration officials may provide a basis to detain, and even arrest. But, without more infor-
mation deportability cannot be proved.
In deportation proceedings, foreign birth raises a presumption of alienage that one
must rebut by showing the time, manner and place of entry, or suffer the conclusion that
he or she is illegally in this country. 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1982). Thus, foreign birth may
provide a basis to detain or arrest an alien without papers to show he or she is legally in
the country. See, e.g., Ramon-Sepulveda v. INS, 743 F.2d 1307, 1308 (9th Cir. 1984).
128. 797 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1986).
129. The fact that persons appeared to be Hispanic, wore work clothes, drove older
cars, had a "lean and hungry look," failed to look officers in the eye, and had "dirty,
unkept appearance" did not support reasonable suspicion that they were illegal aliens so
as to warrant motor vehicle stops. Id. See also United States v. Lamas, 608 F.2d 547,
549-50 (5th Cir. 1979) (avoiding eye contact does not support reasonable suspicion);
United States v. Munoz, 604 F.2d 1160, 1161 (9th Cir. 1979) (vehicles traveling in
tandem with drivers of Hispanic appearance and failure of occupants to look at agents is
not reasonable suspicion); United States v. Lopez, 564 F.2d 710, 712 (5th Cir. 1977)
(failure to make eye contact may be the rule rather than the exception). But even those
courts that have been willing to consider avoidance of eye contact as a factor supportive
of reasonable suspicion give it relatively little weight. See, e.g., United States v. Nikzad,
739 F.2d 1431, 1433 (9th Cir. 1984) (avoidance of eye contact is somewhat probative
where individual stared at officers and after noticing they were looking at him began to
shuffle and fidget); United States v. Vasquez-Cazares, 563 F.2d 1329, 1330 (9th Cir.
1977) (per curiam) (avoidance of eye contact is somewhat probative when a marked
police car is directly in line of vision; this and anonymous tip that suspect was smuggling
aliens supported reasonable suspicion).
130. See, e.g., Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66-67 (1968). In Sibron, an off-
duty police officer was home at his apartment when he heard noises at his door indicating
someone seeking to force entry. Shortly afterwards the officer looked through his peep-
hole and saw "two men tiptoeing out of the alcove toward the stairway." Id. at 48. He
called the police, got dressed, armed himself with his service revolver, and again looked
through the peephole. Id. at 48, 66-67. He saw the men still tiptoeing in the hall. The
officer had never seen the men before. When he opened the door, the men ran down the
stairs. The officer caught one of the men after chasing him down one or two flights of
stairs. The man said he was visiting a girlfriend but refused to give her name claiming
she was a married woman. A pat down of the man revealed burglar's tools; he was subse-
quently criminally convicted. Id. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, ruling that
the pat-down search was reasonably made incident to a lawful arrest.
See also United States v. Medina-Gasca, 739 F.2d 1451 (9th Cir. 1984) (reasonable
suspicion supported where two heavily laden vans had been traveling in tandem on a
known smuggling route, and vehicle's occupants dispersed from a roadside stop when an
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Furthermore, before flight or furtiveness can support reasonable
suspicion, the law enforcement officer must be identifiable as such.
In Wong Sun v. United States,"'1 a plain clothes federal agent went
to James Wah Toy's laundry at 6:00 A.M. When Toy opened the
door to inform the agent that the laundry was closed, the agent
stated that he wanted to pickup his laundry. Toy said the business
did not open until 8:00 A.M. and started to close the door. But the
agent then took out his badge and stated that he was a federal agent.
Toy slammed the door and ran down the hallway through the laun-
dry to the living area where his wife and child were sleeping. The
agent, along with others, broke the door down, followed Toy to his
living quarters, and placed him under arrest. The issue arose of the
appropriate inference to be drawn from Toy's "flight." The Court
stated, "[W]hen an officer insufficiently or unclearly identifies his of-
fice or his mission, the occupant's flight from the door must be re-
garded as ambiguous conduct."'32 Although the officer in Wong Sun
did disclose that he was a narcotics officer, he misrepresented his
mission at the outset by stating that he had come for laundry and
dry cleaning. Furthermore, before Toy fled, the officer never ade-
quately dispelled the misimpression engendered by his own ruse.' 33
Toy's refusal to admit the officers and his flight down the hallway
did not signify guilty knowledge any more than it displayed a natu-
ral desire to avoid an apparently unauthorized intrusion.' 34 The
Court stated that "[a] contrary holding here would mean that a
vague suspicion could bd transformed into probable cause for arrest
by reason of ambiguous conduct which the arresting officers them-
selves provoked."' 35
In discussing the probative value of flight as an indicator of guilt,
the Court quoted from Alberty v. United States:13 6
[I]t is not universally true that a man who is conscious that he has done a
wrong, will pursue a certain course not in harmony with the conduct of a
man who is conscious of having done an act which is innocent, right, and
proper, since it is a matter of common knowledge that men who are entirely
innocent do sometimes fly from the scene of a crime through fear of being
apprehended as the guilty parties, or from an unwillingness to appear as
witnesses. Nor is it true as an accepted axiom of criminal law than "the
officer approached on foot).
131. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
132. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 482 (1963).
133. Id. at 482-83. Cf. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Gatewood v.
United States, 209 F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
134. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 483.
135. Id. at 484 (citation omitted).
136. 162 U.S. 499, 511 (1896).
wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the righteous are as bold as a
lion."1
37
In Au Yi Lau v. INS,138 the court noted that it had earlier 139 sanc-
tioned minimal privacy invasions occasioned by questioning persons
"believed to be of alien origin." Underlying the rule were the ratio-
nales that the minimal invasion of voluntary questioning was justi-
fied by the special needs of immigration officials to make such inter-
rogations and that the subject's cooperation was assumed.1 40
In Au Yi Lau, the court ruled on two separate cases with one
opinion. In both cases, the issue was whether immigration officers
may forcibly detain for questioning one who is reasonably believed
to be an alien.141 The court observed that because forcible detentions
are "far greater intrusions upon personal privacy than the
nonforcible approaches, and since aliens in this country are sheltered
by the fourth amendment in common with citizens," constitutional
principles applicable in similar detentions in other law enforcement
contexts govern. 42 Thus, it was held that immigration officers may
make "forcible detentions of a temporary nature for the purposes of
interrogation under circumstances creating a reasonable suspicion,
not arising to the level of probable cause to arrest, that the individ-
ual so detained is illegally in this country."143 However, such deter-
minations must be made on a case-by-case basis.
In the first case considered by the court in Au Yi Lau, the court
held that the attempted flight of workers from business premises
upon arrival of immigration officers sufficed to create a reasonable
suspicion of illegal alienage.14 4 Accordingly, a temporary detention
for interrogation was warranted. 4 ' The court went on to state:
[D]eliberately furtive actions and flight at the approach of strangers or law
officers are strong indicia of mens rea, and when coupled with specific
knowledge on the part of the officer relating the suspect to the evidence of
crime, they are proper factors to be considered in the decision to make an
arrest."
6
137. Wong Sung, 371 U.S. at 483 n.10. Alberty was a Black man born into slavery
who later became a member of the Cherokee Indian Nation. The court also cited other
decisions indicating flight does not necessarily prove guilty knowledge. Id. But see Cali-
fornia v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547 2549 n.1 (1991).
138. 445 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971).
139. The earlier case referred to is Yam Sang Kwai v. INS, 411 F.2d 683 (1960),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 877 (1969).
140. Au Yi Lau, 445 F.2d at 222.





146. Id. at 223 n.10 (quoting from Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 66-67
(1968)). The Court noted, "If flight can contribute so greatly to probable cause for ar-
rest, it certainly has the capacity in appropriate circumstances to generate the lesser
degree of reasonable suspicion requisite for an investigatory stop." Id. But as discussed
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This language clearly is overbroad. For example, flight from or eva-
sion of strangers could be the normal thing to do depending on the
circumstances. One would have to consider, e.g., the appearance and
manner of an approaching stranger, the place of approach (a de-
serted street or a bustling public place), time (night or day), etc.
Further, to the extent this language is qualified by the requirement
that the officer have specific knowledge connecting the suspect to evi-
dence of crime, this will rarely be the case in an immigration
context.
In the second case considered by the court in Au Yi Lau, two
Chinese individuals were in a hospital waiting room. Upon seeing an
immigration officer, they promptly got up and departed. Upon finish-
ing his business about fifteen minutes later, the officer looked for the
two individuals and saw them in the hospital parking lot. They hast-
ily got in their car on seeing the officer and sought to lock their car
and drive away. The officer reached in the car and took the keys
after they were unable to respond to questions because of a language
barrier. Several minutes later, a Chinese man happened by and was
able to act as an interpreter. The men in the car answered that they
had exceeded their shore leave.147
The court acknowledged it was a close case, but nevertheless
found that the actions here constituted an appropriate Terry stop.
Stressing that the individuals were detained "minutes" rather than
"hours," the court pointed out that the delay was occasioned by ef-
forts to find a channel of communications.148
The court went on:
Because of the language barrier, that stop proved longer here than would be
necessary in the usual Terry criminal context. But different areas of law
enforcement have different problems, and legal doctrine common to all
must be of sufficient flexibility to accommodate these differences. We are
not persuaded that this constituted "official oppression unrelieved by the
quality of reasonableness central to the concept of the fourth amendment.1 49
Likewise, in Lee v. INS,150 where a Chinese man became nervous
and attempted to walk away from an INS investigator who sought to
question him, the court held that the "intermediate response" of ask-
ing him to stop and answer questions was appropriate.1 5' The court
above, the circumstances surrounding the flight in this case constituted compelling evi-
dence of guilt.
147. Id. at 225.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. 590 F.2d 497 (3d Cir. 1979).
151. Id. at 502.
stated that Lee made no further attempt to extricate himself from
the conversation with the officer and was not "physically detained
from doing so. ' 152 The court found that the officer's "response to
Lee's attempt to extricate himself from the interrogation was reason-
ably related in scope to the justification he had for adopting that
response. 1 53
However, this unclear statement by the Lee court fails to explicate
a satisfactory fourth amendment analysis. For example, it may be
read as suggesting that a person may be penalized for exercising his
or her right to refuse to cooperate. How many times must one at-
tempt to walk away before she can expect no further intrusion? The
facts show that it was highly unlikely that the officer had probable
cause or reasonable suspicion. He saw two men walking across a
parking lot toward an adjacent shopping center. A Chinese restau-
rant was in the shopping center; the officer knew from "prior experi-
ence" that illegal aliens had been hired there. The men caught his
attention because they were speaking in Chinese and dressed in
"white shirts, of the type normally worn by kitchen help in restau-
rants. 1 54 These sparse facts would probably not support a reason-
able suspicion to conclude that these particular men were illegally in
the country. However, the facts of the case show that the INS officer
did not speak to Lee first. It was during the officer's brief conversa-
tion with Lee's companion that Lee began to walk away.1"" Thus, it
seems that Lee was not walking away from a conversation directly
aimed at him. Rather, a reasonable construction of the facts would
indicate that the officer merely was alerting Lee that he wished to
speak with him also. At that point, Lee, in response to questions,
indicated he was illegally in the United States.
In Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod,156 the court recognized the
right of INS agents to engage individuals on the street in "casual
conversations.1 157 However, the court stated, "[W]e disagree with
the Government when it claims that INS agents may ask questions
and under threat of detention compel answers about the individual's
right to be in this country. 1 58 The court reasoned that "it would
render meaningless the individual's right to walk away, as recog-
nized by the dissent in Terry v. Ohio, if that refusal were to be then
used as grounds to justify detaining the individual."15'
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 498.
155. Id.
156. 540 F.2d 1062 (7th Cir. 1976).
157. Id. at 1070 n.10.
158. Id.
159. Id. (citation omitted). See also INS v. Degaldo, 466 U.S. 210, 218 (1984)
(recognized that a person approached for questioning by immigration officials may sim-
526
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F. Nervousness, Without More, Will Usually Not Support
Reasonable Suspicion
In .United States v. Ballard,16 0 the court ruled that there was no
reasonable suspicion to detain a black male as fitting the general
profile of a drug courier just because on deplaning at the airport he
(1) appeared nervous, (2) walked at a brisk pace, (3) carried little
baggage and (4) arrived from a known narcotic source city.161 The
primary justification for the stop was the suspect's alleged nervous-
ness and quick pace.162 In United States v. Baptist,"6 3 the court ob-
served that "nervousness on the part of one stopped by a police of-
ficer is not at all unusual .. .."161 The court rejected the claim that
"founded suspicion" existed because the suspect was nervous, asked
to go to the bathroom after he was detained, and placed his foot on
papers that fell out of his pockets.
This points out one of the realities of police encounters with mem-
bers of the public. It is not unusual for an individual approached by
the police to have some apprehension that he has been targeted for
some violation of law. Further, when a police car clings near a vehi-
cle on the highway it is not ai all uncommon for the driver to stiffen,
quickly glance at the speedometer, and possibly slow down. If this
nervous behavior could justify a stop, most drivers could be stopped
whenever a police car unexpectedly pulls next to them or when their
vehicle suddenly comes upon a previously unseen parked Highway
Patrol car.
Another possible problem with allowing nervousness to be equated
with reasonable suspicion is the evidentiary problem of determining
whether the suspect actually appeared "nervous." If no articulation
were required as to how alleged nervous action was manifested, and
if those actions were not sufficiently significant to distinguish the sus-
pect from the general population, 6 5 law enforcement officials would
have virtually unbridled power to detain persons whenever they
chose to do so.
ply walk away without having this act construed as evidence of illegal conduct or status).
160. 573 F.2d 913 (5th Cir. 1978).
161. Id. at 916.
162. Id.
163. 556 F. Supp. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
164. Id. at 289. See also Buffins v. City of Omaha, 922 F.2d 465 n.13 (8th Cir.
1990) (pertinent cases cited therein),
165. See United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913, 916 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that
the facts that allegedly supported reasonable suspicion did "not in any significant way
operate to distinguish Ballard from the general public").
III. FIXED CHECKPOINTS NEAR BORDER TO CHECK FOR
UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS
In contrast with roving patrols, the Supreme Court has ruled that
fixed-checkpoint vehicle stops do not require reasonable suspicion
that the vehicles contain undocumented aliens. In United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte,66 the Court ruled that consistent with the fourth
amendment "a vehicle may be stopped at a fixed checkpoint for brief
questioning of its occupants even though there is no reason to believe
the particular vehicle contains illegal aliens. '1 67
One of the checkpoints considered by the Court was the San Cle-
mente, California, checkpoint on Interstate 5, between San Diego
and Los Angeles. In describing the procedure employed there, the
Court stated that vehicles are slowed or stopped, with most motorists
being allowed to proceed without any oral inquiry or close visual ex-
amination. In a "relatively small number of cases," the agent will
direct vehicles to a "secondary inspection area" where the occupants
are asked about their citizenship and immigration status.16 8 The gov-
ernment asserted that the average time of an investigation in the
secondary inspection area is three to five minutes.6 9 The agent refer-
ring the respondents' vehicles to secondary inspection in Martinez-
Fuerte had no articulable suspicion of illegal activity or status.'70
However, on being referred to secondary inspection, Martinez-Fu-
erte's passengers admitted to being in the United States unlawfully.
The court of appeals reversed the conviction, ruling that a fixed-
checkpoint stop required reasonable suspicion based on articulable
facts.
The Supreme Court balanced the public's interest in stemming the
flow of illegal immigrants into this country against the privacy and
security interests of motorists traversing the checkpoint. The Court
acknowledged that the intrusion on uninterrupted passage through
the checkpoint did implicate the fourth amendment. 1 1 It stressed,
however, that this intrusion was modest, involving "only a brief de-
tention of travelers" during which "all that is required of the vehi-
cle's occupants is a response to a brief question or two and possibly
the production of a document evidencing a right to be in the United
States."'1 2 To distinguish this case from the roving patrol in
166. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
167. Id. at 545.
168. Id. at 546.
169. Id. at 546-47.
170. Id. at 547.
171. Id. at 557.
172. Id. at 558 (quoting from United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880
(1975)).
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Brignoni-Ponce,17 3 the Court reasoned that "the subjective intru-
sion-the generating of concern or even fright on the part of lawful
travelers-is appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint stop."'' 4
Also, the Court stated that fixed checkpoints did not carry the same
unbridled discretion that officers in the field possess, who "could stop
motorists at random for questioning, day or night, anywhere within
100 air miles of the 2,000-mile border, on a city street, a busy high-
way, or a desert road ... .,' The Court offered other reasons in an
effort to demonstrate that fixed checkpoint stops were less intrusive
and gave border patrol agents less discretion than roving patrols. 6
In regard tp the practice of referring vehicles to secondary inspec-
tion, the Court stated:
We further believe that it is constitutional to refer motorists selectively to
the secondary inspection area at the San Clemente checkpoint on the basis
of criteria that would not sustain a roving-patrol stop. Thus, even if it be
assumed that such referrals are made largely on the basis of apparent Mex-
ican ancestry, we perceive no constitutional violation.
1 77
In concluding its opinion, the Court again stressed that the war-
rantless fixed-checkpoint stops were consistent with the Constitution,
primarily because of the limited scope of those stops.
The principal protection of fourth amendment rights at checkpoints lies in
appropriate limitations on the scope of the stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S., at 24-27; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S., at 881-82. We
have held that checkpoint searches are constitutional only if justified by
consent or probable cause to search. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891
(1975). And our holding today is limited to the type of stops described in
this opinion. "[Any further detention . . . must be based on consent or
probable clause." United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 882.178
The Court also made it clear that the decision was limited to fixed-
checkpoint stops, as opposed to temporary-checkpoint stops.
179
The dissent' 80 strongly criticized the failure to require that check-
point stops be supported by reasonable suspicion based on articulable
173. 422 U.S. 873 (1975). See supra text accompanying notes 81-86.
174. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558.
175. Id. at 559 (quoting from Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 882-83).
176. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559.
177. Id. at 563 (footnote and citation omitted). The Court declined to explain why
apparent Mexican appearance alone could be the basis for a further fourth amendment
intrusion. It is disturbing that the Court so cavalierly sanctioned a law enforcement pro-
cedure premised primarily along racial lines. The checkpoint, it must be remembered, is
not at the border. It should also be noted that the area in which the checkpoint in ques-
tion is operated is populated by a large Hispanic population. Id.
178. Id. at 566-67.
179. Id. at 566 n.19.
180. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented. Id. at 567 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
facts. One danger perceived by the dissent is that persons of Mexi-
can ancestry would be singled out for these investigative stops.
Every American citizen of Mexican ancestry and every Mexican alien law-
fully in this country must know after today's decision that he travels the
fixed checkpoint highways at the risk of being subjected not only to a stop,
but also to detention and interrogation, both prolonged and to an extent far
more than for non-Mexican appearing motorists.18
Further, the dissent assailed the majority's holding that referral to
secondary inspection could be based "largely" on Mexican ancestry,
as being inconsistent with Brignoni-Ponce, and on the principle
"[t]hat law in this country should tolerate use of one's ancestry as
probative of possible criminal conduct is repugnant under any
circumstances. 182
Some questions remain after the checkpoint cases. For example,
assume that a vehicle is directed to secondary inspection for no par-
ticular reason, and the occupants state that they are legally in the
United States. If the border patrol officer is suspicious but has no
articulable evidence that they are in the country illegally, how long
may he detain them to investigate? What kind of investigation would
warrant further detention? If the investigation yields no helpful evi-
dence, may the individuals be detained further in hopes that they
will make damaging admissions? What if the occupants simply re-
fuse to answer the officer's questions or provide identification? What
if such a refusal is premised on the right against self-incrimina-
tion?18 3 Does this, standing alone, justify continued detention? If so,
at what point must the individuals be released?
IV. TERRY INVESTIGATIVE STOPS
A. Refusal to Answer Questions Voluntarily at a Fixed
Checkpoint or After a Stop Based on Reasonable Suspicion
There must be a distinction drawn between a refusal to provide
identification and a refusal to answer questions concerning alleged
suspicious conduct. The term "identification" is here used to mean
the suspect's name and address where he or she can be located if
181. Martinez-Fuerte, 488 U.S. at 572. Indeed, Hispanic persons legally in this
country have complained that they feel unfairly singled out at immigration checkpoints
in the United States, while foreign persons of European background are generally not
even questioned. See, e.g., Reza, Immigration Agents' Actions Beg a Question, L.A.
TIMES, Apr. 24, 1988, part 2, at 2, col. 3; and, Epstein, Hispanics: Under the suspicious
eye of border agents, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 14, 1988, at 16.
182. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 571 n.1.
183. Entering this country without inspection is a criminal offense. 8 U.S.C. §
1325 (1982 & Supp. 1991). Thus, questions relating thereto need not be answered on
self-incrimination grounds. See Watkins, Streamlining Deportation Proceeding: Self-In-
crimination, Immunity From Prosecution and the Duty to Testify in a Deportation Con-
text, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1075 (1985).
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subsequently discovered facts lead back to the suspect.1 84
It is well established that the mere refusal to answer questions
concerning alleged suspicious conduct suggesting possible criminal
activity cannot serve to elevate reasonable suspicion to probable
cause. In Terry v. Ohio,8 5 Justice White, in a concurring opinion,
believed it was necessary to address a matter not specifically dis-
cussed by the majority. He opined that one properly stopped for in-
vestigative questioning is free to refuse to answer without fear that
such a refusal will furnish a basis for an arrest.
Also, although the Court puts the matter aside in the context of this case, I
think an additional word is in order concerning the matter of interrogation
during an investigative stop. There is nothing in the Constitution which pre-
vents a policeman from addressing questions to anyone on the streets. Ab-
sent special circumstances, the person approached may not be detained or
frisked but may refuse to cooperate and go on his way. However, given the
proper circumstances, such as those in this case, it seems to me the person
may be briefly detained against his will while pertinent questions are di-
rected to him. Of course, the person stopped is not obliged to answer, an-
swers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for
an arrest, although it may alert the officer to the need for continued
observation,. 1
This issue was again raised in Kolender v. Lawson.187 That case in-
volved a California statute which required persons who loiter or
wander on the streets to provide "credible and reliable" identifica-
tion and to account for their presence when requested by a peace
officer under circumstances that would justify a stop under the stan-
dards of Terry v. Ohio. The district court found that the statute was
overbroad because "a person who is stopped on less than probable
cause cannot be punished for failing to identify himself."' 88 The
court of appeals affirmed on this issue, holding that the statute was
unconstitutional because it violated the fourth amendment's bar
against unreasonable searches and seizures. 8 9 Also, the court of ap-
peals ruled that the statute was void for vagueness. 90 Moreover, the
court of appeals noted that fifth amendment self-incrimination issues
were raised in requiring a suspect, on pain of criminal sanction, to
account for his presence. But, the Supreme Court did not specifically
rule on the fifth amendment issues because it concluded that its rul-
184. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
185. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
186. Id. at 34 (emphasis added).
187. 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
188. Id. at 354.
189. Lawson v. Kolender, 658 F.2d 1362, 1369 (9th Cir. 1981).
190. Id. at 1370.
ing on the statute's vagueness made this unnecessary. The Court, per
Justice O'Connor, ruled that the statute was impermissibly vague
and did not directly address the fourth amendment question. The
California statute requiring reasonable suspicion as a prerequisite to
an investigatory stop ensures "neutral limitations on conduct of indi-
vidual officers." 191 However, the Court found fatally vague the lack
of standards by which officers may determine whether a suspect has
complied with the subsequent identification requirement: 192 that is,
what constitutes "credible and reliable" identification. Consequently,
law enforcement officers had too much discretion to determine
whether an arrest was appropriate. The Court condemned the fact
that, without minimal guidelines for law enforcement officers, "[a]n
individual whom police may think is suspicious but do not have prob-
able cause to believe has committed a crime, is entitled to continue
to walk the public streets 'only at the whim of any police officer' who
happens to stop [him]."
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan agreed with the majority
opinion but added that even if the statute had clear standards and
could survive a vagueness challenge, it would be unconstitutional as
violating the fourth amendment. After a discussion of Terry v. Ohio
and its accommodation of law enforcement interests by recognizing
that a brief investigatory detention could be justified on less than
probable cause, Justice Brennan asserted that there was no justifica-
tion for a further erosion of the privacy and security interests of the
individual. He stated:
Terry encounters must be brief; the suspect must not be moved or asked to
move more than a short distance; physical searches are permitted only to
the extent necessary to protect the police officers involved during the en-
counter; and, most importantly, the suspect must be free to leave after a
short time and to decline to answer the questions put to him.194
Justice Brennan then quoted from Justice White's concurring opin-
ion in Terry to the effect that the subject of an investigative stop
premised on reasonable suspicion "is not obliged to answer, answers
may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for
an arrest, although it may alert the officer to the need for continued
observation.' 95 He continued:
Failure to observe these limitations converts a Terry encounter into the sort
of detention that can be justified only by probable cause to believe that a
crime has been committed. See Florida v: Royer, 460 U.S. at 501, (opinion
of WHITE, J.); id., at 509-511 (Brennan, J., concurring in result); Duna-
191. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. at 360-61 (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S.
47, 51 (1979)).
192. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 360-61.
193. Id. at 358 (quoting from Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87,
90 (1965)).
194. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 365.
195. Id. (quoting from Terry, 392 U.S. 1, at 34).
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way v. New York [442 U.S.] at 216.
In sum, under the fourth amendment, police officers with reasonable sus-
picion that an individual has committed or is about to commit a crime may
detain that individual, using some force if necessary, for the purpose of ask-
ing investigative questions. They may ask their questions in a way calcu-
lated to obtain an answer. But they may not compel an answer, and they
must allow the person to leave after a reasonably brief period of time unless
the information they have acquired during the encounter has given them
probable cause sufficient to justify an arrest.1 98
Finally, Justice Brennan stated that a validation of the California
statute would "make a mockery of the right enforced in Brown v.
Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), in which we held squarely that a State
may not make it a crime to refuse to provide identification on de-
mand in the absence of reasonable suspicion.' 197
Justice White, joined by then Associate Justice Rehnquist, dis-
sented on the grounds that the California statute was not unduly
vague as to the conduct in question. The dissent maintained that the
majority confused vagueness with overbreadth, and that if the stat-
ute was overbroad, it clearly encompassed the subject conduct, and
the defendant could not complain about how it might be applied to
others. However, the dissent stated that "if the statute on its face
violates the fourth or fifth amendment-and I express no views
about that question-the Court would be justified in striking it
down."' 98 Nevertheless, the dissent concluded by stating, "I would
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals."' 99
The Court, while not directly coming to grips with the issue, im-
plicitly concluded that failure to cooperate with authorities after a
Terry stop does not warrant continued detention beyond the time to
conduct a reasonable investigation unless probable cause develops.
Also, the court of appeals expressly so ruled, and the Supreme
Court's decision did not overrule this holding. Moreover, there is no
recognized authority for the proposition that refusal to answer ques-
tions concerning alleged suspicious conduct can, in itself, justify con-
tinued detention. A contrary conclusion would penalize the exercise
of constitutional rights.
One court has reasoned that:
Routine citizenship checks at fixed checkpoints do not impose a degree of
196. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 365, 366.
197. Id. at 368.
198. Id. at 374.
199. Id. It appears odd that the dissent would reverse the court of appeals when
the court of appeals affirmed the district court's opinion striking down the statute on
fourth amendment grounds, and the dissent contends that it expresses no views whether
the statute violates that amendment.
restraint associated with arrest because the detention is by nature brief and
subject to the scrutiny of other travelers, the intrusion is limited in scope,
advance notice obtains and visible signs of authority mitigate rather than
enhance the perceived degree of restraint. 00
The court was addressing whether an individual was "in custody" so
as to require Miranda0 1 warnings. Nevertheless, by this same rea-
soning the court would likely conclude that trappings of a fixed
checkpoint call for some degree of cooperation from all passing
through, and persons answering questions and consenting to searches
could not successfully argue that a reasonable person would not have
felt free to decline to cooperate. But, at the same time, there is no
authority for the proposition that one who refuses to answer ques-
tions or provide identification may be detained indefinitely.
B. Whether a Suspect May Be Required to Provide
Identification After a Terry Stop
As noted above, it seems clear that refusal to cooperate with law
enforcement officers after a Terry stop does not justify a detention
beyond that required for a brief investigation. However, there is
some question whether one may, consistent with the Constitution, be
required to provide identification after such a stop. As seen in Law-
son,202 some states have sought to make it a crime to refuse to pro-
vide identification and account for one's presence in a particular
place after a Terry stop. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
ruled the statute unconstitutionally vague, violative of the fourth
amendment, and though not reaching the issue, the court expressed
some concern whether the statute transgressed the fifth amendment's
protection against self-incrimination.2 3 The Supreme Court af-
firmed, finding the statute's requirement that a suspect provide
"credible and reliable" identification to be unduly vague.20 4 The
Court stated that law enforcement officers, without adequate guide-
lines, may at their whim determine who will be allowed to walk the
public streets.
Lawson shows that the Court, in reviewing statutes making it a
crime to refuse to provide identification after a Terry stop, will (1)
look closely af the reasonableness of the suspicion that prompted the
200. United States v. Bengivenga, 845 F.2d 593, 599 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988).
201. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
202. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
203. 658 F.2d at 1369-71.
204. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 360-61. The Supreme Court also noted that the statute
implicated fifth amendment concerns, stating that while police may request persons to
answer voluntarily questions concerning unsolved crimes, they have no right to compel
such answers. 461 U.S. 352, 360 n.9 (citing Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 n.6
(1969)).
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stop in the first instance and (2) determine whether the identification
requirements are clear and not unduly burdensome. In Lawson, the
facts suggested that the suspicion which led to Lawson's stops was
not reasonable. He was once stopped for walking at "a late hour" in
a business area where some businesses were still open and asked for
identification because burglaries had been committed by unknown
persons in the general area. 05 However, the Court was careful to
note that it did not rule on whether one has a legitimate expectation
of privacy in his or her identity after a valid Terry stop and whether
one has a fifth amendment (self-incrimination) right not to identify
himself or herself in connection with a criminal investigation. 0 6
In an earlier case the Court reserved ruling on. whether an individ-
ual could be "punished for refusing to identify himself in the context
of a lawful investigat[ive] stop. ' 207 This issue is somewhat different
from that addressed by Justice White in Terry, where he opined that
adverse inferences could not be drawn because an individual refused
to answer questions. It appears from the context of Justice White's
comments that he was referring to questions related to the suspicious
circumstances that prompted the stop in the first instance and not
requests for identification. Thus, it is not clear that Justice White
intended to proscribe, in all circumstances, requiring identification
after a Terry stop.
The Court in Adams v. Williams" appeared to endorse, at least
in some circumstances, "[a] brief stop of a suspicious individual, in
order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momen-
205. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 354 n.2. The court of appeals had ruled
that "the serious intrusion on personal security outweighs the mere possibility that identi-
fication may provide a link leading to arrest." Lawson v. Kolender, 658 F.2d at 1366-67.
206. However, the Court is unlikely to uphold such claims challenging carefully
drafted statutes requiring identification in light of its language in Hayes v. Florida, 470
U.S. 811 (1985). See infra notes 218-19 and accompanying text.
207. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 53 n.3 (1979). However, the Court in Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972), state-,:
The fourth amendment does nc, require a policeman who lacks the precise
level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his
shoulders and allow a crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary,
Terry recognizes that it may be the essence of good police work to adopt an
intermediate response .... A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to
determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while ob-
taining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known
to the officer at the time.
Id. at 145-46 (emphasis added). There was, however, no discussion of what action the
officer could take if the suspect refused to identify herself.
208. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
tarily while obtaining more information .. ."09 This language ap-
pears to support the arrest of one who refuses to identify herself af-
ter a Terry stop. However, the better view, consistent with fourth
amendment principles, is that by this language the Court simply was
indicating that where one chose not to identify herself after a Terry
stop, she faced the reasonable alternative of continued detention
pending a prompt investigation to determine if a criminal violation
had occurred involving the subject. However, absent a carefully
crafted statute requiring that the subject of a Terry stop identify
himself or face arrest, the issue is not raised.21 0 Thus, the subject
must be released if probable cause to detain him does not develop
after a reasonable period to investigate.
When there is no independent evidence of a possible or imminent
crime, with some articulable reason for connecting an individual
with that crime, it would seem that identity may not be required.
Thus, where one is detained for suspicions that evaporate upon de-
tention, the detainee's situation would appear to revert to that of the
subject of a consensual encounter. Accordingly, there would be no
duty to provide identification.
The Supreme Court has suggested it would uphold a simple and
nonburdensome identification requirement where one is reasonably
suspected of criminal activity and where identity would tend to con-
firm or refute those suspicions. In Hayes v. Florida,211 the issue was
whether a person stopped on the basis of reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity could be required to provide identifying informa-
tion. The Court reversed the conviction below and suppressed finger-
prints that tied Hayes to a crime. The Florida police had determined
that Hayes was a principal suspect in a burglary-rape offense. The
officers went to Hayes' home without a warrant to ask him to go to
209. Id. at 145-46.
210. One such statute that has been ruled consistent with constitutional principles
is described in State v. Ecker, 311 So.2d 104, 107-09 (Fla.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019
(1975). Quoting Terry, the court describing the statute in question stated, "'[T]he police
officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant' a finding that a breach of the
peace is imminent or the public safety is threatened." Id. at 109. The court stated that
where public safety is threatened there is no constitutional violation in requiring credible
and reliable identification. Id. But the court agreed that an individual may not be re-
quired to "explain his presence and conduct" under pain of criminal penalty. Id. The
court ruled that a conviction under Florida's loitering statute was warranted where the
defendant was hiding in bushes on the property of a private dwelling at 1:20 A.M. He
leaped over a fence and fled when an officer approached. His car had a stolen tag, and
his claim that his car would not start was disproved when an officer started it. Id. at 110.
A simple trespass charge, however, would have obviated the need to resort to the loi-
tering statute. Moreover, whether or not the defendant identified himself was of little
consequence to whether he was guilty under the portion of the statute in question, In-
deed, he could have identified himself and sought to explain his presence to exculpate
himself. Even so, he could have been convicted of loitering.
211. 470 U.S. 811 (1985).
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the police station to provide fingerprints. Hayes would not agree to
being fingerprinted, but, after an officer stated he would be arrested
if necessary to accomplish this, Hayes went to the station. There, his
fingerprints were taken and found to match those found at the scene
of the crime. The Florida state courts refused to suppress the finger-
prints; Hayes was convicted and his conviction was affirmed on ap-
peal in the state court system.
The United States Supreme Court found that because there was
no probable cause for the arrest, no consent to travel to the police
station, and no prior judicial authorization for detaining Hayes, the
investigative detention at the, station to fingerprint him violated his
fourth amendment rights. The Court suppressed the fingerprints as
the fruits of an illegal detention. Following the holding of Davis v.
Mississippi,"2 the Court ruled that taking the suspect to the police
station against his will for fingerprinting exceeded the permissible
limits of temporary seizures authorized by Terry.2 13 The Court also
pointed out that in Dunaway v. New York,2 14 it had refused to ex-
tend 'Terry to authorize forcible investigative interrogations at the
police stations on less than probable cause even though proper warn-
ings under Miranda v. Arizona215 had bden given.216
The Court in Hayes v. Florida further explained:
[O]ur view continues to be that the line is crossed when the police, without
probable cause or a warrant, forcibly remove a person from his home or
other place in which he is entitled to be and transport him to the police
station, where he is detained, although briefly, for investigative purposes.
We adhere to the view that such seizures, at least where not under judicial
supervision, are sufficiently like arrests to invoke the traditional rule that
arrests may constitutionally be made only on probable cause.2 17
Thus, the conviction was reversed.
However, in dictum, the Court added:
There is ... support in our cases for the view that the fourth amendment
would permit seizures for the purpose of fingerprinting, if there is reason-
able suspicion that the suspect has committed a criminal act, if there is a
reasonable basis for believing that fingerprinting will establish or negate the
suspect's connection with that crime, and if the procedure is carried out
with dispatch.2 18
212. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
213. Hayes, 470 U.S. at 814.
214. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
215. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
216. Hayes, 470 U.S. at 815.
217. Id. at 816 (footnote omitted).
218. Id. at 81,7. In support of this proposition the Court cited Adams v. Williams,
407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972); United States v. Hensley, 469.U.S. 221, 229, 232, 234 (1985);
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
Also, the Court was careful to add that fingerprinting does not in-
volve probing of thoughts, etc., and "represents a much less serious
intrusion upon personal security than other types of searches and de-
tentions."2 19 Where identity is an essential part of an investigatory
stop, the person may be required to provide identifying information.
Thus, where fingerprints, blood, or other physical evidence is found
at the scene of a crime, and there is reasonable suspicion to connect
an individual with the crime, he may be required to provide identify-
ing physical evidence. Also, in cases where a particular person is be-
ing sought under warrant or probable cause and police have reason
to believe that the individual stopped may be that person, identifica-
tion may be required before allowing him to proceed.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred in the
judgment, but criticized the majority for reaching out to render an
advisory opinion on issues not involved in the case-i.e., fingerprint-
ing in the field on the basis of reasonable suspicion. Among Justice
Brennan's complaints was that the Court gives no guidance on how
much time would elapse before the individual would be free to go
and whether the police could detain the individual until the finger-
prints could be compared with others.220 We must be mindful that
the dictum in Hayes was not a holding of the Court. Nevertheless, a
majority of the members of the Court went out of their way to indi-
cate what they would do if faced with the issue. Thus, at a mini-
mum, the case offers a likely indicator as to how the Court would
rule on the question.
The cases discussed above support the conclusion that one sub-
jected to a Terry stop need not identify himself unless identity is an
element of the investigation that prompted the initial stop. Since the
purpose of an investigative stop is to detain the individual pending
the investigation, even if the person declines to identify himself, if
the investigation shows that the officer's suspicions were unfounded
the situation reverts to an essentially consensual encounter.
In sum, it seems that after Lawson, an individual generally has no
obligation to provide identification or to otherwise cooperate with
law enforcement officers in connection with a Terry stop. However,
such an individual may be subjected to a more lengthy stop than
may otherwise be necessary to allow an independent investigation to
confirm that the suspicious individual was or was not engaged in ille-
gal activity. Of course, if the individual provides credible identifica-
tion and a serious crime is not involved, only a brief detention would
543 (1976); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
219. Hayes, 470 U.S. at 814 (quoting from Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721,
727).
220. Hayes, 470 U.S. at 819.
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be justified because a follow-up investigation would be possible.221
But, as discussed above, a refusal to answer questions surrounding
a suspected crime cannot elevate reasonable suspicion to probable
cause. Though, of course, probable cause may be dissipated where a
suspect cooperates and provides credible exculpatory information.
C. Fixed Checkpoints: Limitations on the Power of the
Government to Detain
Lopez-Lopez v. Aran222 addressed the scope of INS authority to
question and detain individuals at fixed checkpoints. The court found
that the INS had established a fixed checkpoint at the San Juan,
Puerto Rico, airport and that the analysis of United States v. Marti-
nez-Fuerte223 should be applied.
In Lopez-Lopez v. Aron, 24 the plaintiff challenged the authority
of the INS to require, as a condition of boarding a commercial air-
liner from Puerto Rico to the United States, production of informa-
tion or documents showing entitlement to reside in the United
States. Plaintiff Lopez, a United States citizen residing in Puerto
Rico, was experienced in immigration law. Prior to the incident that
gave rise to the case, he was about to board a flight from San Juan
to New York City when an INS inspector confiscated his ticket and
asked about his citizenship. Instead of answering, Lopez presented a
card with the inscription "Do you suspect I am an alien?" The INS
inspector inspected others boarding the flight, momentarily leaving
the encounter with Lopez. When Lopez asked if he would be allowed
to board, the inspector returned the ticket, allowed Lopez to board,
and stated that she could determine from Lopez' accent that he was
Puerto Rican. Puerto Ricans are United States citizens and as such
are entitled to freely enter the United States.
Later, on October 2, 1982, Lopez approached a departure gate to
board a flight from Puerto Rico to Washington. Two uniformed INS
inspectors, Aran and Figueroa, were positioned near the gate in front
of the fixed security checkpoint conducting inspections of those seek-
ing to board the flight. When Lopez passed them, Figueroa asked
about Lopez' citizenship. Lopez smiled but did not reply. Instead, he
walked past the agents and put his luggage on the conveyor belt at
221. But, as discussed above, mere identity is not suppressible even if illegally ob-
tained. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039-40 (1984).
222. 844 F.2d 898 (1st Cir. 1988).
223. 428 U.S. 543 (1976). See supra text accompanying notes 166-67.
224. 844 F.2d 898 (1st Cir. 1988).
the security station. The inspectors followed Lopez and again asked
about his citizenship. Refusing to respond verbally, Lopez presented
a card identical to the one he previously presented when boarding
the flight to New York City. A security guard stopped Lopez from
passing the departure gate and returned his luggage.
Lopez brought suit in federal district court "challenging the valid-
ity of the stop, interrogation, and related procedures." Among other
things, he sought an injunction to bar INS officials from questioning
or detaining him when he travels between Puerto Rico and the
United States mainland.
Prior to trial, the INS changed its inspection procedure so that the
point of inspection (checkpoint) was established beyond the security
station. Also, a podium was installed bearing the marking "United
States Immigration" and an official U.S. Government seal. The
agents conducted the inspections from behind the podium or close to
it. The agents' operational instructions did not change; they were to
examine every adult passenger and take possession of their ticket
during questioning.
Lopez challenged the statute and regulation upon which the INS
based the inspection procedure2 5 as unconstitutionally vague, unduly
interfering with travel rights, and permitting searches and seizures
violative of the fourth amendment. Further, Lopez argued that the
regulation was promulgated without adequate statutory support, and
that it was applied in a discriminatory manner. The district court
rejected Lopez' arguments.
On review, the court of appeals asserted that Lopez' "most force-
ful challenge is based on the alleged violations of the fourth amend-
ment and of the right to travel. ' 226 The court stated that the analysis
of Lopez' claim must begin with United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte.221
The court next discussed cases which ruled that the fourth amend-
ment is not violated where a law enforcement officer approaches in-
dividuals in a public place and questions them. But in such cases,
absent reasonable suspicion, individuals may not be detained even
momentarily for refusing to listen or cooperate. Further, refusal to
listen or answer questions does not provide a basis to detain,22
As a final prelude to its analysis, the court referenced pertinent
225. The statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(7) (1988), renders excludable from the
United States aliens seeking to leave Puerto Rico to enter the continental United States.
8 C.F.R. § 235.5 (1991) states that persons seeking to board a flight from Puerto Rico to
the continental United States must be determined admissible to this country. The regula-
tion further provides that unless a determination of admissibility is made, "no . . .per-
son shall be permitted to depart."
226. 844 F.2d at 902.
227. 428 U.S. 543 (1976). See supra text accompanying notes 166-67.
228. 844 F.2d at 904 (quoting from Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983)).
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portions of INS v. Delgado.20 The court noted that this case held,
among other things, that interrogation relating to identity or a re-
quest for identification by the police does not, by itself, constitute a
fourth amendment seizure. But, the court added that in Delgado it
also held that if additional steps are taken to secure an answer in the
face of a refusal to respond, the "fourth amendment imposes some
minimal level of objective justification [as a prerequisite] to validate
the detention or seizure."230
Addressing the cases referred to in its analysis, the court stated
that it synthesized those cases to conclude:
Although the fourth amendment protects individuals irrespective of where
they may be, not all brushes between a citizen and the sovereign call into
play the jurisprudence of the Constitution. In the structured context of, say,
an airline departure gate, the government's right to check citizenship, it
seems to us, is stronger than its right to probe identity in completely fortui-
tous, random situations. Especially where the encounter is brief and nonco-
ercive-that is, if the stop and interrogation involve no more than a modest
intrusion-there need be no particularized suspicion.2 31
The court then addressed the rule of Brown v. Texas," 2 that one
may not be required to identify himself under pain of criminal pen-
alty, absent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
The court concluded that the INS procedure can be bifurcated for
analytic purposes. The first part of the procedure was viewed as the
initial inspection, and questioning, followed by a stop for secondary
inspection if the level of suspicion escalates. The secondary inspec-
tion of Lopez, the court stated, involved following him to ask again
the questions regarding citizenship. This was a reasonable way of
ensuring that the subject of the inspection heard the initial question.
This part of the procedure the court deemed to be merely consen-
sual. Although the requirement that individuals stop at the check-
point or respond to questions in another part of the airport impli-
cates the fourth amendment, the court held that this checkpoint
procedure was authorized by Martinez-Fuerte.
However, in addressing the second part of the INS procedure, the
taking of the subject's ticket to coerce a response to the interroga-
tion, the court stated that "the Constitution cannot abide the INS's
policy of seizing passengers' tickets as a matter of course, before
completing an initial inspection and without the slightest articulable
229. 466 U.S. 216 (1984).
230. Lopez-Lojiez, 844 F.2d at 904 (quoting Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216-17).
231. Lopez-Lopez, 844 F.2d at 904-05.
232. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
suspicion that the ticketholder is an illegal alien. '233 The court con-
tinued, "Although the public interest in interception of illegal aliens
warrants some limited intrusion ... it does not justify arbitrary cap-
ture of a passenger's ticket without any basis for assuming that he or
she may be an illegal alien. ' 2 4 The court stated that "[i]n the ab-
sence of some hint that a passenger may not have valid legal status
to travel to the United States mainland, the INS ticket seizure pol-
icy violates the fourth amendment. '23 5 However, the court stated
that once a reasonable suspicion was formed, taking the person's air-
line ticket pending further inquiry would seem appropriate. 23
Addressing Lopez' claim that his right to travel and fourth
amendment rights had been violated by being barred from the flight
to Washington, the court remanded the case to the district court for
a determination whether the INS inspectors "had an objectively rea-
sonable and articulable suspicion that Lopez was an illegal alien at
the time they prevented him'from boarding his flight. '237 However,
the court's statements on this question are not altogether clear. The
court again cited INS v. Delgado and Brown v. Texas for the pro-
position that if a person refuses to answer a question relating to his
identity and the police take additional steps to obtain an answer, the-
fourth amendment imposes some minimal level of objective justifica-
tion to validate the detention. In a footnote, however, the court
stated that at the fixed checkpoint at the departure gate, "once it is
ascertained that the individual has heard and understood, but is will-
fully refusing to answer, there may well be sufficient justification to
refuse passage pending further inspection."238 This suggests that a
coercive detention, undefined in scope, purpose or duration, may be
warranted where one refuses to provide identification. However, the
text accompanying the footnote in which this language appears
states that a refusal to answer questions concerning identity does not
support a detention or seizure.239 It is possible that by this language,
the court meant that a subject could be detained for a brief period to
attempt to ascertain some independent information regarding the
233. Lopez-Lopez, 844 F.2d at 908.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 908 n.14.
237. Id. at 909.
238. Id. at 909 n.15.
239. It is doubtful that the court is suggesting that though individuals may not be
detained for refusing to answer questions, they may be refused passage through the
checkpoint. This is because the court treated as interrelated Lopez' fourth amendment
claims and his right-to-travel argument. Of course, the right to travel could be com-
pletely frustrated if individuals could be turned back at a checkpoint as punishment for
refusing to identify themselves. Moreover, a refusal to allow one to pass a checkpoint
would constitute a significant intrusion on fourth amendment interests, and accordingly
would require some reasonable and articulable justification.
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subject's identity.
The court noted that one point of confusion was Lopez' passing
the card and refusing to answer.
The evidence in the current record is conflicting about both the substance
and timing of what transpired. The appellant's behavior, first refusing to
answer a simple question and then passing a card with a goading message,
was likely enough to arouse reasonable suspicions about his'right to enter
the mainland. On the other hand, there was evidence in the record sug-
gesting that, under the circumstances, blocking Lopez's passage might have
been unreasonable.
2 4 0
Judge Torruella concurred in part and dissented in part. He con-
curred in the majority's view that seizure of the ticket was violative
of the fourth amendment. However, he disagreed on whether the
INS procedure could be bifurcated. Instead, he concluded that the
procedure was inseparable and as such was violative of the fourth
amendment. 41
Further, regarding the inspectors' bar of Lopez from the flight,
Judge Torruella stated:
There can be no question that the INS harbored no reasonable suspicion
that Lopez was an illegal alien. Had this suspicion existed we can take for
granted that he would have been detained further. Instead, he was allowed
to retrieve his baggage-and leave. In not allowing Lopez to board after they
obviously knew that he was not an illegal alien, the INS inspectors were
manifestly harassing Lopez for objecting to the unconstitutional procedures
which were being applied to him. Thus no question of qualified immunity is
presented by these clearly illegal actions and the remand should be solely
for a determination of the damages suffered by Lopez.24 2
Finally, Judge Torruella stated that despite the majority's correct
statement of the law that one may not be detained merely for refus-
ing to answer an agent's inquiry, it proceeded to misapply that stan-
dard by suggesting that Lopez' refusal to answer coupled with his
passing the "goading message" might provide a minimal level of jus-
tification for detention. However, he noted that it is unlikely that
presenting the card caused a higher level of suspicion than if he
would have remained totally silent.
In United States v. Rodriguez-Rosario,24 3 the same panel that de-
cided Lopez-Lopez v. Aran244 ruled that questioning at an INS
checkpoint in a Puerto Rican airport is a consensual encounter.
Thus, where answers voluntarily given to those questions give rise to
240. Lopez-Lopez, 844 F.2d at 909.
241. Id. at 911-12.
242. Id. at 915 (citation omitted).
243. 845 F.2d 27 (1st Cir. 1988).
244. 844 F.2d 898 (1st Cir. 1988).
reasonable suspicion or probable cause, further detention is war-
ranted. The court rejected appellant's arguments concerning the con-
stitutionality of the checkpoint, stating:
Appellant's stop and consensual interrogation must be judged against the
same constitutional standards as are applicable to any stop and interroga-
tion in the streets of our nation, the checkpoint setting being totally imma-
terial to such issues. Cf. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543(1976) .2 45
Application of the Foregoing Principles in an Immigration Context:
1. An individual may, without penalty or adverse inference, refuse
to cooperate or even listen to questions in a consensual encounter.
2. At a fixed checkpoint an individual may be stopped and forced to
listen to questions, but there is no obligation to answer, and without
reasonable suspicion to continue the detention for investigative pur-
poses, the person should be allowed go on his way.24e
3. If there is reasonable suspicion of illegal alienage or other viola-
tion of the immigration laws, but the suspect refuses to answer ques-
tions, probable cause must be independently established before the
suspect may be detained beyond a reasonable time to investigate the
officer's suspicions.
4. The foregoing principles regarding reasonable suspicion should ap-
ply as well to non-fixed checkpoint stops based on reasonable
suspicion.
5. A request for documents that show a right to be in the United
States exceeds a request for identification. Rather, it is a request for
possibly incriminating information 247 and is not information sought
for the purposes contemplated in Hayes v. Florida.248
These principles have, in large measure, been addressed in the
context of a "consensual" street encounter. As discussed above, the
fact that one chooses not to answer questions or to provide identifica-
tion does not justify detention. Otherwise, the encounter simply is
not consensual. Of course, an individual's actions may give rise to
suspicions- that warrant a brief detention for further investigation.
However, differences do exist between consensual encounters and
checkpoint stops. For example, the Supreme Court has authorized
modest fourth amendment intrusions at checkpoints in order to re-
quest that vehicle occupants answer questions about their citizenship
and immigration status and provide identification. It is clear that to
the extent vehicle occupants have to listen to these questions and
245. Rodriguez-Rosario, 845 F.2d at 29.
246. However, at such checkpoints, arguably the INS may, pursuant to a delega-
tion from state authorities, be empowered to check for driver's licenses, since each vehicle
operator must have a license in possession when driving. But this authority still would not
cover passengers.
247. E.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1325 and 1326 (1988).
248. 470 U.S. 811 (1985). See supra text accompanying notes 211-19.
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requests, these encounters are different than consensual encounters,
where the courts have said the individual need not even listen to the
officer.
Regardless of the differences, individuals stopped at a checkpoint
are not required to provide information to the inquiring officers. As
discussed above, Justice White, in a concurring opinion in Terry v.
Ohio,249 opined that a refusal to cooperate with law enforcement of-
ficers does not form a basis for an arrest. But, in Brignoni-Ponce,250
the Court, in describing the limited nature of a Terry investigative
stop, stated that "[a]ll that is required" of the subjects of the stop is
"a response to a brief question or two and possibly the production of
a document evidencing a right to be in the United States. '251 The
Court in Martinez-Fuerte252 used this same language in describing
the nature of the intrusion at a fixed checkpoint. Because of this
language, one must ask: Are individuals "required" to answer ques-
tions and produce documents on demand, or was the Court simply
explaining the limited nature of the stop and the questions posed? In
light of the Supreme Court precedent discussed above, the answer
has to be that if the individuals refuse to answer questions or provide
documentation, they must be allowed to go on their way unless a
brief investigation uncovers evidence to warrant further detention.
The burden is not on an individual to show he is legally in this coun-
try. Instead, the burden is on the government to prove he is not.253
To show that a person is in this country illegally, the government
must prove by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence that the
individual is not a citizen and has no right to be in the country.254
This burden is typically met by showing that the individual was born
abroad. Such a showing shifts the burden to the individual to show
he or she is in the country legally or suffer a finding of
deportability 55
However, when the individual refuses to answer any questions and
there is no independent way to prove alienage, at what point is the
government obliged to allow the person to freely go? The Supreme
249. 392 U.S. 1, 34.
250. 422 U.S. 873 (1975). See supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
251. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 880.
252. 428 U.S. at 558.
253. However, experience has shown that many aliens illegally in the United
States will admit this on being questioned by government agents.
254. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988).
255. See 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1988). See, e.g., Ramon-Sepulveda v. INS, 743 F.2d
1307, 1308 (9th Cir. 1984); Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 725 (9th Cir. 1980); In
re Carrillo, 17 I & N Dec. 30, 32 (BIA 1979).
Court has stated that searches or detentions beyond the limited in-
trusions envisioned by fixed-checkpoint stops require probable cause.
D. Reasonable Scope of a Terry Stop
In addressing what action could be taken to investigate reasonable
suspicion, courts have held that a reasonable suspicion of crime is
insufficient to justify custodial interrogation even though the interro-
gation is investigative.2 51
Justice White, in the plurality opinion of Florida v. Royer,25
stated that Brignoni-Ponce25 8 authorized a temporary seizure "to
verify or dispel the suspicion that the immigration laws were being
violated, a governmental interest that was sufficient to warrant tem-
porary detention for limited questioning. ' 259 But, citing Dunaway v.
New York,260 the Court cautioned that, absent probable cause, police
may not seek to verify their suspicions by means that approach the
conditions of arrest. 261
In United States v. Sharpe,'6 2 the Court held that there is no
bright-line test to determine the amount of time a Terry suspect may
be detained for investigation. Specifically, the Court reversed the
lower court's determination that a twenty minute detention exceeded
the scope of a Terry detention. It was noted that the brevity of a
Terry stop is one important factor in determining whether the intru-
sion is justified. But, also to be considered are the law enforcement
needs to be served by the stop and the time reasonably needed to
effectuate those purposes. 63 The Court stressed that there was no
evidence that the officers had engaged in unnecessary delay or dila-
tory tactics to prolong the detention. 26 4 Concluding, the Court
stated:
In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an
investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police
diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or
dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain
the defendant.265
256. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 211-12 (1979). See also Hayes v. Flor-
ida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985), supra at notes 211-17 and accompanying text.
257. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
258. 422 U.S. 873 (1975). See supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
259. 460 U.S. at 498.
260. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
261. 460 U.S. at 499.
262. 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
263. Id. at 685.
264. Id. at 687.
265. Id. at 686. In United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 223 (1985), the Court
held that the police may stop and briefly detain the subject of a "wanted flier" issued by
a police officer while they attempt to find out whether an arrest warrant had been issued.
Thus, the Court made clear that Terry is not limited to imminent crimes but applies as
well to efforts to apprehend perpetrators of past crimes.
546
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The Court in INS v. Delgado acknowledged that persons at or
around the factories who attempted to flee or evade the agents may
have been detained for questioning.2 6 Flight or evasion by one with
whom a consensual encounter is attempted, alone or in combination
with other factors, has been held to constitute reasonable suspicion
to justify a brief detention for questioning. 87 If the subject refuses to
answer questions, in some circumstances it may be reasonable to
continue the detention pending a brief investigation to discover
whether there is independent evidence the person may be involved in
a violation of law.
But in an immigration context, without the cooperation of the sus-
pect or others who know his or her nationality, in most cases it will
be difficult, if possible at all, for the government to carry its burden
of clear, convincing, and unequivocal evidence that the suspect is an
alien illegally in this country.28 As discussed below, this burden is
typically met by showing that the individual was born abroad.
Thus, law enforcement officers may not arbitrarily exercise their
considerable powers of detention and arrest. The exercise of such
powers must be supported by specific articulable facts available to
the officers prior to the detention or arrest.26 9
The seminal case of Terry v. Ohio acknowledged that one concern
of an unbridled right of law enforcement officers to detain and inter-
rogate individuals was that minority group members would be sin-
gled out and unduly harassed, causing friction between the minority
community and law enforcement.2 70 This concern in the enforcement
of the immigration laws is heightened since racial minorities, espe-
cially Hispanic appearing individuals, will be the primary targets of
266. 466 U.S. at 220.
267. See, e.g., United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975) (stating
in dictum that erratic driving or obvious attempts to evade officers can support a reasona-
ble suspicion). See also United States v. Medina-Gasca, 739 F.2d 1451, 1453 (9th Cir.
1984) (two heavily laden vans, traveling in tandem on a known smuggling route, passen-
gers of which dispersed from a roadside stop when an officer approached in a marked
patrol unit, supported a finding of reasonable suspicion); Au Yi Lau v. INS, 445 F.2d
217, 223 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied 404 U.S. 864 (1971).
However, at least one court has expressed concern that INS may try to create a rea-
sonable suspicion on which to base a forcible stop by prompting the targets of its scrutiny
to flee. This court issued a preliminary injunction barring INS from conducting itself in a
manner that deliberately provokes flight by workers. International Molders' and Allied
Workers' Local Union No. 164 v. Nelson, 643 F. Supp. 884, 903-04 (N.D. Cal. 1986),
aff'd in pertinent part, 799 F.2d 547, 554 (9th Cir. 1986).
268. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1970 & Supp. 1991).
269. See, e.g., Nicacio v. INS, 797 F.2d 700, 701, 706 (9th Cir. 1985).
270. 392 U.S. 1, 14 n.ll.
such enforcement.
V. SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS
The Supreme Court in INS v. Lopez-Mendozaz17 ruled, with cer-
tain exceptions, that the Exclusionary Rule did not apply to civil de-
portation proceedings. The Court, however, stated that its ruling did
not encompass "egregious violations of fourth amendment or other
liberties that might transgress notions of fundamental fairness and
undermine the probative value of the evidence obtained. 27 2 In Lo-
pez-Mendoza, two separate fact situations were addressed. One re-
spondent, Adan Lopez-Mendoza, was arrested in 1976 by INS
agents at his place of work, a transmission repair shop in San Mateo,
California. The INS agents, in response to a tip, arrived at Lopez-
Mendoza's work location shortly before 8:00 A.M. They did not
have warrants to search the premises or to arrest anyone there. The
owner of the shop, in the language of the Court, "firmly refused to
allow the agents to interview his employees during working
hours. 2 73 However, while one agent talked to the owner, another
agent entered the shop and questioned Lopez-Mendoza, who gave his
name and stated that he was from Mexico with no close family ties
in the United States.274 The agent then arrested him. Later, at INS
offices, Lopez-Mendoza admitted he was born in Mexico, was still a
citizen of Mexico, and had entered the United States without inspec-
tion by immigration authorities. On the basis of his statements, the
agents prepared a "Record of Deportable Alien"275 and an affidavit
which Lopez-Mendoza executed, admitting his Mexican nationality
and his illegal entry into this country.2
At the deportation hearing before an immigration judge, Lopez-
Mendoza's counsel moved to terminate the proceeding on the ground
that Lopez-Mendoza had been arrested illegally. The judge ruled
that the legality of the arrest was not relevant to the deportation
proceeding and declined to rule on the legality of the arrest. The
Record of Deportable Alien and the affidavit were received into evi-
dence without objection from Lopez-Mendoza. From this evidence
the immigration judge found Lopez-Mendoza deportable and gave
him the option of departing the country voluntarily.2 77
271. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
272. Id. at 1050-51.
273. Id. at 1035.
274. Id.
275. Id. This report is known as Form 1-213 and sets forth biographical and immi-
gration information of the respondent, which is the basis of the INS' charge that the
person is illegally in the country.
276. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1035.
277. Id. at 1035-36.
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On appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), the immi-
gration judge's ruling was upheld on the grounds that an illegal ar-
rest has no bearing on a subsequent deportation proceeding. Also,
the BIA pointed out that Lopez-Mendoza had not objected to the
admission of the documents that showed he was deportable .27 Fur-
ther, the BIA stated that the Exclusionary Rule is not intended to
redress the injury to the privacy of the search victim and that the
BIA had previously concluded that the Exclusionary Rule did not
apply in deportation matters to deter unlawful INS conduct. The
court of appeals vacated the deportation order and remanded for a
determination whether Lopez-Mendoza's fourth amendment rights
had been violated when he was arrested.279
In the second case considered by the Court, respondent Sandoval-
Sanchez was arrested in 1977 at his job, a potato processing plant in
Paco, Washington. INS Agent Bower and other officers, with the
permission of the plant's personnel manager, questioned employees
to determine if any were undocumented aliens. During a change in
shift, officers stationed themselves at the exits while Bower and a
uniformed Border Patrol agent entered the plant. Bower and the uni-
formed agent eventually stood by the main entrance of the plant and
looked for passing employees who averted their heads, avoided eye
contact, or tried to hide themselves in a group. Those individuals
were addressed with innocuous questions in English. Those who
could not respond in English and who otherwise aroused Agent
Bower's suspicions were questioned in Spanish as to their right to be
in the United States.28 °
Sandoval-Sanchez was in a line of workers entering the plant. He
stated that he did not realize that immigration officers were checking
people entering the plant, but he did see a uniformed man who ap-
peared to be a police officer standing at the plant entrance. Bower
testified that while he was not positive, he probably questioned San-
doval-Sanchez at the plant. The employee Bower thought he
remembered as Sandoval-Sanchez had been "very evasive," averted
his head, turned around and walked away when he saw Bower.
Bower was certain that no one was questioned about their status un-
less their actions had given the agents reason to believe that they
were an undocumented alien. Thirty-seven employees, including San-
doval-Sanchez, were briefly detained at the plant and then taken to
278. I.e., the Form 1-213 and the affidavit. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1036.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 1036-37.
the county jail. Sandoval-Sanchez exercised his right to a deporta-
tion hearing and was questioned further. Bower recorded Sandoval-
Sanchez's admission of illegal entry. Sandoval-Sanchez claimed that
he was not aware that he had a right to remain silent. 28'
At his deportation hearing, Sandoval-Sanchez contended that the
evidence offered by the INS should be suppressed as the fruit of an
unlawful arrest. The immigration judge rejected the claim that there
had been an unlawful arrest but ruled in the alternative that the
legality of the arrest was not relevant to the deportation hearing.
The immigration judge, on the basis of the written record, found
Sandoval-Sanchez deportable and granted him voluntary departure.
The BIA dismissed the alien's appeal, concluding that the circum-
stances of the arrest did not affect the voluntariness of his recorded
admission and declined to invoke the Exclusionary Rule.2 2
On appeal, the court of appeal reversed the BIA's decision, finding
that Sandoval-Sanchez's detention by the immigration officers vio-
lated the fourth amendment, that the statements he made were a
product of that detention, and that the Exclusionary Rule barred
their use in a deportation hearing. However, the Supreme Court re-
versed. Using the analysis of United States v. Janis,28' the Court
concluded that, in deportation proceedings, the Exclusionary Rule's
value in deterring illegal searches and seizures was outweighed by
the societal costs of applying the Rule. In sum, the Court ruled that
the deterrent value of the Exclusionary Rule in deportation proceed-
ings was insufficient to warrant its application because:
1) The person and identity of the respondent are not suppressible,
even assuming an illegal arrest, and "when evidence not derived di-
rectly from the arrest is sufficient" to uphold deportation, then de-
portation is still possible.2"4
2) Few aliens arrested request deportation hearings, and even fewer
challenge the circumstances of their arrest. Thus, the arresting of-
281. Id. at 1037.
282. Id. at 1038.
283. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
284. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1043. The Court also stated:
The "body" or identity of a defendant or respondent in a criminal or civil pro-
ceeding is never itself suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful arrest, even if it is
conceded that an unlawful arrest, search, or interrogation occurred. See Ger-
stein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522
(1952); United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 158 (1923).
Id. at 1039-40. And the Court went on to state that:
[R]egardless of how the arrest is effected, deportation will still be possible
when evidence not derived directly from the arrest is sufficient to support de-
portation.... Since the person and identity of the respondent are not them-
selves suppressible ... the INS must prove only alienage, and that will some-
times be possible using evidence gathered independently of or sufficiently
attenuated from, the original arrest.
Id. at 1043 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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ficer is "most unlikely to shape his conduct in anticipation of the
exclusion of evidence at a formal deportation hearing. '28 5
3) Perhaps most importantly, the INS has its own comprehensive
scheme for deterring fourth amendment violations by its officers. For
example, INS regulations prohibit arrest "unless there is an admis-
sion of illegal alienage or other strong evidence thereof. '2 6
4) The INS is a single agency under central federal control and en-
gaged in repetitive operations, making declaratory relief against vio-
lations of fourth amendment rights a possible remedy.287
Additionally, the Court offered the following reasons to show that
societal costs outweigh the benefits of applying the Exclusionary
Rule in deportation matters:
1) An undocumented alien's mere presence in the United States con-
stitutes a continuing violation of the laws that require an alien to
register his or her presence with proper authorities.88 The Exclu-
sionary Rule does not sanction continuing violations of law.289
2) Deportation hearings are streamlined to handle large numbers of
cases. Applying the Exclusionary Rule would slow the system be-
cause neither the immigration judges nor the attorneys practicing
before them "are likely to be well versed in the intricacies of fourth
amendment law.' ' 90 In this connection, there was a reference to the
possible invocation of fourth amendment claims as a dilatory tactic
to gain delay of an alien's deportation.29'
3) Because of the great numbers of aliens arrested each year it
would be burdensome to require immigration officers to "compile
elaborate, contemporaneous, written reports detailing the circum-
stances of every arrest."29
4) Application of the rule could result in the suppression of large
285. Id. at 1044.
286. Id. at 1044-45.
287. Id. at 1045.
288. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1306 (1920 & Supp. 1991) (imposes requirements on cer-
tain aliens to register).
289. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1046.
290. Id. at 1048. It is ironic that given the Court's reservations concerning the
ability of immigration judges to address the intricacies of fourth amendment law, such
judges will still be obliged to interpret the fourth amendment. To determine whether an
egregious fourth amendment violation has occurred, it is first necessary to determine
whether that amendment has been violated at all. Then there must be distinctions drawn
between nonegregious and egregious violations. In any event, the simple rule of Arguel-
les-Vasquez, discussed infra, would avoid the "intricacies of fourth amendment law" and
would not perplex practitioners or immigration judges.
291. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1048.
292. Id. at 1049.
amounts of lawfully obtained information because INS arrests occur
in crowded and confused circumstances. Further, a requirement that
INS agents record precisely the circumstances of each arrest would
preclude mass arrests of "ascertainably illegal aliens, and even when
the arrests can be and are conducted in full compliance with all
fourth amendment requirements. 293
It warrants mention that Justice White's dissent offers some of the
most cogent and persuasive reasoning to counter the arguments of-
fered by the majority.2 94 However, since Lopez-Mendoza is now the
law of the land, the pertinent inquiry is how that decision should be
interpreted. Examined here is what searches or seizures fall within
the "egregious" conduct exception mentioned in Lopez-Mendoza and
therefore may yet be subject to suppression in a deportation hearing.
The Court stated that the inapplicability of the exclusionary rule
in deportation proceedings did not address "egregious violations of
fourth amendment or other liberties that might transgress notions of
fundamental fairness and undermine the probative value of the evi-
dence obtained. '295 In a footnote, the Court stated:
We note that subsequent to its decision in Matter of Sandoval, 17 I. & N.
Dec. 70 (1979), the BIA held that evidence will be excluded if the circum-
stances surrounding a particular arrest and interrogation would render use
of the evidence obtained thereby "fundamentally unfair" and in violation of
due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment. 29'
Finally, the Court cautioned that its view of the value of the Ex-
clusionary Rule "might change, if there developed good reason to
believe that fourth amendment violations by INS officer§ were wide-
spread. 297 Thus, if the INS systematically violates the fourth
amendment, it is possible that the Court will find that the Exclusion-
293. Id. at 1049-50.
294. Lopez-Mendoza was a 5 to 4 decision with Justices Brennan, White, Marshall
and Stevens dissenting. Of the five justices in the majority, two have been replaced by
Justices Scalia and Kennedy. If either of these justices agrees with the minority reason-
ing the result could change, making the Exclusionary Rule fully applicable in deportation
proceedings. While it is impossible to predict how the new justices will rule, many will
speculate based on the justices' lower court decisions. For example, see then-judge Ken-
nedy's dissent in United States v. Penn, 647 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1980), stating:
The rigidities of the Exclusionary Rule, and the occasional frustration caused
by its enforcement, should not obscure the fact that determinations of fourth
amendment reasonableness must be made independently of the question
whether exclusion of the evidence is undesirable for other reasons.
Id. at 888 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
295. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050-51 (footnote omitted).
296. Id. at 1051, n.5 (citations omitted). This part of the decision did not enjoy a
majority. The majority opinion, per Justice O'Connor, was joined by Justices Burger,
Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist. However, Chief Justice Burger declined to join in the
part of the decision containing the above quoted language. Nevertheless, it seems clear
that the dissenters, who would give the Exclusionary Rule full effect in deportation pro-
ceedings, would apply this limited exclusionary rule.
297. Id. at 1050.
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ary Rule should apply in deportation proceedings as it does in crimi-
nal proceedings.
A. Application of the Exclusionary Rule in Deportation
Proceedings: Terminations of Deportation Proceedings
for Inadmissible or Insufficient Evidence
Where an illegal search or seizure is alleged, the respondent may
seek to suppress admissions of the evidence so obtained. If the mo-
tion to suppress is denied, the contested evidence, which presumably
shows foreign alienage, will be admitted into evidence. If, however,
the motion is granted and the government has no independent evi-
dence of alienage, the proceeding will be terminated. 298 For example,
the Board of Immigration Appeals has barred an admission of for-
eign alienage on the grounds that it was obtained involuntarily. 99
The respondent made the statements after his requests to talk to his
attorney were repeatedly denied and after being held in custody for a
significant period. The Board found that inasmuch as the statements
were involuntarily given, due process barred their admission. Fur-
ther, because the involuntary statements were "the sole evidence
supporting the finding of deportability" the immigration judge's de-
portability finding was reversed and the proceedings ordered
terminated. 300
B. Circumstances Where Evidence Has Been Ruled Excludable
i. Nighttime Warrantless Entry into Respondent's
Residence
In In re Ramira-Cordova,30 1 the disputed evidence was obtained
in an illegal nighttime warrantless entry into the respondent's resi-
dence. 0 2 The occupants were threatened with physical harm, pushed
about and rudely treated. As a result, the occupants made state-
ments to the officers. The immigration officers seized certain docu-
ments which presumedly related to the respondents' alienage, al-
298. See In re Garcia, 17 I & N Dec. 319 (BIA 1980).
299. Id.
300. Id. at 321.
301. No. A21 095-659 (BIA Feb. 21, 1980). See infra notes 349-57 and accompa-
nying text.
302. O'Rourke v. City of Norman, 875 F.2d 1465 (10th Cir. 1989) (outlines the
history of this country's aversion to nighttime searches of residences, even under author-
ity of a search warrant).
though the BIA did not specify the nature or contents of the
documents. 303 The immigration judge admitted the statements and
other evidence resulting from the search. The BIA suppressed the
seized evidence and terminated the proceeding against respondents
because there was no other evidence or testimony establishing
deportability.
Futhermore, where deportation proceedings are terminated after
evidence is suppressed, the INS may not be able to reopen deporta-
tion proceedings to present other evidence of deportability if that evi-
dence was reasonably available at the time of the initial hearing. In
Ramon-Sepulveda v. INS,30 4 the INS brought a deportation action
against Ramon-Sepulveda in May of 1978. At the time of his appre-
hension, Ramon-Sepulveda told the immigration officers that his
name was Corona-Covarrubias. However, at his initial deportation
hearing he identified himself by both names but his attorney admit-
ted that his true name was Jose Ramon-Sepulveda. The immigration
judge granted Ramon-Sepulveda's request for a continuance. The
deportation hearing reconvened six weeks later in July of 1978. At
the July proceeding, the respondent invoked the privilege against
self-incrimination and refused to testify. The INS then sought to in-
troduce a Form 1-213 (Record of Deportable Alien) which purport-
edly related to the respondent. Ramon-Sepulveda's attorney objected
to the document, claiming lack of foundation. The INS withdrew the
proffered document and did not seek a continuance to develop its
case in light of respondent's refusal to testify. Rather, it urged the
judge to find respondent deportable. 305 Ramon-Sepulveda's attorney
moved to terminate the proceedings because alienage had not been
proved. The immigration judge terminated the proceedings because
the Service had not met its burden of proving deportability.
303. Ramira-Cordova, No. A21 095-659 at 2.
304. 743 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir. 1984).
305. The court suggested that the Service could have requested a continuance at
the reconvened hearing when the respondent refused to testify. Id. at 1308 and 1310.
However, a continuance would seem to have been unwarranted. In re Sibrun, 18 I&N
Dec. 354 (BIA 1983), held that a continuance should be granted only on a showing that
the lack of preparation occurred despite a diligent good faith effort to be ready to pro-
ceed, and a showing that any additional evidence to be obtained is "probative, noncumu-
lative, and significantly favorable" to the party seeking -the continuance. Id. at 356. The
burden of proving deportability is on the Service. It is doubtful that the Service can
reasonably assume a respondent will not invoke his privilege against self-incrimination, or
that he will testify consistent with the facts the Service believes to be true. Absent some
representation by the respondent or his attorney that deportability will not be contested it
seems reasonable to expect the Service to be fully prepared to present its case at the time
of the final hearing or seek a continuance prior to that time.
The same is true of a respondent seeking relief in lieu of deportation. It seems unrea-
sonable that a respondent, who has the burden of showing he is entitled to such relief,
would seek a continuance because he assumed the Service would not contest alleged facts
supporting that relief. Such a practice by either respondents or the Service is not justified
under Sibrun and would result in a tremendous waste of the immigration court's time.
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Seven months later, the INS moved to reopen deportation to intro-
duce respondent's birth certificate showing that he was born in Mex-
ico. After the deportation proceeding was terminated, an INS inves-
tigator went to Ramon-Sepulveda's neighborhood and located a
neighbor who told the investigator that Ramon-Sepulveda was born
in Mexico. The INS then obtained what it believed was Ramon-
Sepulveda's birth certificate and sought to reopen deportation pro-
ceedings claiming the birth certificate was material evidence that
was unavailable at the deportation hearing. The immigration judge
reopened to allow the INS to show deportability. The BIA affirmed.
The court reversed, holding that the rules governing motions to reo-
pen which require new and material evidence not reasonably availa-
ble or discoverable at the original hearing °6 apply equally to the
INS as to respondents. The birth certificate, the court found, was
reasonably available at the first hearing. The INS simply did not
think it would be necessary, and indeed, did not even commence its
investigation until after the deportation hearing.
This case has interesting implications. Foremost is the result that
a respondent, though illegally in the country, will be allowed to re-
main because the INS, by not obtaining reasonably available evi-
dence, failed to meet its burden of showing deportability.30 The case
is somewhat ironic in that the INS apparently did not recognize that
the regulations concerning reopening applied to the INS as well as to
306. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.2, 242.22 (1990).
307. However, this is not to say that Ramon-Sepulveda may not have deportation
proceedings initiated against him on the basis of evidence that may develop after the
initial hearing. For example, if he later admits to being an alien illegally in the United
States, the Service might seek to reopen deportation proceedings, arguing that this per-
suasive evidence was not available at the first hearing. Also, if he commits a deportable
offense he is not immune from deportation. Thus, Ramon-Sepulveda is not automatically
entitled to remain in the United States.
But the Service could not simply seek to avoid its burden to reopen deportation pro-
ceedings by commencing a "new" deportation proceeding against Ramon-Sepulveda, any
more than an applicant seeking relief in lieu of deportation could continue to refile previ-
ously denied applications without regard to the reopening provisions. First, the reopening
provisions apply to the Service as well as to respondents or other affected parties. 8
C.F.R. §§ 3.2, 242.22 (1990). Second, the regulations provide that in certain circum-
stances cancellation of an order to show cause, or dismissal of deportation proceedings,
may be "without prejudice to the alien or the Service." 8 C.F.R. § 242.7(b) (1990).
Implicit in this regulation is the premise that other dismissals or terminations are with
prejudice. See Ramon-Sepulveda v. INS, 824 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1987).
It has long been recognized that there is no applicable statute of limitation affecting
deportation proceedings. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
However, under the Ramon-Sepulveda rule, respondents enjoy some degree of protection
from repeated actions seeking their deportation.
respondents.30
In a subsequent proceeding, the INS again sought to initiate a
new deportation proceeding on the basis of the same birth certificate
that had been rejected previously.309 The court found that the earlier
decision was res judicata and that the Service could not litigate it
again.3al
ii. Stops Based Solely on Hispanic Appearance:
Analysis of Arguelles-Vasquez v. INS
On April 19, 1988, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, en banc,
vacated a three-judge panel's earlier Arguelles-Vasquez opinion.31'
In a brief order, the court noted that proceedings had earlier been
stayed in this case pending disposition of the alien's application for
legalization under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986. The court, in its April 19, 1988, order stated that the alien
had been granted the first stage of legalization3 12 and was awaiting
the time when he could apply for permanent residency. In light of
these developments, the petition for review was voluntarily dis-
missed. The court noted that if the petitioner again became deport-
able under the order of deportation at issue, he could refile his peti-
tion for review, which would be assigned to a three-judge panel in
the normal manner.313
The court's action calls into question what effect, if any, its earlier
vacated decision will have. It has often been stated that a decision
that has been vacated lacks precedential value.3 1 4 Although panel
decisions often appear in published reporters even though they have
been vacated, the mere fact of publication does not confer preceden-
tial value on such opinions.315 Instead, vacated opinions may be cited
for precedential effect only when they have been validated by the
court, such as when an en banc court refers to and adopts by refer-
308. However, the regulations make it clear that the "Commissioner or any other
duly authorized officer of the Service" is bound by the reopening requirements. 8 C.F.R.§§ 3.2, 242.22 (1990).
309. Ramon-Sepulveda v. INS, 824 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1987) (per curiam).
310. Id. at 750. In Ramon-Sepulveda v. INS, 863 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1988), the
court awarded attorney's fees to Ramon-Sepulveda for having to defend against the gov-
ernment's renewed attempts to deport him. In this case, the court offers more reasons
why the new deportation charge, based on the same evidence that had been rejected in
the motion to reopen, was insupportable.
311. Arguelles-Vasquez v. INS, 786 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated in 844
F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1988).
312. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a) (Supp. 1991).
313. Thus, it was ordered that "[t]he three-judge panel's opinion, reported at 786
F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1986) is vacated." Arguelles-Vasquez, 844 F.2d at 701.
314. Alvarado v. Bd. of T. of Montgomery Com. College, 848 F.2d 457 (4th Cir.
1988); see also Gutierrez v. Mun. Ct. of S.E. Judicial Dist., 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir.
1988).
315. Alvarado, 848 F.2d 457 (4th Cir. 1988).
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ence a previously published but vacated panel opinion for purposes of
convenience and economy of expression.316
The basic authority for the effect of a vacated decision is County
of Los Angeles v. Davis.3 17 In that case, as in Arguelles-Vasquez v.
INS, the issues involved had become moot. The majority of the
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Brennan, stated that "[o]f ne-
cessity our decision vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals
deprives that court's opinion of precedential effect ... .":18 However,
in dissent, Mr. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger, com-
plained that the majority had avoided the underlying issues in the
case. The dissent stated, "The Court's disposition today will leave
the decision of the court of appeals on the merits as the most perti-
nent statement of the governing law, even if that decision is not di-
rectly binding."3'1 9 The dissent went on to state that vacating a deci-
sion prevents it from being the law of the case.3 20 But the dissent
worried that "the expressions of the court below on the merits, if not
reversed, will continue to have precedential weight and, until con-
trary authority is decided, is likely to be viewed as persuasive au-
thority if not the governing law" of the circuit. 21
The dissenting opinion's claim that a vacated decision will con-
tinue to have precedential weight is inaccurate. However, the dis-
sent's view that a decision that is vacated on grounds other than the
merits (such as mootness) is likely to be viewed as persuasive seems
obvious beyond doubt. First, at least a majority of a three-judge
panel embraced the legal position articulated in their decision. Thus,
absent some significant intervening developments, e.g., contrary
higher court decision or legislation, it is reasonable to assume that
these judges will decide the issue the same way when confronted
with it in the future. Further, presumedly the vacated decision was
based on analysis and reasoning. The elimination of the decision as
precedent does not prevent a repetition of the decision's analysis and
reasoning. Accordingly, few would pretend that a decision vacated
on grounds other than the merits did not exist, and few would not
refer to or repeat its reasoning if the issue were again raised before
the same court. Thus, to this extent, the dissent in Davis merely
states the obvious.
316. Id.
317. 440 U.S. 625 (1979).
318. Id. at 634 n.6 (citation omitted).
319. Id. at 646 (footnote omitted).
320. Id. n.10.
321. Id.
In Arguelles-Vasquez,3 22 the court ruled that an illegal seizure of
a person based solely on Hispanic appearance is an egregious fourth
amendment violation which requires suppression of evidence ob-
tained as fruits of an unlawful seizure. Arguelles-Vasquez' car was
stopped by a Border Patrol officer near Camarillo, California, north
of Los Angeles. He was traveling from his job to his home. The of-
ficer questioned him about his right to be in the United States.
Arguel' .s-Vasquez presented to the officer a Notice of Approval of
Second Preference Visa Petition. While the officer examined the doc-
ument, Arguelles was detained in a Border Patrol vehicle. The officer
determined that the document did not confer an immediate right to
be in the country. Arguelles was then arrested and taken to a Border
Patrol office where he stated that he was a citizen of Mexico and
that he had entered the United States in December of 1979 without
being inspected by an immigration officer. The interrogating officer
wrote this information on a Form 1-213 (Record of Deportable
Alien). Deportation proceedings were commenced by the INS. At
his deportation hearing, Arguelles-Vasquez moved to suppress his
statements, claiming they were obtained as a result of an unlawful
seizure based solely on his Hispanic appearance. He requested an
opportunity to cross-examine the arresting Border Patrol officer to
prove this was the sole basis for the stop. The immigration judge
denied the request, denied the motion to suppress, and concluded
that the information provided by the alien after the stop established
deportability. The BIA affirmed. Although the BIA assumed argu-
endo an illegal arrest, it found no egregious violation of the alien's
constitutional rights warranting exclusion of the evidence obtained.
The court in Arguelles-Vasquez, quoting from Lopez-Mendoza,
noted that the Supreme Court left open the question of whether ex-
clusion of evidence was appropriate if the evidence were obtained by
"egregious violations of fourth amendment or other liberties that
might transgress notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the
probative value of the evidence obtained. 323
The court then pointed out that it had implicitly rejected the no-
tion that the Exclusionary Rule would be applied only when the
challenged conduct undermined the probative value of the illegally
obtained evidence. The court noted that the Supreme Court in Lo-
pez-Mendoza cited Rochin v. California324 as support for the pro-
position that evidence obtained by an egregious violation of individ-
ual liberties may be excluded from civil proceedings.325 In Rochin,
officers directed a doctor to induce Rochin to vomit in order to ob-
322. 786 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1986).
323. Id. at 1434 (quoting from Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050-51 (1984)).
324. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
325. See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050-51.
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tain drug capsules from his stomach. These capsules were deemed
inadmissible though they were highly probative evidence of Rochin's
possession of contraband.3 26 Also, the court in Arguelles-Vasquez
stated that the value of the Exclusionary Rule as a deterrent to offi-
cial misconduct would be very limited if there were a requirement
that the probative value of the evidence obtained was impaired. 27
Further, the Ninth Circuit in Arguelles-Vasquez remarked that
Lopez-Mendoza had cited In re Toro3 28 for the principle that the
BIA would exclude illegally obtained evidence if the use of such evi-
dence would be "'fundamentally unfair' and in violation of due pro-
cess requirements of the fifth amendment. 3 29 In In re Toro the facts
were somewhat similar to those in Arguelles-Vasquez. In Toro, it
was alleged that:
[T]he respondent was stopped just after she stepped off a bus in downtown
Los Angeles, while she was wearing ordinary street clothes... [A] Service
[INS] automobile pulled up next to the respondent, an officer got out of the
car, and asked the respondent for identification. There was no apparent rea-
son for speaking to the respondent other than "her obvious Latin appear-
ance." He proceeded to identify himself as a Service officer, and indicated
that he did not know the respondent's name and was not looking for her
specifically. He allegedly asked to see the respondent's purse, opened it, re-
moved a Social Security card and pay stub, then put the respondent in his
car. It was alleged that the officers then proceeded down the street, stopped
and questioned two other women of Latin appearance, and also placed them
in the car. The women were then taken to Immigration Service offices,
where they were fingerprinted and again questioned, and where the infor-
mation contained in the Form 1-213 [Record of Deportable Alien] was
obtained.33
0
At her deportation hearing, the respondent asked to call the INS
officer who placed her in custody so that he could corroborate her
version of the facts.33 1 However, the immigration judge, after discov-
ering that the arresting officer was not available to testify that day,
ruled that his presence was not necessary because no illegality sur-
rounding her arrest had been shown.3 32 Thus, he admitted the 1-213
in evidence.
As noted above, the alien argued that she had been stopped by
INS agents solely because of her Hispanic appearance in violation of
her fourth amendment rights and that evidence obtained as a result
326. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 166.
327. Vasquez, 786 F.2d at 1434 n.2.
328. 17 I & N Dec. 340 (BIA 1980).
329. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1051.
330. 17 I & N Dec. at 341.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 341-42.
of the stop should consequently be suppressed.333 The BIA acknowl-
edged that although it had concluded previously that the Exclusion-
ary Rule did not apply in deportation proceedings,
with or without a voluntariness issue [whether statements were voluntary or
coerced], cases may arise in which the manner of seizing evidence is so
egregious that to rely on it would offend the fifth amendment's due process
requirement of fundamental fairness.'
3
'
The BIA in In re Toro concluded that the evidence obtained from
the stop did not violate the fundamental fairness rule because the
stop was made before the Supreme Court's decision in United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce,335 which ruled that except at the border or its
functional equivalent officers could not justify a stop of suspected
aliens solely on the basis that they appeared to be of Mexican de-
scent. The Board went on to state that "it has now been held that
persons may not be stopped and questioned on the street by immi-
gration officers absent a reasonable suspicion that they are aliens. '33
However, the BIA held that because the stop was made under
then-existing Service policy, in apparent good faith and prior to the
Brignoni-Ponce decision, and because there was no evidence of invol-
untariness, "we do not find that the admission into evidence of the
Form 1-213 [Record of Deportable Alien-which contained informa-
tion provided by the alien after the stop] was fundamentally un-
fair. ' 337 Accordingly, the Board asserts implicitly that a detention
based solely on Hispanic appearance, after Brignoni-Ponce, is funda-
mentally unfair.
333. Id. at 341.
334. Id. at 343 (citation omitted).
335. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
336. In re Toro, 17 I & N Dec. at 342 (citations omitted). Needless to say, the
Board's broad language concerning stopping and questioning persons on the street is in-
applicable to the extent that a consensual encounter is involved. See supra notes 46-48
and accompanying text.
337. In re Toro, 17 I & N Dec. at 344. However, in concluding that there was no
evidence of involuntariness, the Board fails to discuss the implications of the Service
officer searching the respondent's purse and taking from it a Social Security card and a
pay stub, after asking "to see" the purse.
Also, the Board fails to discuss the implications of respondent's being placed in the
Service vehicle and taken to a Service office where she gave information that was set
forth in the 1-213. The facts of the case do not indicate that, prior to questioning respon-
dent at the Service office, there was any evidence of illegal alienage. If this is what
occurred, it seems beyond reasonable argument that taking the respondent to the office
and questioning her was not in the nature of a consensual encounter. Thus, any state-
ments the respondent ultimately made would have to be viewed with great suspicion on
the issue of whether they were voluntary.
Moreover, assuming that there was no evidence of illegal alienage prior to the interro-
gation at the Service office, there was no discussion whether the Service's actions of
searching her purse, placing her in the Service car, and taking her to the Service office
for interrogation were consistent with fundamental fairness. Rather, the Board only dis-
cussed the fact that the respondent was approached on the street for no other reason than
her Hispanic appearance.
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The court in Arguelles-Vasquez further noted that in Nicacio v.
INS,33 8 it was stated that "Hispanic-looking appearance and pres-
ence in an area where illegal aliens frequently travel are not enough
to justify a stop to interrogate the occupants of a vehicle. '339 The
court ruled that the immigration judge erred by refusing to permit
Arguelles-Vasquez to cross-examine the arresting Border Patrol of-
ficer in support of his unlawful seizure claim, and the court re-
manded the case to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with
the court's opinion.
Judge Canby dissented. He stated that in Lopez-Mendoza340 the
Court had before it a case in which an INS officer, without a war-
rant, brushed by an objecting shop owner and interviewed and ar-
rested an employee in the shop. Under, these facts, Judge Canby as-
serted that the INS officer should have known that he was violating
the fourth amendment but the evidence he obtained was not ex-
cluded. Thus, Judge Canby suggested that the stop of Arguelles-
Vasquez was not any more egregious than the accosting and ques-
tioning involved in Lopez-Mendoza.341
Judge Canby next stated that he did not read Lopez-Mendoza 42
as authorizing the courts to impose an exclusionary rule in deporta-
tion matters. Instead, he suggested that the Court merely observed
that the BIA itself will exclude evidence in appropriate cases.
Finally, Judge Canby expressed support for the majority's goal of
deterring the INS from stopping persons solely because of their His-
panic appearance but stated that after Lopez-Mendoza343 the injunc-
tive relief granted in Nicacio v. INS,344 rather than application of
the Exclusionary Rule, was the proper remedy. Judge Canby did not,
however, discuss the fact that one reason the Supreme Court de-
clined to apply the traditional Exclusionary Rule in deportation pro-
ceedings was because the government represented that it had rules
and procedures barring the admission in deportation proceedings of
fundamentally unfair evidence. Further, one of the reasons for not
strictly applying the Exclusionary Rule is the variety of factors that
a law enforcement officer must consider. A good faith determination
of reasonable suspicion or probable cause may in hindsight be insup-
338. 768 F.2d 1133 (9th Cir. 1985).
339. Id. at 1137.




344. 768 F.2d at 1140.
portable. However, where there is a simple standard, i.e., no stops
solely because of Hispanic appearance, it may be easy enough to
apply. If there are additional legitimate factors warranting the stop,
this takes the case out of the holding of Arguelles-Vasquez.
Also, Judge Canby did not indicate why an injunction would be
necessary against what would constitute clearly illegal conduct.
Neither did he indicate whether he would invoke the Exclusionary
Rule where government officials violated a court injunction. Presum-
ably the Rule would be invoked to meet a violation that is clear and
simple on its face. In such cases, an injunction adds little to a per-
son's duty to obey the law. An injunction is most appropriate where
there is a dispute over what the law requires.
Further, in Lopez-Mendoza one must ask whether there was even
a seizure for purposes of the fourth amendment. As noted, in
Arguelles-Vasquez Judge Canby stated that the seizure in that case
was less intrusive than the stop in Lopez-Mendoza. 3 5 Judge Canby
characterized the situation in Lopez-Mendoza as one where an INS
officer, without a warrant, brushed by an objecting shop owner and
interviewed and arrested an employee in the shop. However, the Su-
preme Court's statement of the facts leading to Lopez-Mendoza's
arrest does not suggest that the actions of the immigration officer
were so intrusive. The Court stated that:
The proprietor of the shop firmly refused to allow the agents to interview
his employees during working hours. Nevertheless, while one agent engaged
the proprietor in conversation another entered the shop and approached Lo-
pez-Mendoza. In response to the agent's questioning, Lopez-Mendoza gave
his name and indicated that he was from Mexico with no close family ties
in the United States.3 486
The Court suggests that the actions of the immigration officer were
devious and furtive in that they circumvented the wishes of the shop
owner. However, while there may be some question as to the propri-
ety of the immigration officer's disregarding the wishes of the owner,
it is doubtful that the questioning of Lopez-Mendoza even amounted
to a seizure for purposes of the fourth amendment. Further, ac-
cepting that the officer disregarded the wishes of the shop owner, it
is doubtful that the privacy interests of Lopez-Mendoza were vio-
lated. Also, Lopez-Mendoza lacked standing to assert the privacy in-
terests of the shop owner. 47
345. Justice Brennan, dissenting in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543 (1976), seems to capture one of the underlying premises in Arguelles-Vasquez. He
stated, "That law in this country should tolerate use of one's ancestry as probative of
possible criminal conduct is repugnant under any circumstances." Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. at 572 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
346. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1035.
347. See infra notes 387-96 and accompanying text (discussion on standing).
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iii. Evidence Excludable in Deportation Proceedings
Where It Is Obtained by Egregious Conduct
The BIA has held that evidence that does not comport with funda-
mental fairness will not be admissible in deportation proceedings.' 8"
Where the government engages in egregious conduct to obtain evi-
dence of alienage or deportability, the Board has stated that funda-
mental fairness, as required by the fifth amendment's due process
clause, bars the use of that evidence in deportation proceedings. In re
Ramira-Cordova,349 though~not officially a reported case, has partic-
ular significance in this area. The Supreme Court in Lopez-Mendoza
cited Ramira-Cordova as an" example that the Department of Justice
has a policy of excluding illegally obtained evidence from deporta-
tion proceedings.3 11 In In re Ramira-Cordova, the disputed evidence
was obtained in the following manner:
[F]our or five armed immigration officers without either a warrant or ade-
quate reason appeared at the respondents' dwelling at 4:00 A.M., pounded
on their door, roused them from their sleep, entered once the door was
opened without invitation, questioned the occupants and threatened one who
declined to speak with physical harm, pushed one occupant aside who was
standing in the doorway to his bedroom, and then searched the entire
apartment .3 1
The immigration officers took statements and seized certain docu-
ments which probably related to the respondents' alienage. But the
Board did not mention what the documents showed.352 Thus, it was
not clear from the language of the BIA's decision exactly what evi-
dence was admitted. However, the BIA did state that there "was no
other evidence or testimony establishing deportability" apart from
that obtained as a result of the illegal search. 53 The BIA then noted
that involuntary statements have been ruled inadmissible as being in
violation of the due process clause.354 Significantly, the BIA went on
348. See In re Toro, 17 I & N Dec. 340 (BIA 1980); In re Ramirez-Sanchez, 17 I
& N Dec. 503 (BIA 1980).
349. No. A21 095 659 (BIA Feb. 21, 1980).
350. 468 U.S. at 1051 n.5.
351. Ramira-Cordova, No. A21 095 659 at 4-5.
352. Id. at 2. The Board stated that "[o]n this record, the immigration judge ad-
mitted the evidence resulting from the search." Because the judge admitted the fruit of
the search, it is reasonable to infer that the documents showed or tended to show
alienage.
353. Id.
354. This rule is set forth in, e.g., Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d 803, 810-11 (Ist
Cir. 1977); Bong Youn Choy v. Barber, 279 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1960).
It has been held that when the critical inquiry as to voluntariness focuses on the tech-
niques of interrogation used, rather than the alien's state of mind, the immigration
to state:
Moreover, with or without a voluntariness issue, cases may arise in which
the manner of seizing evidence is so egregious that to rely on it would of-
fend the fifth amendment's due process requirement of fundamental fair-
ness. We find this to be such a case.3 5
The BIA ordered the proceedings terminated because "the sole evi-
dence establishing the respondents' deportability" was that "result-
ing from the search of the respondents' apartment." 356 In this con-
nection, it should be noted that at the deportation hearing the
respondents invoked their fifth amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination and declined to testify concerning the charge of
deportability. 5
It is important that one of the basic reasons the Court in Lopez-
Mendoza declined to apply the Exclusionary Rule in deportation
proceedings is because it relied on the government's application of its
own exclusionary principle. Therefore, the underpinning of Lopez-
Mendoza may not, consistent with the reasoning of that decision, be
withdrawn or substantially modified so as to eviscerate the effective-
ness of the protective procedures upon which the Court relied.
As discussed in Arguelles-Vasquez, suppression of evidence ob-
tained through egregious means does not require that its probative
value be diminished. Undoubtedly, some methods of obtaining evi-
dence seriously undermine the reliability of the evidence. For exam-
ple, confessions extracted through beatings, extreme intimidation or
other forms of coercion are unreliable because the subject of such
treatment might "admit" to things that are not true simply to extri-
cate himself from a hostile and perhaps dangerous situation. How-
ever, even where the reliability of evidence is ndt subject to dispute,
the method of obtaining the evidence might warrant its exclusion. 5 8
Also, Arguelles-Vasquez pointed out that Lopez-Mendoza cited
Rochin as a situation warranting suppression of evidence. The evi-
dence obtained in Rochin was highly probative. Further, the Board
has stated that one basis for excluding evidence is because "the man-
ner of seizing [it was] so egregious."358
judge's and the Board's voluntariness determinations are reviewed de novo. See Miller v.
Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110-12 (1985); United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1200-
05 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984). Cf. United States v. Fouche,
776 F.2d 1398, 1404 (9th Cir. 1985) (when voluntariness determination depends on "es-
sentially factual" state of mind inquiry, court reviews for clear error).
In making voluntariness determinations, courts examine the "totality of the circum-
stances." Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957).
355. Ramira-Cordova, No. A21 095 659 at 4 (footnote omitted). This languag6 is
identical to that used in In re Toro, 17 I & N Dec. 340, 343 (BIA 1980).
356. Ramira-Cordova, No. A21 095 659 at 5.
357. Id. at 1.
358. See In re Ramira-Cordova, No. A21 095 659 (BIA Feb. 21, 1980).
359. Id. It seems implicit that the documents seized in the nighttime warrantless
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Thus, a limited Exclusionary Rule appears to be applicable in de-
portation proceedings. Where the probative value of evidence is not
disputed, and where exclusion is premised on the manner in which it
was seized, the "prime purpose [of exclusion] is to deter future un-
lawful police conduct. 3 60 It therefore appears that the Court in Lo-
pez-Mendoza concluded that the deterrent value of excluding evi-
dence obtained through nonegregious fourth amendment violations
did not outweigh the societal costs. On the other hand, the deterrent
value of disallowing evidence obtained though egregious means was
deemed to be of sufficient importance to apply the Exclusionary
Rule.
iv. Agency Must Comply with Its Own Rules
The Supreme Court in Lopez-Mendoza stated that perhaps the
most important reason it found the Exclusionary Rule inapplicable
in deportation proceedings was because the Justice Department has
its own enforcement mechanism for deterring fourth amendment vio-
lations by its officers. Included in this mechanism, the Court noted,
is a policy requiring that evidence seized through intentionally un-
lawful conduct be excluded from the proceeding for which it was
obtained. 61 Also, Justice Department regulations "require that no
one be detained without reasonable suspicion of illegal alienage, and
that no one be arrested unless there is an admission of illegal alien-
age or other strong evidence thereof. '1"62 The Court also noted that
new immigration officers receive "instruction and examination in
fourth amendment law, and others receive periodic refresher courses
in law. 363 Because immigration officers are instructed in these fairly
straightforward regulations, where a detention or arrest is clearly
entry in this case proved or indicated alienage. There was no question raised of the pro-
bative value of the documents. Indeed, where documents or other physical evidence are
seized in a nighttime entry of one's residence, the probative value of such evidence is
likely heightened because the possession of the evidence is more closely tied to the occu-
pants. This is unlike statements given under such circumstances which may be subject to
claim of unreliability because of, e.g., coercion. Moreover, as discussed in O'Rourke v.
The City of Norman, 875 F.2d 1465 (10th Cir. 1989) and the authorities therein cited,
this country's historical aversion to nighttime searches of a residence is reflected in the
fourth amendment's heightened protection against, and condemnation of, official intru-
sion into the sanctity of the home during night hours. There is no requirement that the
probative value of evidence secured during any such search be questionable. Id. at 1473.
360. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1041 (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S.
433, 446 (1976)).
361. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1045.
362. Id.
363. Id.
contrary to the regulations, this may support an inference that evi-
dence thus obtained was through intentionally unlawful conduct and
should be excluded. 64 In Adamson v. Commissioner,365 the court as-
sessed the applicability of the Exclusionary Rule in a civil tax pro-
ceeding. While finding no bad faith in that case, the court opined
that "a bad faith violation of an individual's fourth amendment
rights requires application of the exclusionary sanction in a civil tax
proceeding." '66 The court acknowledged Lopez-Mendoza's egregious
conduct rule36' 7 and stated, "[W]hen evidence is obtained by deliber-
ate violation of the fourth amendment, or by conduct a reasonable
officer should know is in violation of the Constitution, the probative
value of that evidence cannot outweigh the need for a judicial sanc-
tion. ' 368 This rule should apply all the more where the violation is of
a rule that is clear and easy to apply; for example, a policy that
foreign appearance standing alone is not an adequate reason to effect
a seizure. Further, adherence to this rule is one of the stated reasons
the Court declined to apply the Exclusionary Rule in deportation
proceedings.
Agencies must comply with their own regulations. 3 9 Moreover,
the Service's violation of a regulation designed to protect aliens can
invalidate deportation proceedings. 370 The Supreme Court in United
States v. Caceres3 71 stated that "[a] court's duty to enforce an
agency regulation is most evident when compliance with the regula-
tion is mandated by the Constitution or federal law. '372 Of course,
the regulation prohibiting detentions or seizures solely on Hispanic
appearance is based on a cofistitutional interpretation. It was also
364. But see Matter of Toro, 17 I & N Dec. 341-44 at 344 (BIA 1980), which
found that a vehicle stop based solely on the driver's Latin appearance did not contra-
vene fundamental fairness because the stop was made in good faith in accordance with
pre-Brignoni-Ponce INS policy.
Judge Pregerson dissenting in Cervantes-Cuevas v. INS, 797 F.2d 707, 712 (9th Cir.
1985), stated that Adamson v.. Commissioner, 745 F.2d 541, 544-45 (9th Cir. 1984),
recognized that a police officer's bad faith violation of fourth amendment rights could
constitute an egregious violation within the meaning of Lopez-Mendoza, warranting ex-
clusion of evidence in a civil tax proceeding. He also observed that the Court suggested
that bad faith would be found if a reasonably competent officer would have believed the
search to be illegal. Cervantes-Cuevas, 797 F.2d at 712 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
365. 745 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1984).
366. Id. at 545.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Ramon-Sepulveda v. INS, 743 F.2d 1307, 1310 (9th Cir. 1984).
370. Id. at 1310. The case is of particular significance given the fact that the Su-
preme Court in Lopez-Mendoza stated that the Service was bound by regulations requir-
ing "that no one be detained without reasonable suspicion of illegal alienage, and that no
one be arrested unless there is an admission of illegal alienage or other strong evidence
thereof." Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1045. See also United States v. Calderon-Me-
dina, 591 F.2d 529, 531 (9th Cir. 1979).
371. 440 U.S. 741 (1979).
372. Id. at 749 (citing Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 152-53 (1945)).
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stated, "[T]his Court held invalid a deportation ordered on the basis
of statements which did not comply with the Immigration Service's
rules requiring signatures and oaths finding that the rules were
designed 'to afford [the alien] due process of law' by providing 'safe-
guards against essentially unfair procedures.' "M The Court cited
United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod374 for the proposition that
the "Court assumed that 'one under investigation with a view to de-
portation is legally entitled to insist upon the observance of rules
promulgated . . . pursuant to law.' ,,"71 For this reason also, where
immigration officers violate their own regulations there is a basis to
exclude evidence thus obtained from deportation proceedings.
However, prior to Arguelles-Vasquez, the courts were most toler-
ant in accepting evidence obtained in violation of an alien's fourth
amendment rights if there was no evident force, coercion or duress.
For example, in two cases decided before Arguelles-Vasquez, the
courts did not even acknowledge the applicability of the fruit of the
poisonous tree doctrine for aliens subjected to an illegal arrest, and
the courts briefly discussed the issue of the effect that an illegal de-
tention and arrest would have on deportation proceedings. In
Cervantes-Cuevas, the subject's car was stopped at approximately
the time when Border Patrol agents were checking places where un-
documented aliens were likely to congregate. The subject slowed his
car to ten miles per hour at a point where a Border Patrol vehicle
had pulled over a pick-up truck and, on passing this point, speeded
up to about forty-five miles per hour. He was stopped by the Border
Patrol and asked to show documents proving he was in the United
States legally. Cervantes handed the agent a government form re-
flecting "Notice of Appearance of Attorney" in immigration pro-
ceedings. Cervantes was then arrested. Later, Cervantes admitted he
originally entered the United States from Mexico without inspection.
These statements were included in the Form 1-213, Record of De-
portable Alien.
In a motion to suppress, Cervantes moved to exclude his state-
ments contending that his detention, arrest and subsequent interro-
gation were unlawful. However, the immigration judge admitted the
Form 1-213, and found him deportable. The court found it signifi-
373. Caceres, 440 U.S. at 749 (quoting Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 152-53
(1945)).
374. 263 U.S. 149, 155 (1923).
375. Caceres, 440 U.S. at 749 n.12 (quoting Bilokumsky, 263 U.S. at 155).
376. Cervantes-Cuevas v. INS, 797 F.2d 707 (9th Cir. 1985); Benitez-Mendez v.
INS, 760 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1985), modified, 748 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1984).
cant that Cervantes did not claim before the immigration judge that
"the agent's conduct was 'egregious' or that his statements were co-
erced, made under duress, or were otherwise involuntary. ' ' 377 The
court noted that the Board, in dismissing Cervantes' appeal, found
that there were sufficient articulable facts to support a reasonable
suspicion that he was an undocumented alien prior to his deten-
tion.3 78 However, even assuming reasonable suspicion, particularly
troubling is the failure by the Board and the court to discuss how
probable cause to arrest was established by Cervantes' offering a
document indicating that he was represented by counsel for immi-
gration purposes. Surely, one may not conclude, consistent with the
Constitution, that only the guilty have lawyers. 379 Neither was there
any discussion of whether the statements given by Cervantes well
after his arrest were the fruit of the poisonous tree. Instead, in a
quite unsatisfactory analysis, the court stated that even assuming an
illegal arrest, the information obtained as a result of the arrest was
admissible at a subsequent deportation hearing.
The Court then summarily dispensed with Cervantes' argument
that the evidence against him was obtained though egregious
conduct:
Petitioner offers no authority for the novel proposition that the mere failure
to articulate specific facts to justify a detention is "egregious" conduct re-
quiring suppression of evidence in a civil deportation proceeding ....
In the absence of some proof casting doubt on the probative value of
voluntary statements following an illegal detention, evidence that the arrest
was unlawful does not affect the admissibility of an undocumented alien's
statements.38 0
Judge Pregerson dissented, stating that he would find egregious con-
duct. As he later articulated in Arguelles-Vasquez, he stated that a
close reading of Lopez-Mendoza showed that the probative value of
illegally obtained evidence did not have to be undermined to be sup-
pressed.3"' Also, he noted that in Adamson v. Commissioner,3 2 the
court suggested that an officer's bad faith violation of fourth amend-
ment rights constitutes egregious conduct. But Judge Pregerson did
not discuss whether it constituted egregious conduct for a law en-
forcement officer to arrest a Hispanic appearing male because he
377. Cervantes-Cuevas, 797 F.2d at 708. Of course, because the hearing before the
immigration judge occurred prior to the Lopez-Mendoza decision, Cervantes' attorney
had no reason to utter the precise words "egregious conduct."
378. Cervantes-Cuevas, 797 F.2d at 709.
379. In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), the Court cautioned
against allowing "a vague suspicion [to] be transformed into probable cause for arrest by
reason of ambiguous conduct which the arresting officers themselves have provoked." Id.
at 484.
380. Cervantes-Cuevas, 797 F.2d at 710-11.
381. Id. at 713.
382. 745 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1984).
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presented a document showing he was represented by counsel for im-
migration purposes.
In Benitez-Mendez v. INS,383 the court addressed the detention of
a man working in a farmer's fields with others. On the approach of
immigration officers, the others fled, but Benitez-Mendez remained
where he was. On being asked if he had papers to live in this coun-
try, he responded that he did and they were in. his car, parked
nearby. He was then placed in an officer's car until his papers could
be checked. The court acknowledged that he was forcibly detained at
that point and that there was not reasonable suspicion to detain him.
Indeed, the court stated that "INS investigators may not detain
workers for citizenship status questioning unless. . . [they] 'are able
to articulate objective facts providing them with a reasonable suspi-
cion that each questioned person, so detained, is an alien illegally in
this country.' ,,s After his detention, Benitez-Mendez gave state-
ments, which were placed in an 1-213, showing he was deportable.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that "even though ... petitioner's
arrest violated the fourth amendment, the information obtained as
the result of the arrest (petitioner's statements on Form 1-213) was
admissible at his deportation hearing."3 85 Again, there was no dis-
cussion of whether the conduct was egregious or whether the state-
ments were the fruit of a poisonous tree. However, the court had not
yet fashioned the rule of Arguelles-Vasquez, and was still seeking to
interpret and apply the "egregious conduct" language of Lopez-
Mendoza. Indeed, the author of both Benitez-Mendez and Arguel-
les-Vasquez was Judge Pregerson. Judge Pregerson, in his dissent in
Cervantes-Cuevas, began to construct the reasoning he used in
Arguelles-Vasquez.
Thus, while there are clear differences between these opinions,
'they are differences in maturation of analysis. Because Arguelles-
Vasquez has been vacated for reasons above stated, it has yet to be
seen how the majority of the members of the Ninth Circuit will ap-
proach the "egregious conduct" issue.3 86
383. 760 F.2d 907 (9th Cir. 1985).
384. Id. at 909 (citations omitted).
385. Id. at 910.
386. It should be stressed that the Exclusionary Rule will not generally be applied
in deportation proceedings where the respondent alleges a fourth amendment violation by
state or local law enforcement officers who subsequently transfer custody of respondent
to federal immigration authorities. The Court ruled in United States v. Janis, 428 U.S.
433 (1976), that the deterrent purposes underlying that rule would not be served by
suppressing, from a federal administrative proceeding, evidence illegally seized in good
faith by a state law enforcement officer. Id. at 434. But, the Janis rule may not be
C. Evidence May Be Admissible Regardless of Fourth
Amendment Violation
i. Where One Has No Standing to Challenge Fourth Amendment
Intrusion, Fruits of Intrusion Are Not Suppressible by that
Person
The concept of standing is important in determining whether
fourth amendment violations will be remedied. If one has no stand-
ing to claim a fourth amendment violation, it of course follows that
no egregious violation may be claimed by him or her. It has long
been established that as a general rule workers without a proprietary
or possessory interest in their job premises cannot object to a search
and seizure on those premises.38 7
In Rakas v. Illinois,388 the Court clarified the overbroad language
of Jones v. United States,389 which had stated that anyone legiti-
mately on premises where a search or seizure occurs has standing to
challenge the search or seizure. The Court in Rakas v. Illinois stated
that the question of standing in search and seizure cases is more
properly posed as the substantive question of whether the proponent
of the motion to suppress has had his own fourth amendment rights
infringed by the search and seizure that he seeks to challenge.39 0 The
Court suggested that where an employee has no possessory or propri-
etary interest in premises, he has no legitimate expectation of
privacy.3 91
Subsequent to Rakas v. Illinois, courts have held that in deter-
mining an employee's fourth amendment rights respecting searches
or seizures at the employee's place of employment, several factors
must be weighed. These factors include whether the employee chal-
lenging the search or seizure has an ownership interest in the prem-
ises, whether he has a possessory interest in the place searched (e.g.,
a desk to which the employee has exclusive access), whether he has a
right to exclude others from the place, whether he has exhibited a
subjective expectation that the place would remain free from govern-
ment intrusion, whether he took precautions to maintain his privacy,
applied where there is evidence of an agreement or arrangement between federal immi-
gration authorities and state or local law enforcement agencies on locating and appre-
hending suspected undocumented aliens. The Court in Janis emphasized that there was
not agreement or participation between the two sovereigns. Id. at 455 n.31.
387. United States v. Conoscento, 63 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 290
U.S. 642 (1933); United States v. Muscarelle, 63 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1933), cert. denied,
290 U.S. 642 (1933); Kelly v. United States, 61 F.2d 843 (8th Cir. 1932) (analyzed at
86 A.L.R. 338); United States v. Crushiata, 59 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1932); Wida v.
United States, 52 F.2d 424 (8th Cir. 1931).
388. 439 U.S. 128 (1978), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 1122 (1979).
389. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
390. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140.
391. Id. at 148.
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and whether he was legitimately on the premises.39 2
In Martinez v. Nygaard,3 93 in the context of an INS "factory sur-
vey," the court ruled that employees had no standing to challenge a
warrant authorizing the INS to enter the factory. Citing Rakas v.
Illinois,"4 the court stated that to establish standing to challenge the
search warrant, the employees must show that the warrant violated
their personal rights not just those of the factory owners or manag-
ers. That is, the employees were required to show that they had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the areas searched or the things
seized. 95 Accordingly, the court ruled that since the INS officers
had a right to be in the factory, questioning or detaining the employ-
ees had to be justified under the rules governing consensual en-
counters, Terry stops, or probable cause, depending on the nature of
the encounter.396
In Lopez-Mendoza, though the facts are not fully set forth in the
Court's decision, there was no suggestion of an intrusion into any
area in which the employee had a legitimate expectation of privacy.
Further, the immigration officer simply approached Lopez-Mendoza
and asked him several questions. There was no search of a desk or
other area in which Lopez-Mendoza had exclusive possession. Ac-
cordingly, unless some interest of Lopez-Mendoza was invaded that
was not articulated by the Court, it would appear that the rule of
INS v. Delgado would apply to the encounter. Thus, Judge Canby's
assertion that the intrusion in Lopez-Mendoza was more intrusive
than that in Arguelles simply is not supportable.
392. United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1022 (1982). See also United States v. Torch, 609 F.2d 1088 (4th Cir. 1979) (list-
ing factors to determine whether employee had legitimate expectation of privacy in em-
ployer's warehouse from which evidence was seized), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980);
United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063 (5th Cir. 1980) (mere crew member can have
no privacy interest in the hold of a cargo vessel); United States v. Briones-Garza, 680
F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1982) (defendant has no standing to challenge search of "drop house"
used to harbor illegal aliens where he has no legitimate property or possessory interest in
the premises), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982). See also United States v. Pitt, 717 F.2d
1334 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984); United States v. Bell, 651
F.2d 1255 (8th Cir. 1981).
393. 820 F.2d 1024 (9th Cir. 1987).
394. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133-34.
395. Nygaard, 820 F.2d at 1027.
396. Id. at 1028-29.
ii. Evidence Independent of an Illegal Search or
Seizure
a. Fruit of the Poisonous Tree: Attenuation of Taint of Illegal
Search or Seizure
In Lopez-Mendoza, the Court reiterated the rule that "[t]he
'body' or identity of a defendant or respondent in a criminal or civil
proceeding is never itself suppressible as a fruit of an unlawful ar-
rest, even if it is conceded that an unlawful arrest, search, or interro-
gation occurred.3 97 The Court proceeded to note that:
[R]egardless of how the arrest is effected, deportation will still be possible
when evidence not derived directly from the arrest is sufficient to support
deportation .... Since the person and identity of the respondent are not
themselves suppressible... the INS must prove only alienage, and that will
sometimes be possible using evidence gathered independently of, or suffi-
ciently attenuated from, the original arrest.398
The Supreme Court in Wong Sun v. United States39 stated that for
evidence not to be excludable following an illegal search or seizure,
that evidence must be "so attenuated ... as to dissipate the taint" of
the fourth amendment intrusion.400
There is no question that physical items seized pursuant to an un-
reasonable search or seizure are suppressible. Further, there is no
question that statements obtained from a suspect in violation of his
fourth amendment rights are suppressible. There are, of course, ex-
ceptions to these general rules. For example, if evidence uncovered
during the course of an illegal search would have been inevitably
discovered, it will be admitted so as not to put the police in a worse
position than they would have been in absent the illegal conduct. 40 1
Also, where evidence is obtained pursuant to a facially valid warrant
that law enforcement officers execute in good faith, and with objec-
tive reasonable reliance, the deterrent value of excluding the evi-
dence because the warrant is later determined defective is scant and
is outweighed by the societal interests at stake.40 2
In United States v. Ceccolini,403 the Court stated that although
the testimony of a live witness discovered through a fourth amend-
ment violation may be excluded, because the cost of excluding live-
397. 468 U.S. at 1039-40 (footnotes omitted).
398. Id. at 1043 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
399. 371 U.S. 471 (1963)..
400- Id. at 487, 491 (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341(1930)).
401. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
402. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
403. 435 U.S. 268 (1978). The case renounced the rule of Wong Sun-that there
is no principled difference between exclusion of physical and verbal evidence-but also
rejected the government's position favoring a per se rule that live witness testimony is not
suppressible, even if the witness was located as the result of an illegal search or seizure.
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witness testimony often will be very great, "a closer, more direct link
between the illegality and that kind of testimony is required" in or-
der for the court to exclude the testimony.0 4 The Court reasoned
that a willing live witness might have come forward on his own, and
in that regard the situation is unlike one involving an inanimate ob-
ject.4 °5 In United States v. Hooton,406 the court listed the Ceccolini
factors to determine whether the witness testimony was sufficiently
attenuated to be permitted. That is: 1) the stated willingness of the
witness to testify; 2) the role played by illegally seized evidence in
gaining the witness' cooperation; 3) the proximity between the illegal
behavior, the witness' decision to cooperate and the actual testimony
at trial; and 4) the police motivation in conducting the search.
Some cases have addressed whether testimony of illegal aliens
should be suppressed following an illegal search. For example, in
United States v. Rubalcava-Montoya, °7 the court considered an ille-
gal search at the San Clemente, California, checkpoint. A car, later
found to have five undocumented aliens hidden in the trunk, arrived
at the checkpoint. Rubalcava was one of the aliens in the trunk. The
presence of the aliens was detected through an illegal search. At trial
on charges of conspiracy to transport illegal aliens and transporta-
tion of aliens illegally in this country, three of the aliens found in the
trunk testified that Rubalcava had arranged for their illegal entry
and that the registered owner of the car was involved in the illegal
enterprise as well. The three aliens also testified that a Mr. Ventura
was driving the car when the aliens were found in the trunk. How-
ever, after the aliens testified, Mr. Ventura took the stand and testi-
fied against his codefendants.
The government argued that the testimony of the witnesses was
voluntary and thus sufficiently attenuated from the illegal search
that it could not be considered an illegal fruit of that search. The
404. Id. at 278.
405. This rule modified the principle of Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
486 (1963), that there is no distinction in the application of the Exclusionary Rule as
regards physical or verbal evidence. But see United States v. Finucan, 708 F.2d 838 (1st
Cir. 1983) (held that the Ceccolini rule is inapplicable where the person discovered by
the illegal search provides physical evidence rather than testimony).
406. 662 F.2d 628 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 1004. The court ruled
that the witness was not the fruit of an illegal execution of a search warrant because the
purpose of the search was to find stolen guns and not evidence relating to the charge in
question. The court rejected the claim that Ceccolini applies only to citizen witnesses
who testify out of civic duty.
407. 597 F.2d 140 (9th Cir. 1978) (per Kennedy, now Associate United States
Supreme Court Justice).
court disagreed, noting that a key element of the Ceccolini analysis
is whether the testimony is the product of the witness' independent
act of will, neither coerced nor induced by the consequences of the
illegal search. The court went on to state,
Nothing in the record of the case before us indicates that in the time
between the search and the trial the witnesses made an independent deci-
sion to come forward to testify to rehabilitate themselves or to assist the
trier of fact in arriving at the truth of the case, or for any other reason. The
illegal aliens who testified against appellants not only were discovered as a
direct result of the illegal search but were implicated thereby in illegal ac-
tivity. The record does not show the substance or extent of any conversions
or negotiations between the government and the witnesses, and thus the
government has not rebutted the logical inference on these facts that the
incriminating "evidence" discovered in the course of the illegal search was
used to persuade these witnesses to testify.4
8
The court also distinguished Ceccolini on the ground that unlike that
case, the witnesses would not have been discovered independently of
the illegal search.409 With regard to the testimony of the codefend-
ant, the court ruled that his testimony was prompted because things
were going badly at trial, which suggested a direct, link between the
illegal search and his testimony.410
In another case, decided before Ceccolini, but employing a similar
analysis, the court suppressed the testimony of aliens discovered in
an illegal search.411 Immigration officers, armed with a defective
search warrant, entered a New York restaurant searching for per-
sons believed to be undocumented aliens. The owners of the restau-
rant were indicted for harboring and concealing aliens. 412 They
moved to exclude from their trial evidence of the presence of the
aliens obtained as a result of the search and the testimony of the
aliens themselves, because the warrant failed to state probable cause
to search.413 The trial court granted the motion and the government
appealed.
The government argued that the testimony of the arrested aliens
about their relationship with the restaurant owners should not be ex-
cluded because their "voluntary" decision to testify broke the con-
nection between the illegal search and the testimony.414 The Court
rejected this argument:
[T]here is a close connection between the initial illegal search and the testi-
mony which the government seeks to use at trial. The purpose of the search,
as described in the warrant, was to seize the illegal aliens; it is these same
408. Id. at 143.
409. Id. at 143-44.
410. Id. at 143.
411. United States v. Karathanos, 531 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 428
U.S. 910 (1976).
412. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(3) (1972).
413. Karathanos, 531 F.2d at 29.
414. Id. at 34.
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aliens who are now the government's prospective witnesses. Once the aliens
were arrested, the INS agents had obtained considerable leverage over
them, since it was within the government's discretion to prosecute and de-
port them, or to allow them to leave the United States voluntarily. 415
Further, the government conceded that it had prompted the aliens'
testimony by allowing them to depart voluntarily without prosecu-
tion. Given these facts, the court concluded, "[W]e think their deci-
sions to testify cannot accurately be characterized as intervening
'act[s] of free will' of sufficient independence 'to purge the primary
taint of the unlawful invasion.' "4"6 Additionally, the court stated
that the aliens' testimony was a foreseeable fruit of the illegal search
and, unless suppressed, "might help induce similar future searches
without probable cause in the hope that they would uncover aliens
who could be similarly prompted to testify. '417 Thus, the suppression
order was affirmed.
In United States v. Ortega-Serrano,418 the defendant was charged
with knowingly transporting undocumented aliens. The defendant
claimed that the stop of his vehicle was not based on reasonable sus-
picion and moved to suppress the testimony of his alien passengers
and his own statements. The motion was denied and the defendant
was convicted. The court of appeals agreed with the defendant and
reversed and remanded. Because no attenuation argument was made,
however, the case suggests that the Government did not believe it
could prevail on an attenuation theory.419
b. Subsequent Voluntary Admission of Alienage
If a respondent voluntarily admits at his deportation hearing that
he is an alien illegally in this country, his admission renders aca-
demic any challenge to the circumstances surrounding his arrest or
any evidence obtained through an illegal search or seizure.420 Like-
415. Id. at 35.
416. Id. (citation omitted).
417. Id.
418. 788 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1986).
419. See also United States v. Ramirez-Sandoval, 872 F.2d 1392 (9th Cir. 1989)
(court barred testimony of undocumented aliens discovered through an illegal search
where there was no evidence that the aliens would have come forward of their own ac-
cord to testify against the defendants); United States v. Scios, 590 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (en banc) (testimony given solely to avoid being jailed for contempt not sufficiently
an act of free will to purge the primary taint).
Furthermore, United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), sustained the
suppression of testimony of undocumented aliens found in the defendant's car pursuant
to an illegal search.
420. Magallanes-Damian v. INS, 783 F.2d 931 (9th Cir. 1986); Young v. INS,
wise, an alien's illegal arrest or detention is irrelevant if his attorney
admits deportability at the subsequent deportation hearing.421 In
Avila-Gallegos v. INS,422 the court first cited numerous cases for the
proposition that even assuming an illegal arrest had been made, and
assuming the "body" of a respondent were obtained illegally, this
does not make the deportation proceedings the fruit of the poisonous
tree.423 The court then found that the respondent admitted facts to
support the charge of deportability in his testimony at his deporta-
tion hearing. The court concluded that this rendered academic, for
purposes of the issue of deportability, whether he had been illegally
arrested.424 A like ruling was made in Guzman-Flores v. INS,425
where the respondents argued on appeal that their presence at the
deportation proceeding was illegally obtained and should be sup-
pressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree. The court rejected this
argument on the basis of the above discussed rule that a respondent's
body is not suppressible as a fruit of the poisonous tree. The order
deporting respondents was upheld since they admitted deportability
at their deportation hearing. These admissions were deemed to be
independent of any illegally seized evidence. 426
c. Documents Obtained Independently of Illegal Search or
Seizure
Where evidence of deportability is discovered by way of an illegal
search or seizure, the government is free to use evidence independent
of the search or seizure to prove deportability. In Hoonsilapa v.
INS,427 the court assumed arguendo that INS officers conducted an
illegal search of an alien's home and discovered his identity. Later
deportation proceedings were brought against the alien. At this pro-
ceeding, a visa petition that had been filed by the alien's wife on his
behalf was introduced to prove alienage. The court noted that the
759 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1985); Rodriguez-Gonzalez v. INS, 640 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir.
1981).
421. Magallanes-Damian, 783 F.2d 931; Young, 759 F.2d 450. However, in these
cases, the court looked to whether the attorney's admission constituted ineffective assis-
tance of counsel. The courts have been reluctant to find ineffective assistance of counsel
in such circumstances and are inclined to rule that an attorney's admission of de-
portability is a "tactical" choice that will not be second guessed because it backfired.
422. 525 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1975).
423. Id. at 667.
424. Id.
425. 496 F.2d 1245 (7th Cir. 1974).
426. See also Men Deng Chang v. Jiugni, 669 F.2d 275, 279 (5th Cir. 1982) (even
assuming illegal arrest, subsequent voluntary admission establishes deportability since
alien himself is not "suppressible fruit"); Medina-Sandoval v. INS, 524 F.2d 658, 659
(9th Cir. 1975) (voluntary admission at deportation hearing admissible despite unlawful
stop); Cuevas-Ortega v. INS, 588 F.2d 1274, 1278 n.9 (9th Cir. 1979) (voluntary admis-
sion at immigration office admissible even after illegal arrest).
427. 575 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1978).
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visa petition was submitted by the alien's wife as a "voluntary act"
following the alleged illegal search and rejected arguments that it
was the fruit of the poisonous tree.428 The court went on to state that
the "mere fact that fourth amendment illegality directs attention to
a particular suspect does not require exclusion of evidence subse-
quently unearthed from independent sources. '42 9 Accordingly, it was
ruled that "there is no sanction to be applied when an illegal arrest
only leads to discovery of the man's identity and that merely leads to
the official file."14 0 In Huerta-Cabrera v. INS,43 the court found
that any taint of an illegal arrest was attenuated by the presentation
at the deportation hearing of other documents obtained indepen-
dently of the arrest, showing the alien had previously been deported
and had not obtained permission to reenter.43 2
d. Obtaining Birth Certificate That Shows Foreign Birth
In some cases where a suspected Mexican citizen contests de-
portability, the Service will execute a Form G-302, "Request for
Record Check in Mexico." This request provides to the appropriate
Service officer in Mexico certain biographical information concern-
ing the respondent. The Service officer then seeks to locate the re-
spondent's birth certificate and baptismal records. If such records
are located, they will show birth in a foreign country and support a
finding of alienage. Once alienage is established, the alien has the
burden of showing time, manner and place of entry into the United
States. If the alien cannot provide this information, it will be pre-
sumed he is in the United States in violation of law.4 38 Such a proce-
dure appears to meet any problems raised in connection with a decli-
nation to testify on the basis of the privilege against self-
incrimination and will generally serve to establish a prima facie case
of deportability. However, there are serious questions whether this
procedure of obtaining a foreign birth certificate is legally permissi-
ble where a respondent's arrest is accomplished by egregious circum-
stances violative of his fourth amendment rights. In Lopez-Men-
428. Id. at 738.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. 466 F.2d 759 (7th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
432. Id. at 761-62.
433. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1991). See generally, Watkins, The Ninth Circuit Versus
the Board of Immigration Appeals: Conflicts Over Burden of Proof on Section 291 De-
portation - Burden, Burden, Who's Got the Burden?, 1 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 5 (Fall
1985).
doza,434 the Court pointed out that the BIA will exclude evidence if
the "circumstances surrounding a particular arrest and interrogation
would render use of the evidence obtained thereby fundamentally
unfair and in violation of due process requirements of the fifth
amendment. 435
However, such a rule would be ineffective if it could be circum-
vented by allowing deportability to be established with proof of
alienage that is not truly independent of the illegal search or seizure.
If an arrest and interrogation were violative of due process and "fun-
damentally unfair," introduction of a birth certificate to prove illegal
alienage would render this protective rule an illusion. To take an
extreme example, a respondent could, without reasonable suspicion,
exigent circumstances or any other justification, have his door kicked
down in the middle of the night, be pulled from his bed, and have a
"confession" extracted by force. To say that the evidence derived
from the illegal search and seizure is inadmissible is a statement de-
void of substance if the respondent's identity and other biographical
information could be used to secure a birth certificate to establish
alienage.
The "Request for Record Check in Mexico" requires more than
the identity of the respondent. It requires date and place of birth,
names of the respondent's parents and grandparents, and other bio-
graphical information. Indeed, the respondent can invoke the privi-
lege against self-incrimination with respect to inquiries about his
place of birth and his family in Mexico because foreign birth estab-
lishes a link in the chain to establish the criminal offense of entry
without inspection.436 The Board in In re Santos437 indicated that if
a respondent makes incriminating admissions concerning his status
in this country after his right to counsel is denied, this is prejudicial
error warranting suppression of the statements. However, the Board
held that if the statements are not incriminating and are otherwise
admissible, the respondent suffers no prejudice by making nonin-
criminating statements concerning his immigration status, since he
has aduty to testify truthfully concerning such matters in any event.
A respondent's place of birth, country of citizenship, etc., may con-
stitute links in the chain to establish criminal offenses, e.g., entry
without inspection.438 The Board has indicated that evidence so ob-
tained is suppressible.
434. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984). See also supra notes 348-50 and accompanying text.
435. Id. at 1051 n.5 (citations omitted).
436. 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1991) (makes it a crime to enter this country without in-
spection). In Ramon-Sepulveda v. INS, 743 F.2d 1307, 1308 (1984), the respondent in-
voked his privilege against self-incrimination and refused to testify concerning his place
of birth, among other things.
437. 19 I & N Dec. 105 (1984).
438. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
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Thus, apart from identity, biographical information should be sup-
pressible if obtained by fundamentally unfair means. Without this
information, it would be unlikely that a foreign birth certificate re-
lating to the respondent could be obtained. Also, it is not fair to
conclude that a foreign birth certificate obtained on, the basis of evi-
dence obtained by egregious means is sufficiently "attenuated" from
the illegal search or seizure so as to be admissible.
Moreover, even if a respondent is granted immunity from prosecu-
tion, there is authority to justify his refusal to testify where his pres-
ence has been obtained by egregious conduct. That is, the foregoing
cases clearly hold that witness testimony is suppressible if not atten-
uated from the taint of an illegal search or seizure. Thus, it seems to
follow necessarily that the target of the proceedings similarly may
withhold testimony on fourth amendment grounds. There is no need
to invoke the fifth amendment's protection against self-incrimination,
and accordingly a grant of immunity from prosecution does not
carry a duty to testify.
There are safeguards to protect against individuals of "foreign ap-
pearance" being hauled before the immigration courts without evi-
dence of deportability and being deported if they refuse to testify. As
noted above, the fourth amendment as well as the fifth amendment
may justify the refusal to testify in such proceedings. If there is no
evidence to detain an individual or compel his appearance at a de-
portation hearing, a habeas corpus or injunctive action would appear
available to prevent proceedings against him.4 9
If the individual refuses to answer any questions and the immigra-
tion officers have no independent evidence of immigration status, it
would be virtually impossible to assert a ground of deportability
under the law.4 0 The standard first paragraph in every order to
show cause is the allegation that the respondent is not a "citizen or
439. The general habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1991), vests jurisdic-
tion in federal district courts to consider habeas corpus petitions challenging detention
incident to deportation proceedings. United States ex rel. Mezei v. Shaughnessy, 195
F.2d 964 (2d Cir. 1952), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., 345 U.S. 206, 215 (1953);
Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1982). However, Congress, at 8 U.S.C. § 1252,
limited habeas corpus review of immigration detentions to cases involving "a conclusive
showing ... that the Attorney General is not proceeding with such reasonable dispatch
as may be warranted by the particular facts and circumstances in the case of any alien to
determine deportability." But, this habeas preemption provision does not apply where a
detention is in violation of law. United States ex rel. Martinez-Angosto v. Mason, 344
F.2d 673, 680 (2d Cir. 1965).
440. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1991) (lists the 19 grounds of deportability).
national of the United States."441 The standard second paragraph is
the allegation that the respondent is a native and citizen of a speci-
fied country or countries. The third paragraph typically states how
and when the respondent entered the United States. The succeeding
paragraphs then assert facts to support a particular ground of de-
portability. However, without pertinent 'facts, no ground of de-
portability can be alleged.442 Thus, an individual detained without
evidence of deportability could resort to the habeas corpus remedy
discussed above.
Further, in almost all cases, the evidence used in deportation pro-
ceedings to prove deportability is obtained from the subject of the
deportation proceedings. In some cases injunctions have issued to bar
certain contacts with persons in particular situations. Indeed, the Su-
preme Court in Lopez-Mendoza noted that because INS is a "single
agency, under central federal control, and engaged in operations of
broad scope but highly repetitive character," declaratory relief
against the agency offers a means for challenging INS institutional
practices.443
Further, the efficacy of any illegal INS information gathering
techniques would be negligible if members of the public (especially
those engaged in actions of questionable legality) were advised that,
absent a search or arrest warrant or other legal compulsion, they are
under no duty to cooperate with law enforcement officers. The Court,
in INS v. Delgado, concluded that no seizure occurred under the
facts of that case because it adopted a strong presumption that per-
sons questioned by law enforcement officers will respond voluntarily.
Because it is presumed that persons so questioned will respond vol-
untarily, there is no requirement that they be told "they are free not
441. The term "national" is defined at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(22), 1408.
442. This author has opined, and holds to the view, that a party's failure to re-
spond to questions that he has a duty to answer justifies an adverse inference which may
support a finding of deportability. See Watkins, Streamlining Deportation Proceedings,
supra note 183. Of course, implicit in such a position is the requirement that the Service
have some evidence that supports the charge of deportation. The Supreme Court in Lo-
pez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984), stressed that INS regulations and policy prohibit
detention absent a reasonable suspicion of illegal alienage, and prohibit arrest unless
there is an admission of illegal alienage or other strong evidence thereof. Id. at 1044-45.
If these regulations are complied with, the inference drawn from a wrongful refusal to
testify along with the other evidence could provide the requisite "clear, convincing, and
unequivocal evidence" to support a deportation order.
Thus, deportability could be established by this inference along with other evidence
which would not ordinarily meet the exacting standard required to prove deportability,
i.e., "clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence that the facts alleged as grounds for
deportation are true." 8 CFR § 242.14(a) (1990). See also Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S.
276 (1966).
Further, it is clear than an essential prerequisite to a charge of deportation is a set of
facts which, if true, support a particular ground of deportability. See 8 CFR § 242.1(b)
(1990).
443. See also, e.g., Nicacio v. United States, 797 F.2d 700 (9th Cir. 1985).
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to respond. 444 The clear import of the Delgado decision is that had
the persons there questioned simply declined to respond to the ques-
tions asked of them, this would have been the end of the "consensual
encounters." Then, if the officers had no evidence of illegal alienage,
the employees could have simply gone about their business with no
risk of detention or arrest for their refusal to cooperate with the INS
officers.
But as noted above, flight or evasion of law enforcement officers
may provide reasonable suspicion to detain the suspect for further
questioning. However, even in such cases, if the suspect refuses to
provide any information concerning his nationality or status, and if
there is no independent evidence of alienage, it would be problematic
to conclude that, especially when not in close proximity to the bor-
der, flight or evasion standing alone can suffice to justify an arrest.
This is because, as the Supreme Court recognized in Lopez-Men-
doza, INS regulations prohibit arrest "unless there is an admission
of illegal alienage or other strong evidence thereof. ' 445 Thus, the is-
sue would be whether flight or evasion constitutes strong evidence of
illegal alienage. It is extremely doubtful that it does. On one hand, it
may be argued that there is no correlation or clear nexus between
one's attempted flight or evasion and his being an undocumented
alien. It is possible that, among other things, he sought to avoid law
enforcement officers because he was nervous or fearful, because he
had committed an offense unrelated to the immigration and naturali-
zation laws or because a family member was an undocumented alien
and he wished to avoid contact with immigration authorities for fear
of exposure of that person's illegal status.
On the other hand, when an immigration officer is in uniform and
clearly is recognized as being affiliated with the effort to detect and
apprehend persons illegally in this country, it is arguable that flight
or attempted evasion constitutes persuasive evidence that the individ-
ual is illegally in the United States, otherwise there would be no
logical reason to attempt avoidance. 46 If the latter position is ac-
444. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216 (1984).
445. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1044-45.
446. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). However, even assum-
ing that flight constitutes strong evidence of illegal alienage, if the subject refused to
answer any questions, and the immigration officers had no independent evidence of the
person's status, it would be virtually impossible to assert a ground of deportability under
the law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1991) (lists the 19 grounds of deportability). The
standard first paragraph in every order to show cause is the allegation that the respon-
dent is not a "citizen or national of the United States." (National is defined at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101 (a)(22), 1408.) The standard second paragraph is the allegation that the respon-
cepted, care must be exercised not to loosely construe what conduct
constitutes attempted evasion. The court in Nacacio v. INS447
stressed that failure of vehicle occupants to make eye contact with
immigration officers does not justify a stop of the vehicle. Thus, for a
detention or arrest on the basis of attempted evasion to withstand a
court challenge, the evasion must be clear and significant and
weighed with other pertinent facts.
However, even assuming that flight constitutes strong evidence of
illegal alienage, if the subject refuses to answer any questions, and
the immigration officers have no independent evidence of his immi-
gration status, it would be virtually impossible to assert a ground of
deportability under the law. 448 Thus, even assuming that a detention,
and even arrest, would be supported by the fact that a person fled
from immigration officials, without more information, deportability
could not be proved.449
Of course, if the subject after a consensual interrogation, or a le-
gal detention or arrest,450 voluntarily admits to facts showing he is
an alien illegally in this country, a deportation charge can issue.4 1
Furthermore, evidence of deportability may be obtained from official
records, persons who know the respondent or others who have infor-
mation concerning his immigration status.
dent is a native and citizen of a specified country or countries. The third paragraph
typically states how and when the respondent entered the United States. The succeeding
paragraphs then assert facts to support a particular ground of deportability. However,
without facts, no ground of deportability can be alleged. Thus, the fact that a person fled
from immigration officials may provide a basis to detain, and even arrest, but without
more information it cannot establish deportability.
447. 797 F.2d 700, 704 (9th Cir. 1985).
448. See supra note 447.
449. Id. Further, inasmuch as deportation proceedings are not initiated against a
respondent until a basis of deportability is alleged, the situation should never arise where
the government seeks to deport a respondent solely on the ground that he fled when he
saw approaching immigration officers. These facts argue strongly against the position
that attempted flight or evasion constitutes "strong grounds."
450. The rule of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), holds that the fifth
amendment's privilege against self-incrimination requires that prior to interrogation of
one in the custody of law enforcement officers, he must be advised that he has a right to
remain silent, that anything he says may be used against him in court, that he has a
right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer present during any interrogation,
and that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. Violation of this
rule renders inadmissible for criminal prosecution statements a respondent may make.
However, such warnings are not required for the admission of incriminating statements
in deportation proceedings. Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 724 n. 3 (9th Cir. 1989);
Trias-Hernandez v. INS, 528 F.2d 366, 369 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1975); In re Sandoval, 17 I &
N Dec. 70, 76-77 (BIA 1979).
451. In this connection, evidence of birth in a foreign country places the burden on
a respondent "to show the time, place, and manner of his entry into the United States
• ..or be presumed to be in the United States in violation of law." 8 U.S.C. § 1361
(1982); Ramon-Sepulveda, 743 F.2d 1307, 1308, n.2 (9th Cir. 1984); In re Ponco, 15 I.
& N. Dec. 120 (BIA 1974). See generally, Watkin, Burden, Burden, Who's Got the
Burden?, supra note 433.
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VI. WARRANTS AND UNDOCUMENTED ALIENS
In Blackie's House of Beef, Inc. v. Castillo,452 the court began its
analysis with the statement "[T]he applicability of the Warrant
Clause of the Fourth Amendment to INS enforcement activities can
no longer be doubted." 453
An arrest warrant will rarely be issued for a suspected undocu-
mented alien. 4  Thus, only search warrants whose targets are un-
documented aliens will be discussed here. In immigration cases, any
warrant issued will, as a rule, be a search warrant to enter premises
where suspected undocumented aliens work. Once officers are in a
place they have a right to be, they are free to question anyone they
encounter, as long as it is a consensual encounter. Because immigra-
tion officers will seldom have warrants seeking particular suspected
aliens, the persons they encounter are free not to cooperate or an-
swer questions.
The Supreme Court affirmed the longstanding rule that law en-
forcement officers may enter open fields without a warrant because
no one could have a legitimate expectation of privacy in such
places. 55 The Congress, in light of this decision which found no con-
stitutional privacy interest, enacted a statutory protection against
immigration officers entering open fields without a warrant or con-
sent of the owner for the purpose of searching for or interrogating
suspected aliens about their right to be in the United States.456
452. 659 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
453. Id. at 1217. The warrant clause states, in pertinent part, that "no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const.
amend. IV.
454. The author is aware of no reported case where an arrest warrant was issued
on the ground that one was believed to be an undocumented alien.
455. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984). The Court reasoned as follows:
"We conclude from the text of the fourth amendment and from the historical and con-
temporary understanding of its purposes, that an individual has no legitimate expectation
that open fields will remain free from warrantless intrusion by government officers." Id.
at 181.
456. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d) (1991). This provision reads:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section other than paragraph (3) of
subsection (a), an officer or employee of the Service may not enter without the
consent of the owner (or agent thereof) or a properly executed warrant onto
the premises of a farm or other outdoor agricultural operation for the purpose
of interrogating a person believed to be an alien as to the person's right to be or
to remain in the United States.
Id. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3)(1982), provides, in part, that any authorized officer or em-
ployee of the INS is empowered, without warrant, within twenty-five miles from any
"external boundary" of the United States "to have access to private lands, but not dwell-
The warrant clause requires that "every intrusion upon the privacy
of an individual first be considered by a 'neutral and detached mag-
istrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.' ",457 Further, the war-
rant should reflect careful and informed consideration by the magis-
trate and reasonably "advise the [subject] of the scope and objects of
the search, beyond which limits the [officer] is not expected to
proceed. '458
In Blackie's House of Beef, the district court had declared a war-
rant invalid because it did not contain names or even physical de-
scriptions of the allegedly deportable aliens but conferred blanket
authority to "locate aliens in the United States without legal author-
ity. ' 459 The district court ruled that the warrant wasn't analogous to
the routine inspection warrant involved in Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc. 46 0 because the nature of the two enforcement activities differed.
The INS sought to enter Blackie's, a Washington, D.C., restaurant
suspected of hiring undocumented aliens, to search for a particular
violation rather than to conduct a routine inspection of regulated in-
dustry premises. Thus, the district court held that the "neutral stan-
dards" principle of Marshall v. Barlow's was inapplicable. 4 1
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed with
the district court's analysis but ruled the district court did not go far
enough. The INS search "was not analogous to a criminal investiga-
tion" because the detention and deportation of undocumented aliens
is not criminal law enforcement activity.462 The court stressed that
"there are no sanctions of any kind, criminal or otherwise, imposed
by law upon a knowing employer of illegal aliens. This warrant in
particular was issued to aid the agency in the enforcement of its stat-
utory mandate, not to aid police in the enforcement of criminal
laws. 484 The court held that the district court failed to recognize
"the unique aspects of an INS search" and thus erroneously con-
cluded that Blackie's fourth amendment rights were violated by the
ings for the purpose of patrolling the border to prevent the illegal entry of aliens into the
United States." Id.
457. Blackie's House of Beef, 659 F.2d 1212, 1217 (quoting from Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)),
458. Blackie's House of Beef, 659 F.2d at 1217 (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's
Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323'(1978)).
459. Blackie's House of Beef, 659 F.2d at 1217-18.
460. 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (indicated a lower standard of proof to obtain a warrant
to conduct routine Occupation Health and Safety Administration inspections where con-
sent to inspect could not be obtained).
461. Blackie's House of Beef, 659 F.2d at 1218.
462. Id. at 1218.
463. But now it is unlawful to employ knowingly "unauthorized aliens." 8
U.S.C.A. § 1324a (Supp. 1991). It is yet to be seen whether the court's analysis would
change in light of the civil and criminal penalties that may be imposed on an offending
employer.
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search warrant. 464 In describing the unique aspects of the INS
search, it was noted that Congress contemplated a vigorous enforce-
ment program that might include INS entries onto private premises
for purposes of questioning "any alien or person believed to be an
alien" and of detaining aliens believed to be in this country ille-
gally.46 5 An INS search is conducted pursuant to an administrative
mandate and a warrant so issued may be evaluated under a different
standard of probable cause than is applicable to criminal war-
rants.46 Also, it was ruled that the warrant was properly tailored
both to protect the fourth amendment rights of Blackie's and to aid
enforcement interests of the United States.467
The court of appeals noted that the warrant was styled an "Order
for Entry on Premises to Search for Aliens in the United States
Without Legal Authority." The court went on to note that probable
cause to search does not require a detailed description of each
alien.46 8
The court stated that had INS followed the more stringent re-
quirements suggested by the district court, the result would have
been the same-the questioning of those employees appearing to be
aliens and found in nonpublic areas of the restaurant. 69
It is unlikely, the court stated, that the INS could meet the stan-
dards of probable cause applicable in criminal cases, at least as for-
mulated by the district court, except in the rare instance when an
INS informer reports on one specific violator and supplies the
description and name of that person.4 70 Instead, the typical situation
precludes insistence upon "some quantum of individualized suspi-
464. Blackie's House of Beef, 659 F.2d at 1218. The warrant was issued under the
authority of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1357 and 1103(a) (1982).
465. Blackie's House of Beef, 659 F.2d at 1218-19.
466. Id. at 1218-19, 1224.
467. Id. at 1218-19.
468. Id. at 1222. The court stated:
It is difficult to imagine any instance in which INS agents could satisfy the
district court's requirements and obtain the names of each illegal alien em-
ployed in the nonpublic areas of a restaurant, or even physical descriptions any
more particularized than those proffered to the magistrate in this instance.
Since an illegal alien is essentially a fugitive outside the law, it is unlikely that
his vital statistics will be on file anywhere in the United States or even that he
will customarily use his real name, either in his contacts with the Government
or with anyone else. Obviously he would never subject himself to more than the




cion" at least as to the persons sought.7 Criminal probable cause is
required only when the investigation changes from purely adminis-
trative to criminal in nature. 2
Despite the INS operating under authority of a warrant in
Blackie's, the court stressed that:
INS agents were empowered to enter Blackie's only for the purpose of ques-
tioning those employees whom the agents might reasonably suspect of being
illegal aliens, on the basis of the information in the warrant and the stan-
dards set'down for the questioning of suspected aliens in Yam Sang Kwai v.INS.473
In sum, the court ruled that the warrant was as descriptive as rea-
sonably possible with respect to the persons sought, the place to be
searched, and the time within which the search might take place. 4
The Blackie's House of Beef case has been much discussed and
applied in immigration enforcement cases. One case offering helpful
explication on Blackie's is International Molders' and Allied Work-
ers' Local Union No. 164 v. INS.47 5 Plaintiffs (a labor union, five
employers and nine employees of Hispanic ancestry) sought a pre-
liminary injunction to prohibit INS factory searches absent either
voluntary employer consent, unprovoked exigent circumstances or a
search warrant identifying specific persons suspected of being illegal
aliens. The district court granted the preliminary injunction and de-
nied an INS request for a stay pending appeal. The court of appeals,
with modifications, affirmed the injunction. The court noted that the
district court's finding of an "evident systematic policy and practice
471. Id. The district court, it was held, should have examined the warrant and
supporting affidavits with an eye to whether the warrant satisfied the alternative require-
ment of Delaware v. Prouse, 440 US. 648, 654 (1979): that is, "sufficient specificity and
reliability to prevent the exercise of unbridled discretion by law enforcement officials."
Blackie's House of Beef, 659 F.2d at 1225.
472. Id. at 1225 n.16 (discussing Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978)). For
example, the difference between the kind of evidence required to make a fire inspection,
and the kind of evidence needed to investigate a fire.
473. Blackie's House of Beef, 659 F.2d at 1226 (citing Yam Sang Kwai v. INS,
411 F.2d 687 (1969)). The court in Au Yi Lau v. INS, 445 F.2d 217 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971), stated that the questioning referenced in Yam Sang
Kwai assumes the cooperation of the person questioned. Au Yi Lau, 445 F.2d at 222, 223
n.8.
In Au Yi Lau v. INS, the issue was whether the INS could temporarily detain a
suspected illegal alien for interrogation. The court ruled that under Terry v. Ohio stan-
dards for temporary detentions, i.e., where there exists reasonable suspicion the person is
illegally in the United States, the INS may "make forcible detentions of a temporary
nature." Au Yi Lau, 445 F.2d at 223.
474. Blackie's House of Beef, 659 F.2d at 1226. For descriptions of contents of
affidavits see id. at 1215. As regards scope of search, no files or books could be searched,
and no private property of Blackie's within the premises was searched. Id. at 1215-16.
Further, it was held that the warrant did not leave impermissible discretion in the hands
of INS agents with respect to persons sought to be questioned. Affidavits "suggested that
numerous persons working in nonpublic areas of the restaurant were possibly illegal
aliens, nd gave credible reasons for the affiants' suspicions as well." Id. at 1226.
475. International Molders', 799 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1986).
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of fourth amendment violations" by the INS was supported by the
record. 6 While acknowledging that law enforcement agencies are
entitled to the widest latitude in performing their duties, the court
stated that INS has "no discretion with which to violate constitu-
tional rights.'
As a threshold matter, the court noted that the district court had
found that a typical warrant authorized not only entry into and
search of premises but also seizures of persons "suspected of being
aliens.' 47  This finding was "amply supported by the record," but
the court did not have to address the issue because the "INS con-
cede[d] that the warrants could properly authorize only entry into
the workplace to question suspected aliens.' 4 9 Further, the Court
stated that:
To the extent the warrants authorize INS to seize employees, the Supreme
Court's holding in Ybarra v. Illinois, requires "probable cause particular-
ized with respect to that person." "This requirement cannot be undercut or
avoided by simply pointing to the fact that coincidentally there exists prob-
able cause to search or seize another or to search the premises where the
person may happen to be."480
In addressing the level of evidence required to obtain a Blackie's
warrant, the court commented that the district court did not require
the INS to identify all suspected illegal aliens by name to obtain an
entry warrant. Rather, it required INS through "the warrant and its
supporting affidavits," to provide information of sufficient specificity
to assure that finding such persons is "reasonably likely. '48 l The
court accepted Blackie's standard that "warrants and accompanying
affidavits [that] narrow down the field of potentially vulnerable per-
sons to those employees whom INS agents might reasonably believe
to be aliens" satisfies the requirements of the fourth amendment
even where the targeted persons are not identified by name.48 2
The court of appeals struck the district court's restriction against
questioning suspects absent probable cause to believe that the sus-
476. Id. at 551.
477. Id. at 551-52 (quoting LaDuke v. Nelson, 762 F.2d 1318, 1325 (9th Cir.
1985), amended on alternative grounds, 796 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1986)).
478. International Molders, 799 F.2d at 552 n.5.
479. Id.
480. Id. (quoting Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. at 85, 91) (emphasis in original).
481. International Molders, 799 F.2d at 553.
482. Id. (quoting Blackie's, 659 F.2d at 1226). See also International Molders',
799 F.2d at 553 n.6. Using this standard, the court struck the specificity requirements of
paragraphs two and three of the injunction issued by the district court for INS entry
warrants. The paragraphs provided, inter alia, that to question suspects there must be
probable cause that they are illegally in the country. See id. at 552 n.4.
pect is an undocumented alien.483 This is because non-detentive
questioning does not implicate the fourth amendment.484
As regards detentions and arrests the court stated that "[an ar-
rest requires probable cause to believe that the worker is an illegal
alien, [citation omitted] and a worker may not be detained absent
'reasonable suspicion of illegal alienage.' "485
The court went on to repeat the rule of Delgado that where a
worker merely refuses to answer but does not attempt to flee or
evade agents, any additional steps to restrict the worker's ability to
walk away must be supported by "some minimal level of objective
justification to validate the detention or seizure. ' 488 However, the
court agreed that the INS could not seek to "deliberately" provoke
flight to justify a detention. The court upheld the requirement that
the INS "must not arrive [at the work site] or conduct themselves in
a manner that would foreseeably provoke flight by workers, or that
would leave a reasonable person with the belief that he had no
choice but to consent to the raid. 487
The Court summarized the principles of Blackie's House of Beef
and stated that Blackie's authorized a hybrid standard of probable
cause applicable to INS enforcement that was less stringent than
required for criminal warrants.488 However, it was also stated that
Blackie's emphasized the need for "sufficient safeguards to assure
that nothing impermissible would be left to the discretion of the INS
agents. 489
VII. CONCLUSION
Minority group members-particularly people of color-are dis-
proportionately targeted by law enforcement for interrogation and
investigation where there is no reasonable suspicion that they have
committed a crime. Implicit in this is the notion that minorities are
more likely to commit crimes. Suspicionless racial targeting is not a
new phenomenon. Terry v. Ohio490 noted that there was a concern
that law enforcement officers, unbridled by articulable standards,
483. Id. at 553.
484. Id. (citing Delgado, 466 U.S. at 221). The court, however, added that "non-
detentive questioning is permitted based solely on a reasonable suspicion that the person
is an alien." Id. See also id. at 554. However, despite this language, Delgado made clear
that consensual encounters do not require even reasonable suspicion. Instead, as dis-
cussed above, reasonable suspicion is required for a forcible, temporary Terry-type
detention.
485. International Molders, 799 F.2d at 553 (citing Benitez-Mendez v. INS, 760
F.2d 907, 909 (9th Cir. 1983)).
486. Id. (quoting Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216-17).
487. International Molders, 799 F.2d at 554.
488. Id. at 552.
489. Id. (quoting Blackie's, 659 F.2d at 1226).
490. 392 U.S. 1, 14, 15 n.11 (1968).
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would single out and unduly harass minority group members, caus-
ing friction between the minority community and law enforcement.
This continues to be a real concern.
However, constitutional restrictions against arbitrary intrusions do
not apply in certain circumstances. As discussed above, the protec-
tions of the fourth amendment do not apply at the international bor-
der or at its functional equivalents. Thus, at the border, officials may
single out minority group members for intrusions not founded on any
suspicion. Also, the Court has ruled that at fixed checkpoints immi-
gration officers may impose a greater intrusion on Hispanic appear-
ing individuals than on others by referring them to secondary inspec-
tion for closer interrogation and inspection. This intrusion may be
based solely on racial appearance.
Further, the protections of the fourth amendment are not trig-
gered until and unless a seizure has occurred. In restating the tradi-
tional standard that a person is seized if a reasonable person would
not believe he was free to simply walk away with impunity, the
Court has devised a "reasonable person" who is alien to most of us.
This person, even though the target of an apparent criminal investi-
gation, is disposed to cooperate with law enforcement officers. This
reasonable person is so assured that he believes he can simply walk
away from a police encounter without harm or repercussions. He
knows his constitutional rights and is aware that he can end the en-
counter, at least in theory, by uttering words such as "I choose not to
cooperate with you, and any further detention is against my will."
The Court has adopted a test of a consensual encounter that makes
it extremely difficult to show that a reasonable person would not feel
free to walk away. The Supreme Court has expanded the concept of
a "consensual encounter" so that there is effectively a presumption
that an encounter is consensual. The dissent in INS v. Delgado as-
sailed the majority's ruling as reflecting a "studied air of unreality"
achieving its result by "a considerable feat of legerdemain."491 As a
California jurist stated:
In the real world this defendant could not possibly have felt himself free to
walk away when his identification was requested, and it is almost laughable
to think that the officers would have let him do so. Nevertheless, a solid
majority of the United States Supreme Court is of the view that ordinary
citizens and even undocumented aliens confronted by immigration officials
would be aware that they could merely saunter off when asked to identify
themselves and produce confirming documents. The same majority also be-
lieves law enforcement agents would allow them to do so, another highly
491. 466 U.S. 210, 226 (1984).
dubious proposition in my opinion.49 2
Because "consensual encounters" do not implicate the fourth
amendment, law enforcement officers are not barred from arbitrarily
targeting minorities for investigation and questioning. Because the
Court has expanded the concept of what constitutes a consensual en-
counter, minorities are subject to a broader range of unbridled intru-
sive and offensive conduct by law enforcement officers.
The author submits that it is an insult to be singled out for inquiry
or investigation on the basis of race, whether or not the encounter is
labeled consensual. Despite the theoretical musings of the Delgado
majority, in the real world most people who are approached by law
enforcement officers and asked for identification or questioned about
criminal conduct do not believe they are free to just walk away.
It is unclear whether the Court would adjust its reasonable person
construct if scientific tests were conducted to demonstrate that the
Court's assumptions are in error. For example, monitors could be
placed on buses on which drug task forces frequently board. Immedi-
ately after such a boarding, the monitors could interview those ap-
proached and ask whether they believed they were free to decline to
cooperate. Or, actors playing policemen could board a bus and ques-
tion unsuspecting passengers about criminal activity. The passengers
could then be questioned about their perceptions of the encounter.
It is further submitted that racial targeting for "consensual" en-
counters carries the danger that the faith minorities have in even-
handed law enforcement will be further eroded. This is ironic be-
cause race-based investigative stops and searches yield a small frac-
tion of persons involved in criminal activity.493 This means that
many innocent people are detained and questioned based on little
more than hunches and "unspeakable 494 assumptions about race
and crime. Where law enforcement officers are candid enough to ad-
mit that their decisions to detain are based largely on the person's
race, they run the risk of having the detention ruled illegal. 49 15 Thus,
law enforcement officers will claim that their decisions to approach
and detain are based on the inarticulable rather than the unspeak-
492. People v. Lopez, 260 Cal. Rptr. 641, 644 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (Crosby, J.,
concurring) (rev. den. by Cal. Sup. Ct. (1989)), cerl. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1122 (1990)
(citations omitted).
493. See, e.g., the dissent in United States v. McKines, 933 F.2d 1412, 1427 (8th
Cir. 1991) (Magill, dissenting). See also the dissent in United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2
484, 499 (2d Cir. 1991) (Pratt, dissenting) (pointing out that according to the officers'
own testimony they stopped 600 people in 1989, which resulted in only 10 arrests).
494. See Justice Marshall's dissent in Florida v. Bostick, III S. Ct. 2382 (1991)
(Marshall, J., dissenting), where he noted that officers who claim that their decisions to
approach and detain certain persons were guided not so much by "inarticulable" hunches
as by "unspeakable" notions of race. Id. at 2390 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
495. See United States v. Taylor, 917 F.2d 1402 (6th Cir. 1990).
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able. But, whatever the claimed basis is for the detention, race-based
stops in public areas are fairly obvious. Furthermore, just as the
plaintiff in Buffkins v. City of Omaha496 objected to being singled
out because she was Black, more minorities will begin to object to
such stops.
In an immigration context, the better rule is to suppress evidence
of alienage obtained as a result of seizures made solely on the basis
of minority appearance. Such stops are now illegal under the govern-
ment's own rules. Further, they offend a basic principle of this coun-
try-i.e., that persons will not be judged on race but on deeds.-
Once minorities learn of their right to refuse to cooperate with law
enforcement, greater numbers will just say no to requests for police
cooperation. Thus, in addition to yielding scant results, racial target-
ing runs the real risk of heightening estrangement and hostility be-
tween law enforcement and minority communities, a warning
sounded in Terry which has not yet been heeded by many law en-
forcement agencies.
496. 922 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1990).
497. In this connection, the REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE
Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, submitted to Mayor Tom Bradley on July 9, 1991,
states:
Routine stops of young African-American and Latino males, seemingly without
"probable cause" or "reasonable suspicion," may be part and parcel of the
LAPD's aggressive style of policing. The practice, however, breeds resentment
and hostility among those who are its targets. Moreover, the practice has.cre-
ated a feeling among many in Los Angeles' minority communities that certain
parts of the City are closed to them or that being detained by the police is the
price of traveling in those areas.
Id. at p. 77.

